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ABSTRACT 
 
Issuing soft law instruments on the enforcement of abuse of a dominant position in 
different competition law systems has never been a global trend in the last decade than 
before. In the European Union (EU), the European Commission published the “Guidance 
on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings” (the Guidance) in February 
2009 as yet the final formal stage during the “modernisation” of Art.102 TFEU. As an 
official candidate for EU membership, Turkey is unlikely to distance itself from the 
developments in the EU. Within this context, “Guidelines on the Assessment of Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings” (the Guidelines on Art.6) were 
published on April 7, 2014. Evident from their structure and substantive content, the 
Guidelines on Art.6 are closely modelled on the Guidance. Although the transposition of 
the Guidance into Turkish competition law seems prima facie desirable in terms of the 
harmonisation of Turkey’s domestic competition law with the EU acquis, the question as 
to whether the Guidelines on Art.6 have suited to Turkey’s own needs gains significance. 
Despite being the first secondary legislation on Art.6 of the Act on the Protection of 
Competition 1994 in Turkey, a lack of much-needed guidance on the problematic areas in 
the enforcement of Art.6 may well result in the Guidelines on Art.6 being a missed 
opportunity to establish a coherent policy on Art.6. This thesis explores whether there is a 
need for adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkish competition law, examines 
whether the Guidance can or should be used as a model, and finally gives reflections on 
how the legal regime and content of these Guidelines can be best tailored to the 
enforcement of Art.6 in Turkey. 
 
  
IX 
 
TABLE OF CASES (alphabetically) 
 
European Commission Decisions 
Case COMP/B2/39.246 Boehringer [2011] (case closure) 
Case AT.39727 CEZ [2013] OJ C251/4 
Case COMP/A.39.116/B2 Coca-Cola [2005] OJ L253/21 
Case COMP/B-2/38.381 De Beers [2006] OJ L205/24 
Case COMP/AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn I [2014] OJ C86/4 
Case COMP/AT.39731 Deutsche Bahn II [2014] OJ C86/4 
Case AT.39915 Deutsche Bahn III [2013] (case closure) 
Case COMP/C-1/37.451, 37.578, 37.579 Deutsche Telekom AG [2003] OJ L263/9 
Case COMP/B-1/37.966 Distrigaz [2008] OJ C9/8 
Case COMP/39.317 E.ON Gas [2010] OJ C278/9 
Case COMP/39.869 easyJet/Schiphol [2013] (rejection of complaint) 
Case IV/30.698 ECS/AKZO [1985] OJ L374/1 
Case COMP/C-3/39.391 EFIM [2009] (rejection of complaint) 
Case COMP/39.315 ENI [2010] OJ C352/8 
Case COMP/39.316 Gaz de France [2010] OJ C57/13 
Case COMP/39.389 German Electricity Balancing Market [2009] OJ C36/8 
Case COMP/39.388 German Electricity Wholesale Market [2009] OJ C36/8 
Case COMP/39.692 IBM Maintenance Services [2012] OJ C18/6 
Case COMP/C-3/37.990 Intel [2009] OJ C227/07 
Case IV/34.621, 35.059/F-3 Irish Sugar plc [1997] OJ L258/1 
Case COMP/39.386 Long-term Contracts France [2010] OJ C133/5 
Case COMP/39387 Long-term Contracts in Belgium [2011] (case closure) 
X 
 
Case AT.39840 MathWorks [2014] (case closure) 
Case COMP/39.530 Microsoft (Tying) [2010] OJ C36/7 
Case AT.39985 Motorola – Enforcement of GPRS SEPs [2014] OJ C344/6 
Case COMP/38.636 Rambus [2010] OJ C30/17 
Case AT.39654 Reuters Instrument Codes [2013] OJ C326/4 
Case AT.39230 Rio Tinto Alcan [2013] OJ C89/5 
Case AT.39984 Romanian Power Exchange / OPCOM [2014] OJ C314/7 
Case COMP/39.402 RWE Gas Foreclosure [2009] OJ C133/10 
Case COMP/39.886 Ryanair/DAA-Aer Lingus [2013] (rejection of complaint) 
Case AT.39939 Samsung – Enforcement of UMTS SEPs [2014] OJ C350/8 
Case COMP/39.707 Si.mobil/Mobitel [2011] (rejection of complaint) 
Case COMP/39.592 Standard & Poor’s [2012] OJ C31/8 
Case COMP/39.981 Stanleybet Group 2/OPAP [2013] (rejection of complaint) 
Case AT.39958 SU/CEZ [2014] (rejection of complaint) 
Case COMP/39.351 Swedish Interconnectors [2010] OJ C142/28 
Case COMP/38.574 Synthon/GlaxoSmithKline [2012] (case closure) 
Case COMP/39.525 Telekomunikacja Polska [2011] OJ C324/7 
Case COMP/39.451 Velux [2009] (rejection of complaint) 
 
General Court Judgments 
Case T-321/05 AstraZeneca v Commission [2010] ECR II-2805 
Case T-191/98 Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v Commission [2003] ECR II-3275 
Case T-24/90 Automec Srl v Commission [1992] ECR II-2223 
Case T-65/89 BPB Industries Plc and British Gypsum v Commission [1993] ECR II-0389 
Case T-219/99 British Airways v Commission [2003] ECR II-5917 
XI 
 
Case T-220/00 Cheil Jedang Corp v Commission [2003] ECR II-2473 
Case T-301/04 Clearstream Banking AG v Commission [2009] ECR II-3155 
Case T-296/09 EFIM v Commission [2011] ECR II-0425 
Case T-340/03 France Télécom SA. v Commission [2007] ECR II-0107 
Case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission [1991] ECR II-1439 
Case T-286/09 Intel Corp v Commission [2014] ECR II-0000 
Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar plc v Commission [1999] ECR II-2969 
Case T-11/96 ITT/Promedia v Commission [1998] ECR II-2937 
Case T-23/99 LR AF 1998 A/S v Commission [2002] ECR II-1705 
Case T-203/01 Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v Commission [2003] 
ECR II-4071 
Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp. v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601 
Case T-57/01 Solvay SA v Commission [2009] ECR II-4621 
Case T-416/13 Stanleybet Malta and Stanley International Betting v Commission [2014] 
ECR II-0000 
Case T-336/07 Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission [2012] ECR I-0000 
Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International SA v Commission [1994] ECR II-0755 
Case T-155/06 Tomra Systems ASA v Commission [2010] ECR II-0297 
Case T-65/98 Van den Bergh Foods Ltd v Commission [2003] ECR II-4653 
Case T-214/95 Vlaamse Gewest v Commission [1998] ECR II-717 
Joined Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98 Atlantic Container Line AB and Others v 
Commission [2003] ECR II-3275 
Joined Cases T-24/26 and 28/93 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA and Others v 
Commission (Cewal) [1996] ECR II-1201 
 
Court of Justice Judgments 
Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359 
XII 
 
Case C-457/10 AstraZeneca v Commission [2012] ECR I-0000 
Case 77/77 Benzine en Petroleum Handelsmaatschappij BV and others v Commission 
[1978] ECR 1513 
Case C-95/04 British Airways v Commission [2007] ECR I-2331 
Case C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa [2010] ECR I-5949 
Case C-280/08 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555 
Case C-189/02 P Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425 
Case 6-72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission 
[1973] ECR 215 
Case C-202/07 France Télécom v Commission [2009] ECR I-2369 
Case C-501/06 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2009] ECR I-9291 
Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission [1979] ECR 461 
Case C-418/01 IMS Health v NDC Health [2004] ECR I-5039 
Case C-91/01 Italy v Commission [2004] ECR I-4355 
Case C-167/04 JCB Service v Commission [2006] ECR I-8935 
Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-0527 
Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 
3461 
Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791 
Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECR I-0000 
Case C-152/88 Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477 
Case C-109/10 P Solvay SA v Commission [2011] ECR I-10329 
Case C-409/00 Spain v Commission [2003] ECR I-1487 
Case C-234/89 Stergios Delimitis v Henninger Bräu [1991] ECR I-935 
Case C-295/12 P Telefónica SA and Telefónica de España SAU v European Commission 
[2014] ECR I-0000 
Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951 
XIII 
 
Case C-549/10 P Tomra Systems and Others v Commission [2012] ECR I-0000 
Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission [1978] ECR 207 
Case 265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens and Van Dijk Food Products v Commission [1987] 
ECR 1155 
Joined Cases C-75/05 and C-80/05 Germany and others v Kronofrance SA [2008] ECR I-
6619 
Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P RTE and ITP v Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR 
I-0743 
 
Advocate Generals Opinions 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-95/04 British Airways v Commission 
[2007] ECR I-2331 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-441/07 P Commission v Alrosa [2010] 
ECR I-5949 
Opinion of Advocate General Mazák in C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige 
AB [2011] ECR I-0527 
Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint [1998] 
ECR I-7791 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV v Raad van 
bestuur van de Nederlandse Mededingingsautoriteit [2009] ECR I-4529 
 
Turkish Competition Authority Decisions 
Akkaya Buz, Decision no: 10-52/993-357, dated: 05/08/2010 
Amadeus, Decision no: 08-01/6-5, dated: 03/01/2008 
Anadolu Cam/Marmara Cam, Decision no: 09-35/877-206, dated: 06/08/2009 
Anadolu Cam/Solmaz Mercan, Decision no: 09-39/949-236, dated: 26/08/2009 
Aurubis Bulgaria/Dostel Alüminyum, Decision no: 13-15/224-109, dated: 19/03/2013 
Bausch & Lomb, Decision no: 07-30/302-115, dated: 05/04/2007 
XIV 
 
BELKO, Decision no: 01-17/150-39, dated: 06/04/2001 
Cevahir AVM, Decision no: 06-44/540-142, dated: 15/06/2006 
Cine5/Digiturk, Decision no: 12-24/710-198, dated: 03/05/2012 
CNR/NTSR, Decision no: 07-74/896-333, dated: 19/09/2007 
Coca Cola, Decision no: 04-07/75-18, dated: 23/01/2004 
Coca Cola Damla Su, Decision no: 14-08/159-69, dated: 26/02/2014 
Coca Cola/TAB Gıda, Decision no: 05-36/453-106, dated: 26/05/2005 
ÇEAŞ, Decision no: 07-13/101-30, dated: 08/02/2007 
Doğan Yayın Holding, Decision no: 11-18/341-103, dated: 30/03/2011 
Domino’s Pizza, Decision no: 10-69/1458-557, dated: 04/11/2010 
Fida Film Reklam, Decision no: 09-29/632-148, dated: 18/06/2009 
Frito Lay, Decision no: 06-24/304-71, dated: 06/04/2006 
Garanti Bankası, Decision no: 09-34/787-192, dated: 05/08/2009 
Gillette, Decision no: 08-25/261-88, dated: 20/03/2008 
Hilal Ekmek Fabrikası, Decision no: 09-48/1193-301, dated 21/10/2009 
İZOCAM, Decision no: 10-14/175-66, dated: 08/02/2010 
Kale Kilit, Decision no: 12-62/1633-598, dated: 06/12/2012 
Karbogaz, Decision no: 02-49/634-257, dated: 23/08/2002 
Mey İçki, Decision no: 11-57/1476-532, dated: 17/11/2011 
Microsoft/Gelecek Bilişim, Decision no: 08-35/465-165, dated: 27/05/2008 
Neveksan Ekmek Fabrikası, Decision no: 05-49/702-190, dated: 28/07/2005 
Nuh Çimento, Decision no: 10-63/1317-494, dated: 07/10/2010 
Roaming, Decision no: 03-40/432-186, dated: 09/06/2003 
Reckitt Benckiser/Akyüz Gıda, Decision no: 10-63/1320-496, dated: 07/10/2010 
Sanofi Aventis, Decision no: 09-16/374-88, dated: 20/04/2009 
XV 
 
Selena Gıda, Decision no: 05-63/902-244, dated: 29/09/2005 
Sigorta Acenteliği Yapan Bankalar, Decision no: 09-34/786-191, dated: 05/08/2009 
Solmaz Mercan, Decision no: 07-47/506-181, dated: 05/06/2007 
Tarsus Belediyesi, Decision no: 10-52/992-356, dated: 05/08/2010 
TFF/Digiturk, Decision no: 06-61/822-237, dated: 07/09/2006 
Toprak Mahsülleri Ofisi, Decision no: 08-50/720-280, dated: 14/08/2008 
TTNET/Avea, Decision no: 08-57/912-363, dated: 09/10/2008 
TTNET/Superonline, Decision no: 13-71/992-423, dated: 19/12/2013 
TTNET Yaz Fırtınası, Decision no: 08-65/1055-411, dated: 19/11/2008 
Turkcell/Avea/Vodafone, Decision no: 11-34/742-230, dated: 06/06/2011 
Turkcell BizBize Kamu, Decision no: 10-21/271-100, dated: 04/03/2010 
Turkcell GSM Kampanyaları, Decision no: 09-60/1490-379, dated: 23/12/2009 
Turkish Airlines/Pegasus, Decision no: 11-65/1692-599, dated: 30/12/2011 
TÜPRAŞ, Decision no: 14-03/60-24, dated: 17/01/2014 
Türk Telekom/Grid Telekom, Decision no: 09-47/1160-294, dated: 14/10/2009 
Türk Telekom/TİSSAD, Decision no: 06-02/47-8, dated: 05/01/2006 
Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları, Decision no: 13-46/589-259, dated: 18/07/2013 
TÜVTÜRK, Decision no: 09-58/1405-367, dated: 09/12/2009 
UN RO-RO, Decision no: 12-47/1413-474, dated: 01/10/2012 
Zincir Süpermarketler, Decision no: 09-35/891-214, dated: 06/08/2009 
 
Ankara Administrative Court Judgments 
Ankara Administrative Court, 11
th
 Chamber, Decision no: E.2012/1727, K.2013/1083, 
dated: 11/07/2013 
 
XVI 
 
The Council of State Judgments 
The Council of State, 13
th
 Chamber, Decision no: E.2006/2308, K.2008/3417, dated: 
31/03/2008 
The Council of State, 13
th
 Chamber, Decision no: E.2007/13574, K.2011/486, dated: 
07/02/2011 
The Council of State, 13
th
 Chamber, Decision no: E.2008/8249, K.2011/1525, dated: 
12/04/2011 
 
US Court of Appeals Judgments 
Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v Mutual Hospital Insurance, Inc., 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 
1986) 
Brunswick Corp. v Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1984) 
Mr. Furniture Warehouse, Inc. v Barclays American/Commercial Inc., 919 F.2d 1517 (11
th
 
Cir. 1990) 
Town of Concord v Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17 (1
st
 Cir. 1990) 
United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 346 (D.C. Cir. 2001) 
 
US Supreme Court Judgments 
Aspen Skiing Co. v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 US 585 (1985) 
Brooke Group Ltd v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 509 US 209 (1993) 
Brown Shoe Co. v United States, 370 US 294 (1962) 
  
XVII 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AG   Advocate General 
CJEU   Court of Justice of the European Union 
DG Comp   Directorate-General for Competition 
EAGCP  Economic Advisory Group on Competition Policy 
EC   European Community 
EEC   European Economic Community 
EU   European Union 
EUMR   European Union Merger Regulation 
GCEU   The General Court of the European Union 
ICN   International Competition Network 
MS   Member State of the European Union 
NC   National Court 
NCA    National Competition Authority 
OECD   Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OJ   Official Journal of the EU 
TCA   The Turkish Competition Authority 
TEU   The Treaty on European Union 
TFEU   The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UK   United Kingdom 
US   United States of America 
 
  
1 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE THESIS 
I. Background 
Issuing soft law instruments on the enforcement of the legal concept of prohibition of 
“abuse of a dominant position” in different competition law systems has never been a 
global trend in the last decade than before. Notwithstanding the difference in terminology, 
be it “abuse of a dominant position” in European Union (EU) and Turkish competition 
laws,
1
 “monopolization” and “attempts to monopolize” in United States (US) antitrust law,2 
“misuse of market power” in Australian competition law3 and “taking advantage of market 
power” in New Zealand competition law;4 a general discussion about the appropriate 
treatment of abuse of a dominant position has been taking place within the last few years, 
especially in Europe, in the US and even at the level of international organisations such as 
the International Competition Network (ICN) and the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).
5
 As an outcome of these world-wide discussions, a 
significant number of formal and informal materials have been released for public 
consultation and eventually published. 
The first piece of general and non-sector-specific soft law material, “Enforcement 
Guidelines on the Abuse of Dominance Provisions (Sections 78 and 79 of the Competition 
Act)”, was published in July 2001 by the Competition Bureau of Canada.6 In December 
2004, the Office of Fair Trading (now the Competition and Markets Authority) in the 
United Kingdom (UK) published two set of Guidelines as “Abuse of a Dominant Position 
(OFT402)” and “Assessment of Market Power (OFT425)” explaining how it will operate its 
                                                          
1
 Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (Art.102) in EU competition 
law and Article 6 of the Act on the Protection of Competition 1994 (Art.6) in Turkish competition law both 
render it illegal abuse of a dominant position. 
2
 Section 2 of the Sherman Act 1890. 
3
 Section 46 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010. 
4
 Section 36 of the Commerce Act 1986. 
5
 The ICN published a vast amount of reports on the appropriate treatment of specific types of unilateral 
conduct in the last decade and is currently preparing a complete “Unilateral Conduct Workbook”. For a 
complete list of those reports, see <http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/> [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
See also OECD (2005) Competition on the Merits, OECD Policy Roundtables, DAF/COMP(2005)27, 
<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf> [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
6
 A newer and updated version of these Guidelines went into force in September 2012 replacing its 
predecessor. Available at <http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/cb-abuse-of-
dominance-provisions-e.pdf/$FILE/cb-abuse-of-dominance-provisions-e.pdf> [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
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powers under the relevant competition law legislation in assessing the conduct of dominant 
undertakings.
7
 In September 2008, the US Department of Justice issued “Competition and 
Monopoly: Single-firm Conduct under Section 2 of the Sherman Act” reflecting its 
enforcement policy in respect of monopolization cases.
8
 In October 2009, the Japan Fair 
Trade Commission published “the Guidelines for Exclusionary Private Monopolization 
under the Antimonopoly Act” describing its investigation policies in cases concerning 
“exclusionary private monopolization”.9 
The last decade also witnessed formal documents on the prohibition of abuse of a 
dominant position at the EU level as well. “Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement 
Priorities in Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by 
Dominant Undertakings” (the Guidance) was announced in December 2008 and published 
in the Official Journal of the EU (OJ) by the European Commission (the Commission) in 
February 2009.
10
 Unlike the abovementioned Guidelines in other competition law systems, 
in the EU the Guidance has a relatively long history and a unique motive.
11
 In fact, the 
Guidance does not exist in vacuum; so far it is the final stage in the “modernisation” of 
Art.102. In other words, the Commission’s years of efforts to modernise the way it enforces 
Art.102 culminated into the publication of the Guidance. It follows that rather than standing 
out as a “stand-alone” document, the Guidance situates within the broader framework of the 
modernisation of Art.102. 
Following the modernisation of Art.101 TFEU and merger control as the two other 
pillars of EU competition law, the modernisation of Art.102 was initiated by the 
Commission in the summer of 2003. The review of Art.102 started within the Directorate-
General for Competition (DG Comp) and after some internal debate, members of the 
                                                          
7
 Available respectively at <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/ca98_guidelines/oft402.pdf> 
and <http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/ca98_guidelines/oft415.pdf> [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
8
 Available at <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf> [accessed 30/09/2014]. However, these 
Guidelines were withdrawn less than a year later in May 2009. See “Justice Department Withdraws Report on 
Antitrust Monopoly Law”, available at <http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2009/245710.htm> 
[accessed 30/09/2014].  
9
 Available at 
<http://www.jftc.go.jp/en/legislation_gls/imonopoly_guidelines.files/guidelines_exclusionary.pdf> [accessed 
30/09/2014]. 
10
 Communication from the Commission: Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings [2009] OJ C45/7. 
11
 See Chapter 1. 
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competition authorities of the Member States (MS) were invited to join the discussions. 
The first piece of informal work which was shared with public in July 2005 was the report 
entitled “An economic approach to Article 82” prepared by the Economic Advisory Group 
on Competition Policy (the EAGCP Report) within the Commission.
12
 The modernisation 
efforts provided its first substantive product with the release of the “Discussion Paper on 
the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses” (the Discussion Paper) 
in December 2005.
13
 The Discussion Paper sets out ‘principles for the Commission’s 
application’ of Art.102 and presents ‘the analytical framework that could be used by the 
Commission’.14 
After years of extensive review and consultation process among leading academics, 
legal scholars, practitioners, and representatives of the business community; the 
Commission finally published the Guidance in December 2008 as the next (and yet the final 
formal) stage in the modernisation of Art.102. The Guidance sets out ‘the enforcement 
priorities that will guide the Commission’s action’ in applying Art.102. It is intended ‘to 
provide greater clarity and predictability as regards the general framework of analysis 
which the Commission employs’ and ‘to help undertakings better assess whether certain 
behaviour is likely to result in intervention by the Commission’ under Art.102.15 It is 
noteworthy that after almost fifty years of enforcement, the Commission has issued a 
formal document articulating some general and non-sector-specific statements on Art.102 
for the first time.
16
 The Guidance is primarily related to the Commission’s own 
enforcement and thus not legally binding on the MSs. 
                                                          
12
 Report by the EAGCP: An economic approach to Article 82, July 2005, available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/competition/economist/eagcp_july_21_05.pdf> [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
13
 Discussion Paper on the Application of Article 82 of the Treaty to Exclusionary Abuses, Brussels 
December 2005, available at <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf> [accessed 
30/09/2014]. 
14
 ibid at paras.1-2. 
15
 Guidance, para.2. 
16
 It should be noted that despite having minor importance, some guidance on the enforcement of Art.102 in 
the form of soft law was available even before the modernisation. See Notice from the Commission on the 
application of the competition rules to the postal sector and on the assessment of certain State measures 
relating to postal services [1998] OJ C39/2, Notice on the application of the competition rules to access 
agreements in the telecommunications sector [1998] OJ C265/02 and Guidelines on the effect on trade 
concept contained in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2004] OJ C101/81. 
4 
 
While Turkey is not a member of the EU yet, as an official candidate for EU 
membership, the country is unlikely to distance itself from the developments in the EU, in 
this respect EU competition law. In the accession process, Turkey has long aligned its 
competition legislation with the EU acquis with the passage of the Act on the Protection of 
Competition 1994 (the Act).
17
 Being a milestone in Turkish competition law, the Act is the 
first piece of legislation governing competition law in Turkey. The provisions of this Act 
closely mirror the articles related to “rules of competition” in the TFEU18 and the EUMR. 
Within this context, Art.6 of the Act governs the prohibition of abuse of a dominant 
position and is the national equivalent of Art.102. Art.6 follows a similar pattern with 
Art.102 in that both Articles first lay down a general prohibition of abuse of a dominant 
position and then enumerate some non-exhaustive examples through their subparagraphs. 
Pursuant to Art.6: 
“Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position, acting individually or by means of 
agreements with others or collective practices, in a market for goods or services within the whole territory 
of the country or in a substantial part of it shall be unlawful and prohibited. 
Abusive practices are, in particular, as follows: 
(a) directly or indirectly preventing the entry of a potential undertaking to the market, or practices 
which aim to impede the activities of competitors in the market; 
(b) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent or to the same rights and obligations, thereby making 
a direct or indirect discrimination amongst equivalent trading parties; 
(c) making the conclusion of contracts subject to the acceptance of other goods or services or to the 
acceptance of restrictions concerning resale conditions, such as the display of other goods or services or 
the maintenance of a minimum resale price, by intermediary purchasers; 
(d) practices which aim to distort competition in a market for goods or services by making use of the 
financial, technological and commercial advantages obtained through a dominant position in another 
market; 
(e) limiting production, marketing or technical development to the prejudice of consumers.” 
Although the concept of abuse of a dominant position lies at the heart of both Art.6 
and Art.102, a definition for this concept is not provided in any of these Articles. Apart 
from some non-exhaustive examples in their subparagraphs, the exact scope of these 
Articles is not fully clear. For instance neither of them articulates the objective(s) pursued 
by such prohibition, in particular who or what is harmed from an abuse or whose benefits 
are protected. Little understanding can thus be gleaned from the texts of Art.6 and Art.102. 
This necessitates the issue of some guidance and guiding principles as to how the 
                                                          
17
 Published in Official Gazette No: 22140, dated: 13/12/1994. An unofficial English translation is available at 
<http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/en-US/Pages/Act-No-4054>  [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
18
 Title VII, Chapter 1, Section 1 of the TFEU contains the “rules on competition” throughout Arts.101-109. 
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prohibition laid down in these Articles would be enforced. In most cases, such guidance is 
made available through non-binding soft law instruments, usually in the form of 
“Guidelines”. The value of Guidelines, especially for undertakings who wish to observe the 
law, can be appreciated since the language of competition law in most jurisdictions is 
general and the provisions of the law are usually not sufficiently detailed to offer 
appropriate guidance.
19
 It has been argued that Guidelines have become ‘a far more 
significant part of the antitrust legal development process than their technical status as mere 
nonbinding guides for agency prosecutorial discretion would suggest’.20 
When this thesis first started, Turkey had no secondary legislation on Art.6. A 
commission was set up within the Turkish Competition Authority (the TCA) in the second 
half of 2012 with the aim of preparing some form of guidance on Art.6. The commission 
began by reviewing the state of case law on Art.6 (which predominantly includes the 
decisions of the TCA since the driving force for competition law in Turkey is the TCA 
rather than the Turkish Appellate Courts), the existing literature in Turkish competition law 
and the developments in other competition law systems in the area of abuse of a dominant 
position. Being the first substantive product of the commission, “the draft Guidelines on the 
Assessment of Conduct by Dominant Undertakings” were shared with the internal staff of 
the TCA and received feedback. Taking all the feedback into account, the second draft was 
presented to the members of the Board of the TCA. The third draft was finally shared with 
public: On July 18, 2013, the TCA released for public consultation “the draft Guidelines on 
the Assessment of Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings”.21 All 
interested parties were invited to make their comments until September 8, 2013. Finally, the 
TCA published in its website the “Guidelines on the Assessment of Abusive Exclusionary 
                                                          
19
 Dabbah, M. M. (2010) International and Comparative Competition Law, CUP, Great Britain, p.69. 
20
 Greene, H. (2006) ‘Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse’, 
William and Mary Law Review, 48(3), p.777. 
21
 Available in Turkish at <http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Guncel/Hkim-Durumdaki-Tesebbuslerin-
Dislayici-Kotuye-Kullanma-Niteligindeki-Davranislarinin-Degerlendirilmesine-Iliskin-Kilavuz-Taslagi-
kamuoyu-gorusune-acildi> [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
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Conduct by Dominant Undertakings” (the Guidelines on Art.6) on April 7, 2014, which 
went into force on the date of publication.
22
 
It can be observed that the TCA has opted for the adoption of the Guidance rather 
than drafting its own Guidelines which could have reflected its own experience with Art.6. 
Even a cursory analysis of the Guidelines on Art.6 shows that they mirror the Guidance in 
terms of both structure and substantive content.
23
 Theoretically, it can be assumed that the 
concerns expressed and problems experienced in the enforcement of Art.102 before the 
modernisation
24
 might be the same for Art.6 as Art.6 borrowed extensively from Art.102. 
On the other hand, the application of Art.6 may have evolved in a different direction than 
that of Art.102 or may merely be at a different stage of evolution. The reasons behind the 
modernisation of Art.102 may not be an issue in Turkey and the motivations for Turkey 
may be far more different. After all; economic development, and political and social 
circumstances of Turkey may differ from the EU, especially in an area as complex as abuse 
of a dominant position. In contrast to the TCA, it is almost inevitable that the Commission 
is subject to a great deal of pressure to remove policy-making inconsistencies as well as to 
clarify legal principles and the economic basis of its decisions, due to the continent-wide 
territorial scope of its jurisdiction and the economic and legal relevance of the cases 
brought before it.
25
 
Alternatively there may be some aspects in Turkish practice which may already 
overlap with, or may even be more advanced than, the Commission’s new reading of 
Art.102 with the Guidance, so that there may not be a need for adopting Guidelines in the 
first place. As discussed above, in the absence of a definition which successfully embraces 
all abusive behaviour that fall into the scope of the prohibition laid down in Art.6, it is 
desirable to identify some guiding principles that would inform the content of the Article. 
In this respect, as non-binding soft law instruments, Guidelines are good means of 
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 Available in Turkish at <http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Guncel/Hakim-Durumdaki-Tesebbuslerin-
Dislayici-Kotuye-Kullanma-Niteligindeki-Davranislarinin-Degerlendirilmesine-Iliskin-Kilavuz-Yayimlandi> 
[accessed 30/09/2014]. See Annex II for an unofficial English translation of the Guidelines on Art.6. 
23
 See Chapter 5. 
24
 See Chapter 2. 
25
 Blanco, L. O. and Colomo, P. I. (2011) “Evolving Priorities and Rising Standards: Spanish Law on Abuse 
of Market Power in the Light of the 2008 Guidance Paper on Article 82 EC”, in Pace L. F. (ed.), European 
Competition Law: The Impact of the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102, Edward Elgar Publishing, Great 
Britain, p.99. 
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providing guidance on areas which are in need of clarification. However, competition 
authorities must think twice before issuing any set of Guidelines. This is because 
Guidelines lead to a limited discretion for competition authorities and create legitimate 
expectations for undertakings as their addressees.
26
 Departures from Guidelines, where not 
justified with convincing evidence, may make the enforcement less predictable and lead to 
an unnecessary confusion in the business world. Competition authorities’ failure to comply 
with their own Guidelines may result in an even worse situation in that undertakings may 
face with a dilemma about abiding by the Guidelines or obeying the statutory or case law 
instead. 
Furthermore, the accession of Turkey to the EU may have a bearing on the 
transposition of the Guidance into Turkish competition law. The duty of Turkey to 
harmonise its domestic law with the EU acquis, which includes inter alia complying with 
EU block exemption Regulations, Frameworks and Guidelines, may obligate Turkey to 
adapt the Guidance as Guidelines in relation to Art.6 and align its enforcement of Art.6 
with the Commission’s new reading of Art.102. On the other hand, Turkey may not be 
under an obligation to adapt the Guidance, considering the fact that the Guidance is not a 
statement of law and only sets out some principles of the administrative practice of the 
Commission.
27
 In any case, the transposition of the Guidance does not necessarily prevent 
the needs of Turkey being included into the scope of Guidelines in relation to Art.6. In the 
event that they do not offer adequate guidance on the problematic areas in the enforcement 
of Art.6, Guidelines in relation to Art.6 may well be a missed opportunity to establish a 
coherent policy on abuse of a dominant position in Turkey. All in all, adoption of 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6 requires an inquisitive approach, one that considers all of 
those aspects and takes no argument for granted. A comprehensive research in this area is 
therefore highly relevant and needed. 
II. Research Approach, Research Questions and Limitations 
It is against this background that this thesis thoroughly explores whether there is a need for 
adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkish competition law, examines whether the 
                                                          
26
 See Chapter 4. 
27
 See Chapter 3. 
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Commission’s Guidance as the main outcome of the modernisation of Art.102 in EU 
competition law can be or, considering the duty of Turkey to harmonise its domestic 
competition law with the EU acquis under the accession regime, should be used as a model 
or a benchmark, and finally gives reflections on how the legal regime and substantive 
content of Guidelines in relation to Art.6 can be best tailored to the enforcement of Art.6 by 
the TCA and the Turkish Appellate Courts. 
It follows that the thesis provides answers to the following two main research 
questions: 
 Is there a need for adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkish competition 
law? If the answer is in the affirmative, can or should the Guidance be used as a 
model? 
 In the event that the Guidance does not suit to the needs of Turkey, how can such 
Guidelines be best tailored to reflect the country’s experience with Art.6? 
A comparative approach into the research subject is employed in this thesis which 
aims to make comparisons between the EU experience with the Guidance at the Union level 
and the Turkish experience at the domestic level with the prohibition of abuse of a 
dominant position. The thesis draws on the EU experience by using it as background and 
context against which it measures Turkish experience and derives significant conclusions. 
The reason for the choice of this approach is the “close links” between Turkey and the EU 
in that Turkey is an official candidate country for EU membership, and developments in the 
EU acquis are unlikely to have no bearing on the current state of statutory law and case law 
in Turkey. Compared to the American experience or the experience of any other country 
with Guidelines or other soft law instruments in this area of competition law, the EU 
experience is directly relevant for Turkey’s national law and has therefore a strong 
influence on the direction of both statutory law and case law in Turkey. 
The thesis takes the view that understanding the Guidance lies beneath 
understanding a priori the modernisation of Art.102. This includes as to why Art.102 was 
subject to a modernisation process in the first place, why the Commission felt the need (or 
was called upon) to modernise the way it had enforced Art.102, how that modernisation has 
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progressed over time, whether the process was straight-forward or the Commission faced 
any problem, what changes have occurred in the Commission’s approach towards the 
interpretation of abuse of a dominant position, what the Guidance has brought to the 
enforcement of Art.102 that could be regarded as “novel”, and how that enforcement has 
progressed after the Guidance. Because the Guidelines on Art.6 are modelled on the 
Guidance, a thorough discussion of the Guidance and the underlying modernisation is 
therefore deemed as essential for a better understanding of the Guidelines on Art.6. 
The thesis therefore examines the abovementioned main research questions by also 
exploring the following sub-questions: 
 Why was Art.102 subject to a modernisation process? How has the modernisation 
of Art.102 progressed? (Chapter 1) 
 What changes have occurred in the Commission’s approach towards the 
interpretation of abuse of a dominant position with the modernisation of Art.102? 
(Chapter 2) 
 What has the Guidance brought to the enforcement of Art.102? How has the 
enforcement of Art.102 moved forward since the publication of the Guidance in 
2009? (Chapter 3) 
 What are the likely benefits and costs of adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6? 
What is the impact of Turkey’s duty to harmonise with the EU acquis on the 
adoption of the Guidance as Guidelines in relation to Art.6? What are the opinions 
of the internal staff of the TCA, lawyers, judges and academics in Turkey on the 
adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6? (Chapter 4) 
 What have the Guidelines on Art.6 brought to the enforcement of Art.6 and to what 
extent, are they in harmony with the established case law? Are there any historical 
and/or current issues on Art.6 that should have been addressed in the Guidelines on 
Art.6? What will be the future of the Guidelines on Art.6? (Chapter 5) 
As for the research limitations, the thesis only deals with substantial competition 
law thinking on abuse of a dominant position, rather than procedure. There is no discussion 
of the modernisation of EU competition law with respect to reforms in the institutional 
functioning of the enforcement or of the decentralisation of powers between the 
10 
 
Commission and the MSs. This discussion is deemed as irrelevant since Turkey has not yet 
become part of the institutional structure of the EU and is not subject to the relevant 
regulatory framework yet. 
Furthermore, the thesis attaches more weight to the abuse element of both Art.102 
and Art.6 which stands out as the most controversial part of both of those Articles, in 
contrast to the jurisdictional element and the dominant position element. In this respect, the 
abuse element appears to be in more need of guidance. The other elements are discussed in 
a few parts of the thesis where specific references are made thereto.  
The thesis is up to date as September 30, 2014. 
III. Contribution to the Literature 
The contribution of the thesis to the existing research literature on Art.102 TFEU and its 
application in Turkey is two-fold: First, it contributes to the literature on EU competition 
law by shedding light on the enforcement of Art.102 in the post-Guidance period. This 
thesis is timely in that it enjoys the advantage of articulating what has actually happened 
after the official issue of the Guidance in early 2009, rather than to merely speculate on the 
future of the Guidance. It analyses the developments after the Guidance, such as the 
prohibition, commitment and rejection decisions of the Commission, as well as the 
judgments of the General Court (GCEU) and Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) (the EU 
Courts) with a view to deriving conclusions on how the enforcement of Art.102 has been 
shaped after 2009. It explores whether the Commission has stuck to the principles in the 
Guidance, whether the assessments of the Commission in its post-Guidance decisions are in 
line with its “enforcement priorities”, what types of abuses have been taken up by the 
Commission, how the allegations of abuse have appeared and finally how the EU Courts 
have reacted to the Commission’s new reading of Art.102. Much has been written in EU 
competition law literature on Art.102 and on the modernisation of Art.102, but little has 
been said in scholarly works with respect to the evaluation of the Commission’s practice in 
the post-Guidance period as a whole and its impact on the modernisation of Art.102. 
 Analyses of decisions and investigations in the post-Guidance period have often 
been confined to a particular case or a group of cases that are related to the same industry or 
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decided in the same year. There is a growing literature on some specific highlights of this 
period, especially on the Commission’s ongoing Google investigation, the implications of 
the Alrosa saga of the EU Courts for the use of commitments in Art.102 cases and the 
commitment decisions in the energy industry.
28
 However, the method of inquiry in this 
thesis is not confined to the analysis of one particular decision or a group of decisions. 
Instead, the thesis aims to explore the post-Guidance period from a broader perspective: It 
examines the Commission’s overall practice in this period, which includes Art.9 Regulation 
1/2003 commitment decisions, Art.7 Regulation 1/2003 prohibition decisions, and 
decisions on rejection of complaints and on case closures. No single study in the literature 
has made such a comprehensive analysis of the Commission’s enforcement practice in the 
post-Guidance period. At the end of the inquiry, the thesis observes that Art.9 commitments 
mark another, albeit informal, stage in the modernisation of Art.102, an original argument 
which has not been put forward in any of the scholarly works to date. It is true that Art.9 
commitments have attracted attention in the literature in recent years, but the thesis 
approaches commitments from a different perspective: It does not argue whether 
commitments are an “appropriate” tool of enforcement in Art.102 cases as most 
commentators have done in scholarly works. Instead, it regards Art.9 commitments as a 
stage, albeit not necessarily positive, in the modernisation of Art.102. It is this particular 
view that represents the original contribution. 
The main contribution of the thesis is, however, to Turkish competition law. In 
Turkish competition law and policy literature, this area is not properly researched and many 
questions are yet to be answered satisfactorily. So far only three scholarly works have 
voiced a need for adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6 from different perspectives. 
Demiröz and Tunçel analysed whether the judgments of the Turkish Appellate Courts could 
guide the TCA in preparing Guidelines in the area of Art.6.
29
 Dealing with cost benchmarks 
in pricing abuses, Özdemir argued that the TCA should make it clear by issuing Guidelines 
how it would assess pricing abuses and which cost concepts it would use in its 
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 See Chapter 3. 
29
 Demiröz, A. and Tunçel, Ç. (2011) Tek Taraflı Davranışların Değerlendirilmesine Yönelik Standart 
Arayışında Danıştay Kararlarının Yol Göstericiliği, Rekabet Hukuku ile İlgili Kurul ve Yargı Kararları 
Sempozyumu-II, BTHAE Publications, Ankara. 
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assessments.
30
 Finally, Madan found that Guidelines on the standards or tests that the TCA 
explicitly or implicitly uses in its decisions when identifying abuses would be beneficial.
31
 
In addition, no scholarly work on the analysis of the Guidelines on Art.6 of 2014 was 
published at the time of writing, with the exception of an article published by the author of 
this thesis.
32
 It follows that there is no comprehensive study on the Guidelines on Art.6 as a 
whole, and there is thus a gap in the literature. An analysis of this area will not be a 
theoretical pursuit of merely academic interest, but a matter of practical importance as it 
will deal with a legal instrument which is in force and expected to be applied to unilateral 
exclusionary conduct of dominant undertakings in Turkey. This area should be studied in 
that a good research in this area will ultimately increase predictability and legal certainty 
for businesses in the enforcement of Art.6 in Turkey by providing them a more 
comprehensive analysis of the Guidelines on Art.6 than their paragraphs would suggest, as 
well as by explaining them the gaps in these Guidelines. 
This thesis is the first thorough, comparative and original research on the Guidelines 
on Art.6 which significantly contributes to the literature by providing a deep, critical and 
coherent analysis of the Guidelines on Art.6 in the light of the national experience of 
Turkey with Art.6 while fully taking into account the EU competition law context. Before 
this thesis, no scholarly work has provided a similar critique of the Guidelines on Art.6. In 
essence, the thesis deals with a new legislation in Turkish competition law which further 
demonstrates its originality. In doing so, the thesis does not briefly analyse the Guidelines 
on Art.6 as a mere recent development, but instead provides the abovementioned critique of 
the Guidelines on Art.6 at a PhD level. In addition, this thesis is also the first, and so far the 
only, piece of empirical research in this area which is enhanced by first-hand qualitative 
data obtained as a result of a series of research interviews made with some selected 
members of the internal staff of the TCA, lawyers, judges and academics in Turkey (see 
below). Lastly, as discussed above, this thesis deals with a recent research topic across 
                                                          
30
 Özdemir, Ü. N. (2010) Fiyatlamaya İlişkin Tek Taraflı Davranışların Değerlendirilmesinde Kullanılan 
Maliyet Ölçütleri, The Turkish Competition Authority Expertise Theses Series No 96, Ankara. 
31
 Madan, Z. (2009) ABD ve AB Perspektifinden Dışlayıcı Uygulamaların Tespitine Yönelik Standart 
Tartışmaları, The Turkish Competition Authority Expertise Theses Series No 85, Ankara. 
32
 Özkan, A. F. (2014a) ‘Hakim Durumun Kötüye Kullanılması Kılavuzu'nun Kapsamlı Bir İncelemesi’, 
Rekabet Forumu, No 85, p.10-42. 
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different competition law systems in the world, therefore being a timely thesis also 
increases its capability of contributing to the literature. 
IV. Methodology 
In providing answers to the abovementioned main research questions, a legal approach has 
been adopted as the theoretical framework of the thesis. In other words, whether there is a 
need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkish competition law is not examined from an 
economic or a political perspective. This thesis primarily focuses on legal issues in 
answering the abovementioned main research questions and in this respect examines, for 
instance, whether the reasons that paved the way for the publication of the Guidance also 
exist in Turkish competition law or whether there are inconsistencies in the standards and 
tests used by the TCA which may justify the adoption of Guidelines for transparency and 
legal certainty. Analysis of the markets in Turkey is not provided in this thesis; therefore, 
questions that are deemed as unrelated to the theoretical framework of the thesis, for 
instance whether there are markets where significant market power is likely or whether 
there are sectors susceptible to abuse of a dominant position in Turkey so that they can be 
given more weight or priority in Guidelines, are not addressed. 
The thesis is essentially based on library-based (doctrinal) research. The main 
research method employed in this thesis is the examination and critical analysis of primary 
and secondary sources of law. In this respect, the thesis mainly explores the decisional 
practice of the Commission and the TCA, and the case law of the EU Courts and the 
Turkish Appellate Courts as primary sources of law. Scholarly works, legal journals, 
textbooks, case comments and so on are examined as secondary sources of law. The 
jurisdictional scope is limited to the EU and Turkish competition laws. It should be noted 
that there is a tendency in the literature to compare and contrast EU competition law with 
US antitrust law in the context of the modernisation of Art.102 usually in an attempt to 
show that the former lagged behind the latter on a given topic. This thesis also follows this 
trend by comparing, where necessary, the changes in the Commission’s approach to 
Art.102 after the modernisation with the situation in the US. 
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A complementary methodology is empirical research. The thesis takes the view that 
if there is a need for something in practice, this could be best determined by gathering 
information through direct interaction with the relevant people or institutions. To this end, 
the author of this thesis undertook research interviews with (i) the internal staff of the TCA, 
namely competition experts, senior competition experts and other high-ranked officials 
within the TCA, and the Commissioners who prepared the Guidelines on Art.6, (ii) the 
lawyers who specialise in competition law cases in Turkey, (iii) the judges within the 
special chamber for competition law cases within the Council of State
33
 and (iv) the 
academics who have their research interests in Art.6 or who have published widely in 
competition law in Turkey. Their practical experience, together with their theoretical 
knowledge, were deemed as insightful and helpful in answering the abovementioned main 
research questions. They assisted the theoretical framework of the thesis in complementing 
the written works with practical views from the perspective of the enforcer of Turkish 
competition law, the legal counsel of dominant undertakings, the judiciary and lastly the 
academia.
34
 
V. Thesis Structure 
The thesis is divided into five chapters in two parts. Being the first chapter of Part I, 
Chapter 1 begins by the discussion of the modernisation of Art.102 initiated by the 
Commission during the last decade. It provides answers to the sub-questions as to why 
Art.102 was subject to a modernisation process in the first place and how that 
modernisation has progressed. After a brief introduction to Art.102, this Chapter discusses 
the reasons that paved the way for the modernisation of Art.102, carefully analyses some 
illustrating examples from the case law of the EU Courts and finally explains the stages of 
the modernisation. Chapter 1 observes that there was a need for at least guidance, if not 
modernisation, on the enforcement of Art.102, because of the fact that the text of the 
                                                          
33
 In the Turkish legal system, decisions of the TCA are subject to judicial review and can be appealed to the 
appellate courts on both merits and law. Originally, the appellate court was the Council of State (Danıştay). In 
July 2012, the appellate court for the decisions of the TCA was changed to the Ankara Administrative Court. 
Decisions of the Ankara Administrative Court are further appealable to the Council of State. A special 
chamber (13
th
 Chamber) within the Council of State performs the judicial review of the decisions of the TCA, 
while there is no special chamber within the Ankara Administrative Court. 
34
 See Annex I for more information on the interviewee groups, a full list of interview questions, a summary 
of replies of the interviewees and the method used in the reporting and analysis of the interview data. 
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Article was silent on the meaning of abuse and on the objective(s) of the Article, the 
definition of abuse by the CJEU was unsatisfactory and provided no methodology for 
identifying its scope, distinguishing “competition on the merits” from abusive conduct was 
challenging and finally there was a lack of coherent analytical approach in the case law. 
Chapter 1 argues that mainly because of the old case law on Art.102 which has been 
criticised for being formalistic and lacking economic arguments or efficiency 
considerations, the Commission engaged in the modernisation of the way it enforces 
Art.102 with a view to bringing the Article into line with the modern economic thinking on 
unilateral conduct. 
Chapter 2 discusses the Commission’s new reading of Art.102 with the 
modernisation of Art.102. It deals with the sub-question as to what changes have occurred 
in the Commission’s approach towards the interpretation of abuse of a dominant position 
with the modernisation. Built upon the findings of Chapter 1, Chapter 2 furthers the 
discussion and examines the situation both before the modernisation and after the 
modernisation in an attempt to highlight the changes in the Commission’s substantial 
thinking. The Chapter observes that the modernisation involved a reorientation in the 
Commission’s reading of Art.102 with respect to a greater recognition of efficiency, 
effects-based assessments and proof of consumer harm in Art.102 cases. Chapter 2 argues 
that with the modernisation of Art.102, which has given a fresh impetus to the use of 
economic analysis in the assessment of unilateral conduct, the Commission has aimed to 
steer the enforcement of Art.102 from a heavy reliance on the special responsibility of 
dominant firms towards a greater recognition of efficiency, from an approach based on the 
form of conduct towards an approach that is concerned with the effects of conduct, and 
lastly from the presence of harm to competitors to the analysis of consumer harm in Art.102 
cases. 
Chapter 3 is on the substantial analysis of the Guidance and the evaluation of the 
post-Guidance period. It is concerned with the sub-questions as to what the Guidance has 
brought to the enforcement of Art.102 and how that enforcement has evolved since the 
issue of the Guidance. This Chapter examines the purpose and legal regime of the 
Guidance, commentators’ criticisms that have been levelled against the Guidance and the 
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contributions of the Guidance to the enforcement of Art.102, as well as how that 
enforcement has been shaped in the post-Guidance period after 2009. It draws attention to 
the fact that the Guidance is not “Guidelines” from a legal point of view and determines 
that the Guidance has caused a great deal of controversy arising from its title to its 
substantive content among commentators. Chapter 3 observes that anti-competitive 
foreclosure, the “as efficient competitor” test, efficiency defence and detailed assessments 
on specific forms of abusive exclusionary conduct stand out as the most novel parts and 
contributions of the Guidance to the enforcement of Art.102. Chapter 3 argues that Art.9 
Regulation 1/2003 commitments mark another, albeit informal, stage in the modernisation 
of Art.102, as the Commission’s increasing use of such commitments has outstripped many 
practical discussions that were expected to take place after the issue of the Guidance but 
instead created new problems on the appropriateness, legal review and excessive use of 
commitments in Art.102 cases. 
Chapter 4 is the first chapter of Part II and shifts the focus of the thesis to Turkey. 
Taking both a theoretical and a practical approach, this Chapter aims to answer the first 
main research question as to whether there is a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in 
Turkey. It begins by discussing the functions of Guidelines as soft law instruments and then 
draws some theoretical conclusions for Turkey on the likely benefits and costs of adopting 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6. Second, it deals with the impact of Turkey’s duty to 
harmonise its national competition law with the EU acquis on the adoption Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6. In this respect, it outlines the accession process of Turkey to the EU with a 
focus on  competition policy as a negotiation chapter, explores the reforms made by Turkey 
in this process and examines whether the country is legally required to adopt the Guidance 
as Guidelines in relation to Art.6 as part of its duty of harmonisation. Lastly, it reports the 
findings of the research interviews made with different groups of interviewees with a view 
to demonstrating opinions from practice. Chapter 4 observes that the TCA and other State 
authorities in Turkey explicitly stressed the need for adopting Guidelines in relation to 
Art.6 through different documents. Chapter 4 argues that while the enforcers of Art.6 and 
the legal counsel of the undertakings as the addressees of this Article felt a need for 
Guidelines in their personal experience, the judges were rather reluctant to the adoption of 
17 
 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6 and took the view that such Guidelines would have a limited 
impact on the judicial review. 
Chapter 5 provides answers to the second main research question as to how 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6 can be best tailored to reflect Turkey’s experience with 
Art.6. First, it provides a comparative analysis of the content of the Guidelines on Art.6 
with the contributions of the Guidance and the established case law on Art.6, with a view to 
showing to what extent the Guidelines on Art.6 reflect the experience of the country with 
Art.6. It then explores the most problematic historical and/or current issues on Art.6 in 
Turkey which should have been addressed in the Guidelines on Art.6, but were left outside 
their scope as a result of the adoption of the Guidance. Lastly, it speculates on the future of 
the Guidelines on Art.6, and explores whether the TCA will abide by its own Guidelines 
and how the appellate courts will react. Chapter 5 observes that the general assessments of 
the Guidelines on Art.6 are in line with the case law on Art.6, but the specific assessments 
on specific forms of exclusionary conduct largely differ from those in the case law. Chapter 
5 argues that the absence of any guidance on the problematic areas that are peculiar to 
Turkey undermines predictability and legal certainty as aimed by the Guidelines on Art.6. 
Chapter 5 is followed by the Conclusion, which outlines the findings and conclusions of the 
thesis. 
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PART I 
CHAPTER 1 – THE MODERNISATION OF ART.102 
Introduction 
Chapter 1 explores the following sub-questions: First, why was Art.102 subject to a 
modernisation process? Second, how has that modernisation progressed? This Chapter 
introduces Art.102 and the modernisation of Art.102. It takes the view that understanding 
the Guidance lies beneath understanding a priori the modernisation of Art.102, because of 
the fact the Guidance is the culmination of the Commission’s efforts to modernise the way 
it has applied Art.102. In other words, because the Guidance does not exist in vacuum, it 
should be interpreted within the broader framework of the underlying modernisation. For 
this reason, before the analysis of the Guidance itself, it is necessary to explore the 
modernisation of Art.102 which constitutes the background of the Guidance. The analysis 
of the modernisation in this Chapter centres on why the Article was subject to a 
modernisation process in the first place and how that modernisation has progressed until the 
publication of the Guidance.  
Chapter 1 is divided into three sections: Section 1.1 introduces Art.102 as the 
subject of the modernisation and of the Guidance. This Section first discusses the analytical 
framework and the constituent elements of Art.102. It proceeds with a discussion of the 
theoretical underpinning of the Article and the predominantly pursued objective of 
economic freedom. Lastly, it briefly shows how the Article has been applied and how the 
concept of abuse of a dominant position has been interpreted by the Commission and the 
EU Courts. Section 1.1 observes that there was a need for at least guidance, if not 
modernisation, on the enforcement of Art.102, because of the fact the text of the Article 
was silent on the meaning of abuse and on the objective(s) of the Article, the definition of 
abuse by the CJEU was unsatisfactory and provided no methodology for identifying its 
scope, distinguishing “competition on the merits” from abusive conduct was challenging 
and there was a lack of coherent analytical approach to the Article in the case law. 
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Section 1.2 is concerned with the modernisation of Art.102. This Section first 
provides background to the modernisation of Art.102 by addressing the modernisation of 
the two other pillars of EU competition law, namely Art.101 and merger control, which 
preceded the modernisation of Art.102. By shedding light on some examples from the case 
law on Art.102, it then focuses on the reasons as to why the approach of the Commission 
and the EU Courts to Art.102 before the modernisation gave rise to heavy criticisms in the 
literature and paved the way for modernisation. Finally it explains the consumer welfare 
objective which has given a special consideration with the modernisation of Art.102. 
Section 1.2 observes that mainly because of the old case law on Art.102 which has been 
criticised for being formalistic and lacking economic arguments or efficiency 
considerations, the Commission engaged in the modernisation of Art.102 with a view to 
bringing the Article into line with the modern economic thinking on unilateral conduct. 
Section 1.3 explains the stages of the modernisation. This Section sheds light on 
how the modernisation of Art.102 has progressed and analyses the earlier documents that 
preceded the Guidance during this process. First, it briefly explains the modernisation 
process from its very beginning to the publication of the Guidance. It then discusses the 
first piece of written work of the modernisation that was shared with public, the EAGCP’s 
Report entitled “An economic approach to Article 82”. Finally, it analyses the first 
substantive product of the modernisation, the Discussion Paper on the Application of 
Article 82 to Exclusionary Abuses. Section 1.3 observes that the modernisation of Art.102 
began in 2003 and started within the DG Comp, and the earlier products of the 
modernisation appeared only in 2005 once the reform in the area of merger control was 
completed. 
1.1. The Analytical and Theoretical Framework of Art.102 
1.1.1. Introduction to Art.102 
Art.102 has been a basic provision of EU competition law for more than half a century. It 
forms a part of the chapter in the TFEU devoted to the common rules on the EU’s policy in 
the field of competition. Being the legal basis for a crucial component of EU competition 
law and policy, the provision was first laid down in the Treaty establishing the European 
Economic Community 1957 (the Treaty of Rome) as “Art.86 EEC”. The numbering of this 
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Article has varied over the years as a result of different amendments to the founding 
Treaties of the EU. In this respect, it was renumbered as “Art.82 EC” by the Treaty on 
European Union 1992 (the Treaty of Maastricht) and recently, it was renumbered as 
“Art.102 TFEU” by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2009 (the Treaty 
of Lisbon).
1
 Notwithstanding those changes in its numbering, the text of the Article has 
remained substantially unchanged. 
Art.102 regulates the unilateral conduct of dominant undertakings. In order for 
Art.102 to apply, there must be an undertaking (or more than one undertaking) holding a 
dominant position in the Internal Market or in substantial part of it (the dominant position 
element), such position must be abused (the abuse element) and finally, there must be 
actual or potential effect on trade between MSs in a substantial part of the Internal Market 
(the Union dimension element). Not all undertakings are subjected to Art.102; it applies to 
an undertaking, or in certain cases more than one undertaking, holding a dominant position 
on the relevant market.
2
 Normally, more than one national market must be affected by the 
abusive conduct for Art.102 to apply. The underlying elements of the Article are the 
dominant position element and, in particular, the abuse element which is also the most 
controversial part of the Article. 
The list of abuses contained in the Article is not an exhaustive enumeration of the 
abuses prohibited by the Treaty.
3
 The subparagraphs of Art.102 are merely illustrative and 
do not attempt to provide a fully defined list of all possible types of abuses. For this reason, 
it is irrelevant to show that alleged abuse must actually conform to one of the examples in 
the subparagraphs, though this could be conclusive in a case. The illustrative examples in 
the subparagraphs are open to interpretation and more often than not to a considerable 
degree of doubt.
4
 However, it is also true that no legal rule on the prohibition of abuse of a 
dominant position could realistically list all possible types of abuses in an exhaustive way. 
                                                          
1
 All references to “Art.86 EEC” and “Art.82 EC” shall be understood as references to “Art.102 TFEU” 
throughout this thesis. 
2
 ‘It is in no way the purpose of Article [102] to prevent an undertaking from acquiring, on its own merits, the 
dominant position on a market.’ Case C-209/10 Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] ECR I-0000. 
3
 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission [1973] ECR 
215, para.26; Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v Commission [1996] ECR I-5951, para.37. 
4
 Vesterdorf, B. (2011) ‘Article 102 TFEU and Sanctions: Appropriate When?’, European Competition Law 
Review, 32(11), p.576. 
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Even if a rule that listed most types of abusive conduct existed, dominant undertakings 
would be able to devise new abusive practices.
5
 
 Little understanding can be gleaned from reading the text of Art.102 itself, since 
much of the Treaty’s wording is open-textured.6 Although the concept of abuse of a 
dominant position lies at the heart of Art.102, ironically a statutory definition for this 
concept is not provided in the Article. Art.102 offers little guidance as to who or what is 
harmed from an abuse, whose benefits are protected or what objectives are or can be 
pursued. In fact, if the Union dimension element and the dominant position element are 
omitted from the text, the Article will then merely state that “any abuse shall be 
prohibited”. What is clear from the wording is perhaps the notion that a dominant position 
is not prohibited; only its abuse is prohibited.
7
 It follows that even a careful and law-
abiding undertaking may easily find itself in a situation in which it is not clear whether it is 
dominant and/or its conduct amounts to an abuse.
8
 
It is correct to say that Art.102 is thus not drafted in clear, precise and unambiguous 
language.
9
 For these reasons, the theoretical underpinning of the Article should be 
examined. In this respect, a broader interpretation of the ratio legis of Art.102 taking into 
account the theoretical foundations that paved the way for its enactment will be much more 
helpful compared to a narrow literal interpretation of its text. In this way, some expressions 
in its subparagraphs such as “unfair” and “prejudice of consumers” will be more 
meaningful; for example, it will make more sense as to why these expressions were not 
drafted by the original draftsmen as “inefficient” and “prejudice of competitors” 
respectively. Understanding the theoretical underpinning of Art.102 will be helpful in 
understanding what the Article aims to prevent and why the abuse of a dominant position is 
condemned by the law. 
                                                          
5
 Temple Lang, J. (1979) ‘Some Aspects of Abuse of Dominant Positions in European Community Antitrust 
Law’, 3 Fordham Int’l L.J., p.23. 
6
 The Treaty is drafted in broad and non-specific language, leaving it to the EU institutions and in particular 
the EU Courts, to put flesh on the bare bones. Whish, R. (2009) Competition Law, 6
th
 Edition, OUP, Great 
Britain, p.191. 
7
 The Commission and the EU Courts have long reiterated that Art.102 does not prohibit dominance itself, but 
only its abuse. See Case 322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden Industrie Michelin v Commission [1983] ECR 
3461, para.57 (‘A finding that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a recrimination’). 
8
 Vesterdorf (2011), p.575. 
9
 ibid at p.577. 
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1.1.2. Art.102 and the Economic Freedom Objective  
While it has been widely argued that Art.102 is aimed at controlling ‘the abusive exercise 
of market power’,10 it is less clear how this would be done in practice and what legal 
interest that is worth protecting from being infringed. It appears that this wholly depends on 
the objective that is pursued by the Article. The text of Art.102 is silent on its objective(s) 
and does not explicitly specify any in this respect. An advantage of such drafting is that it 
allows flexibility in pursuing different objectives and adopting different approaches to 
abuse.
11
 On the other hand, as with every legal rule, Art.102 must be clear and precise, and 
should not leave room for ambiguity in order for dominant undertakings to ensure that they 
abide by the Article and avoid large fines. However, Art.102 will be neither clear, nor 
particularly helpful in the absence of an objective which would elaborate the meaning of 
abuse. 
Contrary to what one may think, Art.102 does not have a settled objective; there is 
in fact a feverish debate on its objective(s). As the former Competition Commissioner 
Kroes pointed out, some may think it somewhat surprising that after many years of 
enforcement, there is still a lively debate on the objectives of Art.102.
12
 According to Faull 
and Nikpay, debate about Art.102 has generally centred on the purpose of the prohibition of 
abusive conduct as to what it is supposed to protect.
13
 This is because, as Dabbah  observes, 
the CJEU has created a jurisprudence which makes it difficult to figure out ‘the real aim’ of 
                                                          
10
 Bellamy, C. and Child, G. (2008) European Community Law of Competition, 6
th
 Edition, OUP, Great 
Britain, p.910. See also Sher, B. (2004) ‘The Last of the Steam-powered Trains: Modernising Article 82’, 
European Competition Law Review, 25(5), p.244 (‘[T]he control of market power is the most obvious goal for 
Art [102].’); Fox, E. M. (2003) ‘We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors’, World Competition, 
26(2), p.9 (‘Article [102] was intended to regulate the conduct of dominant firms and to prevent dominant 
firms from unfairly using their power...’) (emphasis original); and O’Donoghue, R. and Padilla, J. (2013) The 
Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 2
nd
 Edition, Hart Publishing, Great Britain (2013), p.3 (‘Article 102 
seeks to avoid the use and misuse of market power...). On the meaning of market power, see infra “1.1.3. 
Art.102 in the Case Law”. 
11
 The language of Art.102 created ample discretion to determine its protective scope by reference to the kind 
of policy objectives it favoured. Monti, G. (2007) EC Competition Law, CUP, United Kingdom, p.161. 
12
 Kroes, N. (2005) Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82, Speech at the Fordham Corporate 
Law Institute New York, 23 September 2005, 
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/537&format=PDF&aged=1&languag
e=EN&guiLanguage=en> [accessed 30/09/2014], p.3. 
13
 Faull, J. and Nikpay, A. (2007) The EC Law of Competition, 2
nd
 Edition, OUP, Great Britain, p.335. 
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Art.102.
14
 The body of cases as a whole contains references to several objectives, and they 
do not always or even often explain how they relate to each other.
15
 The case law 
establishes that the abusive conduct may violate Art.102 where it manipulates or prevents 
the flow of goods between the MSs, precludes access to market and sourcing of products or 
generates anti-competitive effects to the prejudice of consumers.
16
 
It has been argued that in its earlier decisions, the CJEU favoured a “teleological” 
method and interpreted the competition provisions in a way that could achieve the 
integrationist goals of the Treaty.
17
 Art.102 was primarily used to ensure the proper 
functioning of the Internal Market. The objective of Art.102 was viewed as maintaining 
undistorted competition in the Internal Market by safeguarding the competition that still 
exists on the market.
18
 Some commentators argue that competition rules in the Treaty, 
including Art.102, should be considered in the light of the Treaty provisions which are 
designed to establish a single market, ensure the protection of the freedom to provide 
services or avoid discrimination on the grounds of nationality.
19
  Whereas others oppose 
that the primacy of integration among the policy goals of EU competition law does not hold 
anymore.
20
 
To date, at least before the modernisation of Art.102, the predominantly pursued 
objective under Art.102 in the case law is the objective of economic freedom, also known 
as “Ordoliberalism”: Although the EU Courts have never referred to the drafting history of 
Art.102, it has been widely argued that Art.102 is grounded in “Ordoliberal” thinking and 
                                                          
14
 Dabbah, M. M. (2000) ‘Conduct, Dominance and Abuse in “Market Relationship”: Analysis of Some 
Conceptual Issues under Article 82 E.C’, European Competition Law Review, 21(1), p.45. 
15
 Gerber, D. J. (2008a) “The Future of Article 82: Dissecting the Conflict”, in Ehlermann, C. and Marquis, 
M. (eds.), European Competition Law Annual 2007: A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC, Hart Publishing, 
Great Britain, p.43-44. See also Whish, R. and Bailey, D. (2012) Competition Law, 7
th
 Edition, OUP, Great 
Britain, p.19 (‘[M]any different policy objectives have been pursued in the name of competition over the 
years... Historically there has not been a single, unifying, policy that bound the development of EU... law 
together.’). 
16
 Downing, R. and Jones, A. (2010) “Margin Squeezes in Telecommunications Markets”, in Anderman, S. 
and Ezrachi, A. (eds.), Intellectual Property and Competition Law, New Frontiers, OUP, Great Britain, p.221. 
17
 Gerber, D. J. (1994) ‘The Transformation of European Community Competition Law?’, 35 Harvard 
International Law Journal, p.116-117. 
18
 Case 6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission [1973] ECR 
215 and Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International SA v Commission [1994] ECR II-0755. 
19
 Vaughan, D., Lee, S., Kennelly, B. and Riches, P. (2006) EU Competition Law: General Principles, 
Richmond Law & Tax Ltd, p.1. 
20
 Cseres, K. J. (2006) ‘The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard’, The Competition Law Review, 
3(2), p.151-152. 
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has “Ordoliberal” origins.21 The ideas of Ordoliberalism, developed by the Freiburg 
School,
22
 took shape in Germany in the 1930s. Ordoliberals identified the accumulation of 
private economic power and wealth as a potential problem, and believed that in order to 
prevent such power turning into a political power, it was imperative to establish an 
appropriate economic order to protect individual economic freedom.
23
 According to this 
line of thought, individual economic freedom is an essential accompaniment to political 
freedom and competition is necessary for the economic liberty and equality of 
individuals.
24
 The primary goal of ordoliberal competition lies in the protection of 
“economic freedom” as a value in itself.25 
In essence, this school of thought considers that the presence of dominant firms 
weakens the competitive process and reduces the economic freedom of other market 
participants.
26
 According to the Ordoliberal philosophy, Art.102 seeks to prevent harm to 
the residual competition on a market where competition is already weakened by the 
presence of a dominant firm. The Ordoliberal approach seems to presume that dominance 
itself is a threat to competition and weakens the competitive structure of market; therefore, 
it reduces the economic freedom of other firms. The idea is that economic system should 
                                                          
21
 See generally Kallaugher, J. and Sher, B. (2004) ‘Rebates Revisited: Anti-competitive Effects and 
Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82’, European Competition Law Review, 25(5), p.268 (‘It is well 
established that the origin, development, and application of competition rules under the EEC Treaty was 
based on the policy and legal structure of… “ordoliberal” ideology…’); Gormsen, L. L. (2005) ‘Article 82 
EC: Where Are We Coming from and Where Are We Going to?’, The Competition Law Review, 2(2), p.19 
(‘Article [102] was very much a product of ordoliberal thought’); Rousseva, E. (2007) “Objective 
Justification and Article 82 EC in the Era of Modernisation”, in Amato, G. and Ehlermann, C. D. (eds.), EC 
Competition Law: A Critical Assessment, Hart Publishing, Great Britain, p.379 (‘The application of Article 
[102] has largely been influenced by the ordo-liberal school of thought...’); McMahon, K. (2009) “A 
Reformed Approach to Article 82 and the Special Responsibility Not to Distort Competition”, in Ezrachi, A. 
(ed.), Article 82 EC: Reflections on Its Recent Evolution, Hart Publishing, United Kingdom, p.130 (‘[T]he 
theoretical foundations of EC competition law are strongly linked to the ideas of ordoliberalism’); Riziotis, D. 
(2008) “Efficiency Defence in Article 82 EC”, in Mackenrodt, M. O., Gallego, B. C. and Enchelmaier, S. 
(eds.), Abuse of Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms?, Springer, Germany, 
p.95 (‘[O]rdoliberal principles of competition policy… influenced the European competition law from its very 
beginning.’); and Kavanagh, J., Marshall, N. and Niels, G. (2009) “Reform of Article 82 EC – Can the Law 
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allow all individuals the freedom to participate in the marketplace unimpaired by the power 
of other firms. In determining whether the conduct of a dominant undertaking impairs the 
freedom to participate in the marketplace, the Ordoliberalists distinguished between 
“Leistungswettbewerb”, which can be translated as “performance-based competition” or 
“normal competition”, and “Behinderungswettbewerb” which can be translated as 
“impediment competition” or “non-performance-based competition”. 27 In this distinction, 
the former is permitted, while the latter is prohibited. 
Ordoliberalism gives priority to the preservation of the competitive structure of the 
market and attaches importance to protecting the process of rivalry and competitors’ 
freedom to compete. It aims to protect competition by protecting the structure of the market 
based on the belief that having as many firms as possible in a market is a sign of 
competition. Ordoliberals assume that market would always be more competitive with more 
suppliers and consumers would necessarily benefit from increased competition, if new 
firms enter the market.
28
 For this reason, small- and medium-sized firms deserve a certain 
degree of protection from the exercise of market power with a view to establishing a free 
order which liberates individual economic freedom. Under this objective, conduct is 
regarded as an abuse, or “Behinderungswettbewerb”, when it restricts the freedom of or 
impairs the right of competitors to actively participate in the market unimpaired by the 
market power of a dominant firm. Whether the excluded competitors have been delivering 
less to consumers than a more efficient dominant firm is of no concern in this respect. 
As will be seen, in sharp contrast to the core of the modernisation of Art.102, the 
economic freedom approach is not concerned with consumer welfare or economic 
efficiency. It is a rights-based approach and is based on humanist values rather than 
economic concerns.
29
 The Ordoliberal system treats individuals as ends in themselves and 
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not as the means of welfare.
30
 Ordoliberals see economic efficiency as a generic term for 
growth and for the encouragement and development of technical progress; ‘it is only an 
indirect and derived result of individual economic freedom.’31 This objective is essentially 
oriented towards individual freedom, with efficiency as its by-product, not an end in 
itself.
32
 Again contrary to the modernisation, Ordoliberalism puts the emphasis on the form 
of conduct and the very presence of a dominant firm in a market rather than the effects of 
conduct on the market or on consumer welfare. 
Despite the predominant view in the literature that Art.102 is significantly 
influenced by Ordoliberalism, harsh criticisms have been levelled against the economic 
freedom objective. It has been argued that this objective risks creating markets with more 
numerous, but less efficient and smaller competitors, who charge higher prices but offer 
less innovative products and ultimately less choice, while at the same time deterring 
dominant firms from investing and improving their offering as part of competition on the 
merits.
33
 Criticisms have particularly come from the proponents of the consumer welfare 
approach. With the modernisation, the theoretical framework of Art.102, which has thus 
been shaped by Ordoliberal thoughts, is aimed to shift towards the consumer welfare 
objective with efficiency as its main product, rather than a by-product.
34
 
1.1.3. Art.102 in the Case Law 
Art.102 is drafted in a vague manner; neither the dominant position element, nor the abuse 
element, as the underlying elements of the Article, are not defined by the Treaty. Nowhere 
does the TFEU define the legal concepts of dominant position or abuse of a dominant 
position. However, this is in tune with the overall drafting of the original Treaties: they are 
a traité cadre allowing for the evolution and development of EU law definitions. As with 
most Articles of the Treaties, the underlying elements of Art.102 are therefore left to the 
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interpretation of the EU Courts,
35
 while the Commission also plays an important role in the 
day to day interpretation of the Article.
36
 The practical meaning of Art.102 has evolved 
over time through the case law of the EU Courts. The first judgments on Art.102 began to 
emerge in the late 1970s and there was hardly any case before this era.
37
 
The definition of “dominant position” preceded the definition of “abuse of a 
dominant position”. In United Brands, the CJEU defined the legal concept of dominant 
position as ‘a position of economic strength enjoyed by an undertaking which enables it to 
prevent effective competition being maintained on the relevant market by giving it the 
power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of its competitors, customers and 
ultimately of its consumers.’38 This definition can be taken to mean that a dominant firm 
has the power to unilaterally set the parameters of competition, such as price, output and 
product variety without being constrained by the decisions of its competitors, customers or 
consumers. The definition set out by the CJEU largely corresponds to the concept of 
“significant market power”39 and has been reiterated in the case law. 
A dominant position is not an absolute term but a matter of degree, and the degree 
of market power will depend on the circumstances of each case.
40
 Market power derives 
from a combination of several factors. In this respect, market share stands out as the first 
and most important element in the assessment of dominant position.
41
 The CJEU held in 
Hoffmann La Roche that ‘very large market shares’ are highly significant evidence of the 
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existence of a dominant position.
42
 It found in AKZO that a stable market share of 50 
percent or more is normally indicative of dominance.
43
 Market shares of below 50 percent 
were also found to have amounted to a dominant position in some cases.
44
 Most recent 
cases on Art.102 usually involve dominant positions almost amounting to statutory 
monopolies,
45
 de facto monopolies
46
 or legal monopolies granted by intellectual property 
rights.
47
 Arguably, the increasing use of Art.9 Regulation 1/2003 commitments has 
rendered the analysis of dominance down to a “preliminary finding” and focused more on 
the abuse element.
48
 
The second underlying element of Art.102, which is also the most controversial part 
of the Article, is the abuse element. The first founding Art.102 case that was brought before 
the CJEU in the context of annulment proceedings against a Commission decision was 
Continental Can
49
 in 1973, almost more than fifteen years after the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957. In this case, the Court did not lay down a definition of the concept 
of abuse, but importantly it established two different types of abuse, which have been 
widely accepted in the case law as well as in the literature. The CJEU held the view that 
Art.102 covers two different types of practices: One that damages consumers or customers 
of a dominant firm directly and the other that indirectly harms them through its impact on 
the structure of the market. Though they were not defined in this way in the judgment, the 
former were later called “exploitative abuses” and the latter called “exclusionary abuses” 
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by commentators. Since then, much of the case law has been concerned with exclusionary 
abuses.
50
 
It took almost a quarter of a century after the entry into force of the Treaty of Rome 
for the CJEU to define the concept of abuse of a dominant position in Hoffmann La Roche 
for the first time in 1979 as follows: 
 ‘The concept of abuse is an objective concept relating to the behaviour of an undertaking in a 
dominant position which is such as to influence the structure of a market where, as a result of the very 
presence of the undertaking in question, the degree of competition is weakened and which, through 
recourse to methods different from those which condition normal competition in products or services on 
the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the 
degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that competition.’51 
In the light of the definition, three elements come to the fore: First, abusive conduct 
must influence the structure of the relevant market. Second, it must generate the effect of 
hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing on the market or the 
growth of that competition.
52
 Lastly, there must be recourse to methods different from those 
which condition normal competition on the part of a dominant firm. It can be seen from its 
choice of words that the CJEU defined the concept more in line with the economic freedom 
objective. The structure of the market was stressed and there was no mentioning of 
consumers or of consumer welfare. The fact that the ‘very presence’ of a dominant 
undertaking as the reason for the weakening of competition was emphasised reveals the 
Ordoliberal view of dominant firms, rather than the consumer welfare perception which is 
more concerned with consumer benefits dominant firms may generate, instead of mere 
presence or size of these firms. Also the reference to ‘normal competition’ is indicative of 
the Ordoliberal concept of “Leistungswettbewerb”. 
At first glance, the definition of the Court is intuitive: Conduct amounts to an abuse, 
if it is not a normal competitive practice. However, the definition itself necessitates a 
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further definition for “normal competition” and the test of “normal competition” requires a 
benchmark against which the conduct in question could be ruled as an abuse. In this 
respect, a widespread practice in competitive markets could be a typical benchmark: If a 
certain practice is available to and commonly practiced by non-dominant firms, then it 
should mean that such conduct does not amount to an abuse. However, the notion that a 
common practice within an industry would necessarily constitute normal competition was 
rejected by the GCEU.
53
 A different, perhaps more popular, term that co-exists with 
“normal competition” is “competition on the merits”. Accordingly, a dominant firm is 
entitled to compete vigorously, as long as it does so by competing “on the merits”. Just as 
“normal competition”, “competition on the merits” is not a sufficiently clear concept. It is 
not always easy to reach agreement on whether to locate certain types of conduct in or out 
of the area circumscribed by competition on the merits.
54
 
The case law definition of abuse has arisen much controversy among commentators. 
O’Donoghue and Padilla criticise the definition for being imprecise and failing to 
encapsulate a clear normative concept capable of satisfying the basic requirements of the 
rule of law and legal certainty.
55
 Art and Colomo argue that the definition of abuse provides 
no precise benchmark or methodology for identifying its limits; therefore, it is examined as 
a matter of policy, not as a matter of law.
56
 Osterud  finds the definition vague and far from 
being clear-cut, and claims that it is difficult to determine whether a specific type of 
unilateral conduct falls within the scope of Art.102.
57
 Nazzini regards the definition as not 
an ‘immediately operational test itself’.58 Riziotis insists that a practical and useful positive 
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definition for normal competition has proven to be unachievable until now.
59
 Finally, Lowe 
draws a good analogy in this respect and finds that ‘just as physicists strive to find the 
theory that unifies Newtonian physics and quantum mechanics, so economists strive to find 
the theory that unifies the various aspects of anti-competitive unilateral conduct.’60 
Because pinpointing what amounts to competition on the merits is difficult, if not 
impossible; one challenge in the case law has been to draw a line between lawful 
competitive conduct and abusive conduct under Art.102. Finding the appropriate dividing 
line between these two is very difficult even if the enforcers agree on the purpose of the law 
and methods to be deployed.
61
 This is because conduct that benefits consumers through 
lower prices or new products also forecloses the market to competitors who have failed to 
cut down on their costs or bring new products to the market. For instance, the mechanism 
by which a dominant undertaking engages in predatory pricing, lowering prices, is the same 
mechanism by which it stimulates competition.
62
 To date, the EU Courts have failed to 
provide a definition that successfully distinguishes conduct that should be tolerated on the 
part of dominant firms from conduct that should be prohibited as an abuse.
63
 The 
enforcement of Art.102 suffers from this problem due to the vacuous definition of abuse. 
A lack of coherent analytical approach to Art.102 in the case law is also criticised in 
the literature. Temple Lang and O’Donoghue note that the Commission and the EU Courts 
have dealt with individual cases that were said to raise questions by reference to the facts of 
the individual case, seemingly without having any clear general analytical or intellectual 
framework for doing so.
64
 Whish and Bailey argue that the EU Courts have refrained from 
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broad theoretical statements, preferring instead to decide each case on its merits.
65
 
Rousseva claims that even a cursory examination reveals that there is no conceptual 
consistency in the application of Art.102.
66
 Lastly, Vickers accepts that case law suggests 
some standards to distinguish between lawful and unlawful behaviour for some types of 
conduct, but maintains that the underlying substantive principles are not always easy to 
discern.
67
 
In the absence of one single coherent framework for all types of abuses, Art.102 
cases have instead involved categories of potentially abusive conduct. There is much more 
precedent, as well as literature, on some categories of conduct than others. To indicate this, 
different expressions have been used by commentators and practitioners such as “main 
types of abuses”,68 “principal forms of abuse”,69 “traditional categories of abuse”70 and 
“most frequent types of abusive behaviour”71 versus “other forms of abusive conduct”,72 
“other forms of abuse”73 and “miscellaneous abuses”.74 Predatory pricing, exclusive 
dealing, rebates, tying and bundling and refusal to deal stand out as the most common 
categories of conduct that have been challenged under Art.102. Most recent cases on 
Art.102, however, involve seemingly new forms of abuses such as refusal to provide 
interoperability information,
75
 abuse of regulatory procedures,
76
 abuse of standard-essential 
patents,
77
 long-term capacity bookings,
78
 strategic underinvestment,
79
 capacity hoarding
80
 
and manipulation of internet search results.
81
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It follows that the text of Art.102 is silent on the meaning of abuse and objective(s) 
of the Article, the definition of abuse by the CJEU is unsatisfactory and provides no 
methodology for identifying its scope, distinguishing “competition on the merits” from 
abusive conduct is challenging and there is a lack of coherent analytical approach to 
Art.102 in the case law. Therefore, the case law on abuse is ‘complex and controversial’.82 
This has important consequences for dominant firms as the subjects of the Article. On the 
part of dominant firms, it can be quite a difficult task to show that they are competing on 
the merits in the absence of a firmly accepted definition of what it means to do so.
83
 If 
dominant firms are to be denied recourse to commercial strategies that are available to their 
non-dominant competitors, it is essential for them to know firstly whether they are 
dominant and secondly what conduct they must avoid.
84
 It is against this background that 
there was a need for at least guidance, if not modernisation, on the enforcement of Art.102. 
1.2. The Modernisation of Art.102 
1.2.1. Background to the Modernisation of Art.102 
During the last two decades, both the Commission and the EU Courts had been criticised 
for their “structuralist” positions in their decisions and judgments which often showed a 
high level of formalism and did not adequately take into account economic arguments or 
efficiency considerations. Both under Art.101 TFEU and under Art.102, they placed too 
much emphasis on forms or categories of behaviour, but too little emphasis on their effects 
on the market and/or consumers. Particularly Art.102 was subject to harsh criticism in the 
literature for lacking economic rigour.
85
 Before the modernisation, some commentators 
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even regarded Art.102 as ‘a Community problem child’,86 while for others the Article was 
‘the last of the steam-powered trains’87 because of it being the last piece of EU competition 
law that was finally subject to a review after almost 50 years of enforcement. 
In spite of the case law, the Commission has listened to criticism and to calls for it 
to abandon its formalistic methodology.
88
 To address the concerns and calls for changes in 
the enforcement, the Commission engaged in a series of reforms with the ultimate aim of 
modernising the way it enforces EU competition law rules. The modernisation of EU 
competition law was not confined to Art.102 and instead began in the area of vertical 
restraints under Art.101 TFEU with the adoption of Regulation 2790/1999.
89
 The 
modernisation started with vertical agreements because the view was that these seldom 
restrict competition and often lead to efficiencies for the benefit of consumers.
90
 The 
officials in the DG Comp, who came to believe in the objective of encouraging efficiency 
after the first EUMR in 1989,
91
 started by considering reform of the treatment of vertical 
agreements on the grounds that their reform would be easier than that of horizontal 
agreements or abuse of a dominant position.
92
 
As the first formal document of the modernisation of EU competition law, 
Regulation 2790/1999 started the shift towards a consumer welfare-oriented approach to 
vertical agreements. Regulation 2790/1999 introduced a “safe harbour” for vertical 
agreements: Where the market share of the undertaking (supplier) does not exceed 30 
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percent, vertical agreements which do not contain “hard-core restrictions” are thought to 
create efficiencies in production or distribution and yield consumer benefits.
93
 Shortly after, 
the Commission issued Guidelines on vertical restraints
94
 which, together with Regulation 
2790/1999, formed the basis for a more economic competition policy towards vertical 
agreements.
95
 Guidelines on vertical restraints state that the Commission will adopt ‘an 
economic approach’ based on vertical agreements’ ‘effects on the market’ and will analyse 
vertical agreements ‘in their legal and economic context’.96 Guidelines on the applicability 
of Art.101 TFEU to horizontal cooperation agreements similarly adopt an effect analysis to 
horizontal cooperation agreements.
97
 
Published in 2004 as a further reform in this respect, Guidelines on the application 
of Art.81(3) EC (now Art.101(3) TFEU) made the shift even clearer. This time, the 
objective of ‘enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of 
resources’ is clearly attributed to Art.101 TFEU.98 These Guidelines also employ an 
effects-based approach to “restrictions of competition by effect”, and thus differentiate 
them with “restrictions of competition by object”.99 Many other consumer welfare-oriented 
rules and effects-based assessments are included in other Regulations and Guidelines such 
as Regulation 772/2004 on the application of Art.81(3) TFEU to technology transfer 
agreements,
100
 Guidelines on the application of Art.81(3) TFEU to technology transfer 
agreements,
101
 Regulation 1217/2010 on application of Art.101(3) TFEU to research and 
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development agreements
102
 and finally Regulation 1218/2010 on the application of 
Art.101(3) TFEU to specialisation agreements.
103
 
The other pillar of EU competition law, namely mergers, was not left outside the 
scope of the modernisation. An important reform was made in 2004 with the issue of the 
new EUMR.
104
 The EUMR forms the basis for the Commission’s more-economic 
approach, which is intended to ground EU merger analysis more firmly in modern 
industrial organisation theory, based on a consumer welfare standard.
105
 The EUMR moved 
away from the more structural concept of dominant position to make clear that all anti-
competitive mergers resulting in higher prices, less choice or innovation -in other words: 
causing consumer harm- are covered.
106
 The old dominance test was replaced with the new 
significant impediment to effective competition (SIEC) test which is more suitable for 
evaluating the effects of complex mergers. Similar to agreements under Art.101 TFEU, the 
structuralist approach to mergers was thus reformed and the idea that mergers may also 
create efficiencies and benefit consumers gained ground. 
The primary legislation on mergers is complemented with Guidelines on horizontal 
and non-horizontal mergers. Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers state that 
the Commission will prevent mergers that would be likely to deprive consumers of low 
prices, high quality products and innovation through its control of mergers.
107
 These 
Guidelines involve an effects-based approach to mergers based on “coordinated” and “non-
coordinated” effects that may arise out of mergers,108 and accept the notion that mergers 
may bring about various types of efficiency gains that can lead to benefits to consumers.
109
 
Guidelines on the assessment of non-horizontal mergers also contain many references to 
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efficiency and consumer welfare
110
 and take the view that the fact that competitors may be 
harmed because the merger creates efficiencies cannot in itself give rise to competition 
concerns.
111
 All of these documents reflect a clear willingness on the part of the 
Commission to embrace the economic thinking in the areas of agreements and mergers at 
the time.
112
 No comparable documents had existed under Art.102 until late 2008 before the 
publication of the Guidance. 
1.2.2. Art.102 and Formalism 
Modernisation of Art.101 TFEU and merger control has shown a relatively successful 
movement towards a more effects-based and consumer welfare-oriented approach from the 
previous form-based Ordoliberal approach. However, the same cannot be said in the 
context of Art.102. Although the Commission was able to radically change its attitude to 
efficiency in the context of vertical agreements in the 1990s, it had more difficulty in 
changing the interpretation of Art.102.
113
 This is because officials within the DG Comp 
were not agreed that access to markets was desirable only if the new entrants were likely to 
be as efficient as the incumbents, implying that the goal of efficiency was not found to be 
justifiable under Art.102 when rivals were foreclosed from the market.
114
 Also the EU 
Courts appeared to be less supportive of the modernisation of Art.102 compared to to the 
modernisation of Art.101 TFEU and merger control, and tended to follow their old 
formalistic case law on Art.102 even after the Commission started its review of Art.102. 
It has been argued that a form-based approach to unilateral conduct was first 
adopted when EU competition law was in its infancy and it was considered that reasonably 
clear rules were needed to address conduct which impeded trade between MSs, since at that 
time economic analysis was less developed and could not provide a clear view of the 
effects of practices on competition.
115
 The formalistic manner the EU authorities have 
applied competition rules in the EU is often compared with the enforcement on the other 
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side of the Atlantic. While in US antitrust law conduct is held abusive only when both the 
exclusionary effects of conduct and a reduction in consumer welfare appear together, in the 
EU the analysis used to centre on the special responsibility of dominant undertakings to 
protect existing small, often inefficient, competitors and takes account of possible damage 
to such competitors.
116
 The European authorities have shown a continuing interest in 
preserving “rivalry” as such by protecting business firms against the results of intensive 
competition.
117
 There seems little doubt that EU competition law has, in some cases, been 
applied with competitors in mind.
118
 
The US law of monopolization stresses the costs of antitrust intervention, tending 
towards per se legality in a number of situations and otherwise imposing considerable 
burdens on plaintiffs to show how the particular conduct will increase market power and 
harm consumers, while the EU perspective on abuse of a dominant position stresses the 
process of competition and seeks to enable all market actors to compete on their merits.
119
 
Indeed, EU competition law is more concerned with the structure and openness of the 
market.
120
 Starting from the Ordoliberal tradition, EU competition law had always viewed a 
dominant firm with suspicion rather than admiration.
121
  The EU Courts have tended to 
create a wider zone of liability for dominant firms than the US courts.
122
 European 
authorities appear to be substantially more active than their American counterparts.
123
 For 
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all those reasons, the US treatment of dominant firms is generally less ‘intervention-
minded’ than the EU treatment.124 
Many examples from the case law in fact show the apparent formalism in the 
context of Art.102. In Cewal, the GCEU explicitly stated that it was ‘irrelevant whether 
[the] conduct actually did or did not have a restrictive effect on competition’ and took the 
view that where a dominant firm implements a practice ‘whose aim is to remove a 
competitor, the fact that the result sought is not achieved is not enough to avoid the practice 
being characterized as an abuse’.125 In Irish Sugar, the GCEU ruled that Art.102 does not 
distinguish between the “object” and the “effect” of unilateral conduct, implying that in the 
presence of an object to abuse a dominant position, the assessment of effects will then be 
irrelevant.
126
 This reasoning culminated in Michelin II where the GCEU held that anti-
competitive effects need not be examined, if the conduct seems capable of generating such 
effects: 
 ‘The effect referred to in the case-law… does not necessarily relate to the actual effect of the 
abusive conduct complained of. For the purposes of establishing an infringement of Article [102], it is 
sufficient to show that the abusive conduct of the undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict 
competition or, in other words, that the conduct is capable of having that effect… It follows that, for the 
purposes of applying Article [102], establishing the anti-competitive object and the anti-competitive effect 
are one and the same thing... If it is shown that the object pursued by the conduct of an undertaking in a 
dominant position is to limit competition, that conduct will also be liable to have such an effect.’127 
Michelin II is in fact the hallmark of the form-based approach in the EU before the 
modernisation. In this case, Michelin’s standard volume rebate scheme was found ‘loyalty-
inducing’128 by the GCEU and its effects were deemed as irrelevant since the ‘purpose’ of 
the rebate scheme was to tie the dealers to Michelin and to make it more difficult for 
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competitors to enter the market.
129
 Michelin defended that its markets share fell constantly 
over a period of time, new competitors entered the market and prices were falling, but the 
Court dismissed all of those arguments and assumed effects by holding that ‘any loyalty-
inducing rebate system applied by an undertaking in a dominant position has foreclosure 
effects prohibited by Article [102]’.130 Thus the Court practically created a per se illegality 
rule for loyalty rebates and loyalty-inducing rebates under Art.102, unless the dominant 
undertaking in question provides an objective justification. The rationale was simple that 
loyalty rebates requiring the customer to purchase all or almost all of its supplies from a 
dominant firm would foreclose the market to competitors, and a reduction in the number of 
competitors would not be in the best interests of the structure of that market.
131
 
Formalism was also prevalent in British Airways.
132
 In this judgment, the GCEU 
disregarded an effects-based analysis and held that it was ‘not necessary to demonstrate that 
the abuse in question had a concrete effect on the markets concerned.’133 Not only effects 
on the market, but also effects on consumers were irrelevant. According to the GCEU, 
Art.102 ‘does not require it to be demonstrated that the conduct in question had any actual 
or direct effect on consumers’.134 The Court maintained that Art.102 concentrates upon 
‘protecting the market structure from artificial distortions because by doing so the interests 
of the consumer in the medium to long term are best protected.’135 At the end, the Court did 
not examine in detail the effects of British Airways’ rebate scheme on the market or on 
consumers and found that it was likely to generate anti-competitive effects based on the fact 
that 85 percent of sales were made through its customers.
136
 British Airways’ argument that 
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there was not any anti-competitive effect arising from its rebate system and it was losing 
market shares to its competitors during the relevant period was rejected.
137
  
In Wanadoo, the CJEU took the view that a dominant firm commits an abuse 
‘where, in a market the competition structure of which is already weakened by reason 
precisely of the presence of that undertaking, it operates a pricing policy the sole economic 
objective of which is to eliminate its competitors’.138 In British Gypsum, the GCEU held 
that ‘appraisal of the effects... on the functioning of the market concerned depends on the 
characteristics of that market’ and maintained by citing a seminal effects-based judgment 
under Art.101 TFEU
139
 that ‘it is necessary, in principle, to examine the effects of such 
commitments on the market’.140 However, the Court concluded that ‘[b]ut those 
considerations, which apply in a normal competitive market situation, cannot be 
unreservedly accepted in the case of a market where, precisely because of the dominant 
position of one of the economic operators, competition is already restricted.’141 This 
finding was in line with the Ordoliberal approach which mainly considers the very presence 
of dominant undertakings as a sign for the weakening of competition. 
Taken together, there was an apparent formalism in the case law and it seemed to be 
quite easy for dominant undertakings to find themselves in breach of Art.102. Some of the 
abovementioned cases clearly show that the presence of a dominant position almost 
“justified” a lack of a need for analysing effects, and all those cases were in fact upheld 
quite easily by the EU Courts. In general, the EU Courts were satisfied if the Commission 
showed the expected exclusionary effects of conduct and as a result, practices with 
exclusionary potential were presumed to be abusive unless an objective justification could 
be put forward by dominant firms.
142
 Despite being rare, some ad hoc effects-based 
judgments do exist.
143
 Notwithstanding, equating object with effect appears to be 
dangerously broad in that it could allow a finding of abuse to be detached from any real 
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analysis of effects.
144
 Also, there have been occasions on which conduct of a dominant firm 
did not have or could not have had any harmful effect on consumers, and may have even 
been pro-competitive.
145
 It can be observed that the role of economics-based asseesments 
on Art.102 had thus been less influential compared to Art.101 TFEU and the EUMR. 
Nevertheless, along with advances in the modern economic thinking on unilateral 
conduct, especially with the rise of the Chicago School in the US,
146
 the attitude towards 
dominant firms has begun to change and the tide has shifted in favour of dominant firms. 
Commentators have come to realise that despite their market power, dominant firms can 
also bring benefits to consumers which can be identified once the focus is moved away 
from structuralist parameters. From this new point of view, formalism risks creating 
markets with numerous, but less efficient competitors, who charge higher prices but offer 
less innovative products and less choice, while at the same time deterring dominant firms 
from investing and improving their offerings.
147
 Accordingly, if the form-based approach 
was leading to outcomes where competition was actually discouraged rather than promoted, 
this would contradict with the very essence of competition law.
148
 The modernisation of 
Art.102 in line with the modern economic thinking would steer the enforcement from such 
drawbacks of formalism on the one hand, and bring it more in line with the reforms made in 
the context of Art.101 TFEU and merger control on the other hand. 
1.2.3. Consumer Welfare as a New Objective for Art.102 
In recent years many competition authorities have stressed the central importance of 
consumer welfare when applying competition law and as a result, the consumer welfare 
standard is currently in the ascendancy.
149
 Achieving economic efficiency and maximising 
consumer welfare are today considered the main goals of competition law.
150
 Most 
economists have come to think that the main, if not the only, goal of competition law 
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should be to prevent any unilateral (or collective) practice that harms consumers and 
reduces the efficiency of markets.
151
 There is now a growing recognition that sound 
economic analysis should be made to identify the effects on consumers before ruling a 
certain practice as an abuse. It has been suggested that the effectiveness, efficiency and 
coherence of EU competition law requires a modernised approach to Art.102, involving the 
analysis of effects of conduct on competition in the market and on consumer welfare.
152
 
With the modernisation of Art.102, the Commission has been trying to adopt the 
new consumer welfare objective as the guiding principle under Art.102 and to embrace an 
effects-based approach to Art.102. The modernisation involves ‘a tighter focus on 
consumer welfare and a more economic approach’153 As one commentator has observed, 
the modernisation of Art.102 has three essential characteristics: First, strong emphasis is 
placed on the promotion of economic efficiency and consumer welfare. Second, only those 
practices that have the effect of harming consumers are to be prohibited. Third, the 
enforcement practice shall make increasing use of modern microeconomic insights and 
econometric tools when assessing abuse of a dominant position.
154
 The former ‘legalistic 
straight-jacket approach’ has thus been rejected in favour of the more economics-based 
approach.
155
 As a result, the EU has moved towards what can be seen as an ‘American-
style’ competition law model.156 
The consumer welfare objective is a “welfarist” approach which analyses, often 
through recourse to economic and econometric analysis, harm to consumers caused by the 
abusive conduct based on the belief that harm to competitors is the essence of competition 
and what matters at the end is, or should be, whether there is harm to consumers.
157
 Under 
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this approach, protection of neither competition as an institution, nor the economic freedom 
of competitors is an aim in itself since the overall aim is the protection of consumer welfare 
as an outcome of the competitive process. Economic theory has made significant progress 
in the area of unilateral conduct and has found that many practices that were previously 
held to be an abuse have turned out to be justified by some pro-competitive justifications. 
Proponents of the consumer welfare objective argue that a sole focus on the issue of 
structure of the market affecting its outcome or the number of competitors in the market is 
problematic in the absence of an examination of the effects on consumer welfare.
158
 
The consumer welfare objective is based on the belief that protecting inefficient 
competitors could burden the dominant firms by subsidising inefficient firms and lead to a 
reduction in consumer welfare. Therefore exclusion of inefficient firms as the result of 
conduct which does not harm consumers should not be regarded as a concern for 
competition law. This feature of the consumer welfare objective may be problematic vis-à-
vis the old case law where protection of the market structure was in some cases found to be 
in the interests of consumers.
159
 The fact of the matter is that the EU Courts’ endorsement 
is required in order for the Commission to depart from the established jurisprudence.
160
 
Though cases, in particular the earlier ones, show traces of the economic freedom objective 
and formalism, it can be argued that the tide is nevertheless shifting towards the consumer 
welfare objective with the modernisation of Art.102. 
1.3.  Stages of the Modernisation of Art.102 
1.3.1. The Modernisation at a Glance 
As discussed above, the modernisation of Art.102 does not exist in a vacuum; it is a part (in 
fact the last part) of the reform of EU competition law towards a more economic approach 
which first began in the area of vertical agreements under Art.101 TFEU. After a period of 
struggle to transform the law under Art.101 TFEU from form to effect and to introduce 
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merger control, the Commission became free to focus its resources on Art.102.
161
 The 
review of Art.102, as the last pillar of EU competition law to be reformed, began in the 
summer of 2003
162
 and therefore ‘the air of change’ finally reached Art.102.163 The review 
of Art.102 started within the DG Comp and after some internal debate, members of the 
competition authorities of MSs were invited to join the discussions.
164
 
The earliest outcome of the modernisation appeared only in 2005 once the reform in 
the area of merger control was completed with the publication of the EUMR. The first piece 
of written work which was shared with public was the “An economic approach to Article 
82”: Commissioned by the Chief Economist of the DG Comp, the EAGCP prepared a 
report in July 2005 which advocates a more economics-based approach into Art.102. It 
proposes that the emphasis should be placed on the economic analysis of anti-competitive 
effects of abusive conduct on consumers in the enforcement of Art.102, where decisions 
should be made on a case-by-case basis and based on sound economics. The EAGCP 
Report was produced independently from the DG Comp’s internal review process and it 
therefore does not present the position of the DG Comp.
165
 
During the modernisation process, public statements by senior officials of the 
Commission shed light on the Commission’s likely analytical approach to Art.102. The 
then Competition Commissioner Kroes gave a speech few months later in September 
2005.
166
 Providing details on the modernisation process, she began by stating that she was 
‘convinced’ that the exercise of market power must be assessed essentially on the basis of 
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its effects in the market.
167
 She explained that the Commission’s intention was not to 
propose a radical shift in the enforcement policy, but to develop and explain theories of 
harm on the basis of a sound economic assessment for abusive conduct. According to 
Kroes, the enforcement of Art.102 should focus on ‘real competition problems’: that is, 
conduct that has actual or likely restrictive effects on the market, which harm consumers.
168
 
With regard to the objective of Art.102, Kroes observed that Art.102 had been 
intrinsically concerned with ‘fairness’, and therefore not focused primarily on consumer 
welfare.
169
 She brought consumer welfare to the fore and argued that the objective should 
be the protection of competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare 
and ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. She was concerned with two principles 
upon which the modernisation should be oriented: First, it should be competition and not 
competitors, that is to be protected and second, the ultimate aim should be to avoid 
consumer harm. Directly addressing the fundamental point in the EAGCP Report, she 
stated that attention should be paid to the fact that conduct may have efficiency-enhancing 
effects as well as foreclosure effects, and for this reason efficiencies should be included in 
the assessment. 
Three months after this oft-quoted speech, the Commission published the 
Discussion Paper on the application of Art.102 in December 2005. The Discussion Paper is 
the first substantive outcome of the modernisation and the first document that aims to 
widen the analytical framework of Art.102. It was intended to only constitute an informal 
discussion on the future implementation of Art.102 by the Commission, and therefore was 
not published in the OJ. Even though it does not have enforcement status, the Discussion 
Paper still offers valuable insights into the concept of abuse of a dominant position and 
proposes a substantive assessment which takes into account the effects of abusive conduct 
on the market and on consumers. A quick review of the Discussion Paper will show that 
Kroes’ key points are clearly reflected both in the wording of its paragraphs, as well as in 
the general tone of the document. 
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The Discussion Paper was intended to be the Commission’s first contribution to the 
discussion, not the Commission’s last word.170 Following the publication of the Discussion 
Paper in the Commission’s website in December 2005, the Commission launched a formal 
public consultation and invited interested parties to submit their comments until March 
2006. More than 100 submissions were received
171
 and a public hearing was held in June 
2006 focusing on the most common topical issues raised in those submissions.
172
 In 
addition, the Discussion Paper was widely discussed at numerous conferences that took 
place in Europe, the US and Canada. Consequently, the Discussion Paper led to feverish 
debate as to the proper application of Art.102, in which a broad spectrum of views was 
expressed, ranging from a staunch defence of the status quo to demands for a radical 
reorientation of the existing case law.
173
 
After years of extensive review and consultation process among leading academic 
economists and legal scholars, practitioners, and representatives of the business 
community, the Commission finally published the Guidance on the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities in applying Art.102 to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings in December 2008 as the next (and yet the final formal) stage in the 
modernisation process. The Guidance is intended to contribute to the process of introducing 
an effects-based approach for the application of Art.102 which has underpinned the 
Commission’s thinking since the launching of the policy review,174 and implies a 
determination to take proper account of the effects of unilateral conduct on the market and 
on consumers. 
1.3.2. Report by the EAGCP: An Economic Approach to Art.82 EC 
The EAGCP Report is the first informal document that was issued in July 2005 during the 
modernisation process of Art.102. In line with the overall aim of the modernisation, the 
Report suggests a more economics-based approach to Art.102, which was quite different 
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from the approaches of the Commission and of the EU Courts at that time. The EAGCP 
Report articulates from the outset that it advocates an effects-based approach to Art.102, as 
opposed to a form-based approach. The Report sets out general principles in its Chapter 1, 
followed by the articulation of three different types of competitive harm (exclusion within 
one market, exclusion in adjacent markets and exclusion in vertically related markets) in 
Chapter 2 and their application to certain types of exclusionary practices (price 
discrimination, rebates, tying and bundling, refusal to deal, exclusive dealing and predatory 
pricing) in Chapter 3. 
 According to the EAGCP Report, an economics-based approach to the application 
of Art.102 implies that the assessment of each specific case will not be undertaken on the 
basis of the form that a particular business practice takes but rather will be based on the 
assessment of anti-competitive effects generated by that business behaviour (para.3). By 
focusing on effects rather than forms of conduct, an economics-based approach makes it 
more difficult for dominant undertakings to circumvent competition rules by way of 
attempting to achieve the same end results through the use of different unilateral practices 
(para.2). It also guarantees that the statutory provisions do not unduly thwart pro-
competitive practices as many business practices may have different effects in different 
circumstances: Distorting competition in some cases and promoting efficiencies and 
innovation in others (paras.2-3). 
The application of this approach is expected to require a competition authority or a 
court to explain in each case a competitive harm from the dominant firm’s unilateral 
conduct and identify its detrimental effects on consumer welfare. If the conduct in question 
both generates anti-competitive effects and creates efficiencies (this is in fact one of the 
fundamental premises of the Report), then the competition authority or court should 
identify whether the anti-competitive effects are sufficiently outweighed by the efficiency 
gains and then how those efficiencies are passed on to consumers (para.3). Put another way, 
the first step is to identify and substantiate with economic arguments one of the three 
typologies of competitive harm
175
 and determine any efficiency gain the conduct is capable 
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of producing, followed by the second step of assessing whether efficiencies counterbalance 
anti-competitive effects or vice versa. Therefore, the Report calls for a balancing test.
176
 
The EAGCP Report clearly requires the demonstration of effects on consumers. 
Throughout the Report, the main concern stands out as consumer welfare. Accordingly, 
anti-competitive effects are those which are generated on consumers, not merely on 
competitors. Conduct that harms consumer welfare is abusive.
177
 In other words, 
competition is “on the merits” when conduct does not harm consumers, as the Report states 
that the standard for assessing whether a given practice is detrimental to competition or 
whether it is a legitimate tool of competition should be derived from the effects of the 
practice on consumers (para.8). The Report objects to the protection of competition with a 
view to preserving a particular market structure, since this may merely have the effect of 
protecting competitors from competition and enable them to maintain their presence in the 
market even though their offerings do not provide consumers with the best choices in terms 
of prices, quality or variety (para.9). 
Since the proposed effects-based approach requires a departure from the form-based 
approach that the Commission and the EU Courts have relied upon thus far, the EAGCP 
Report also includes a section on procedure. As already mentioned, the first step is to 
determine the competitive harm of concern; there should be ‘a consistent and verifiable 
economic account of significant competitive harm’ (para.13). The assessment should be 
based on sound economic analysis and grounded on facts of each case. A competition 
authority or a court should identify the economic theory or theories on which the 
competitive harm is based, as well as the facts which support the theory as opposed to 
competing theories (para.15). The dominant firm may then come up with a convincing 
efficiency defence, which should be properly justified on the basis of sound economic 
analysis and grounded on facts. One radical aspect of the Report is that arguably it does not 
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require a separate step for determining dominant position; a consistent and verifiable 
account of significant competitive harm is itself evidence of dominance (para.14). 
All in all, the EAGCP Report was issued during the early years of the modernisation 
process and can be regarded as the first concrete call for a movement towards an effects-
based approach, albeit non-binding on the Commission. The Report seems to have placed 
the consumer welfare objective at the forefront of the economic freedom objective in the 
enforcement of Art.102 and insists that formalism should be replaced with an evaluation of 
effects based on sound economics. A strong commitment to an effects-based approach, the 
emphasis placed on consumer welfare and the recognition of the fact that unilateral conduct 
can both create efficiencies and generate anti-competitive effects at the same time are the 
highlights of the Report. Mostly because it was prepared by a group of economists 
commissioned by the Chief Economist of the DG Comp and it departed from some 
traditional legal concepts in the enforcement of Art.102, in terms of the rigour of the 
economic analysis, the EAGCP Report was more advanced in contrast to both the 
Discussion Paper and the Guidance. 
1.3.3. Discussion Paper on the Application of Art.82 EC to Exclusionary Abuses 
The Discussion Paper is the first substantive product of the modernisation that was issued 
in December 2005, a few months after the EAGCP Report. Like the EAGCP Report, the 
Discussion Paper suggests an effects-based approach to Art.102 and aims to improve, if not 
to reform, some of the former formalistic elements in the enforcement of Art.102. Having 
no enforcement status, it ‘draws and elaborates on the Commission’s evolving experience’ 
with the application of Art.102 (para.5). The Discussion Paper outlines an analytical 
framework for assessing abusive conduct under Art.102, but limits itself to exclusionary 
abuses. It begins by examining the market definition and dominance in Art.102 cases 
(paras.11-50), proceeds with the articulation of the framework for the analysis of 
exclusionary abuses (paras.51-92) and finally analyses some specific types of potentially 
abusive conduct in more detail (paras.93-242). 
Under the framework of the analysis of exclusionary abuses, the Discussion Paper 
begins by explicitly stating that ‘[t]he objective of Article [102] is the protection of 
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competition on the market as a means of enhancing consumer welfare and of ensuring an 
efficient allocation of resources’ (para.4). Therefore, the Discussion Paper announces from 
the outset that it interprets abusive conduct in the light of the consumer welfare objective, 
instead of the economic freedom objective. In parallel to this, it maintains that in applying 
Art.102, the Commission will adopt ‘an approach which is based on the likely effects on 
the market’ (para.4) by ‘taking into account the particular facts and circumstances of each 
case’ (para.2). The Discussion Paper thus opts for an effects-based approach and disregards 
the form-based approach into abusive conduct. 
Interestingly, the Discussion Paper lays down a definition of exclusionary abuses, 
something that is lacking both in the EAGCP Report, as well as in the Guidance. 
Accordingly, exclusionary abuses are practices of dominant undertakings which ‘are likely 
to have a foreclosure effect on the market, i.e. which are likely to completely or partially 
deny profitable expansion in or access to a market to actual or potential competitors and 
which ultimately harm consumers’ (para.1). The Commission takes this further in the later 
parts and states that Art.102 prohibits ‘exclusionary conduct which produces actual or 
likely anticompetitive effects in the market and which can harm consumers in a direct or 
indirect way’ (para.55). This definition is different from the definition originally set out by 
the CJEU in Hoffmann La Roche which was concerned with, or at least mentioned, effects 
of conduct on the market, but not on consumers. 
Taking into account the effects of conduct rather than its form, the definition is 
centred on the competitive harm caused by exclusionary conduct, which involves both 
harm to competition and harm to consumers. Accordingly, conduct amounts to an abuse if 
it generates actual or likely anti-competitive effects in the market and causes direct or 
indirect consumer harm. This implies that harm to competition is not one and the same 
thing as harm to consumers in that both should be proved separately. This seems to be the 
methodological choice of the Discussion Paper; the EAGCP Report considers the harm to 
consumers as the only competitive harm, without a separate or additional requirement to 
prove harm to competition. Separate proof of consumer harm can be explained by the 
Commission’s willingness with the modernisation not to infer consumer harm from harm to 
competition or from the mere presence of a dominant position. 
52 
 
 
 
In terms of anti-competitive effects, the Discussion Paper states that ‘a likely market 
distorting foreclosure effect must be established’ (para.58). The Commission does not 
refrain from defining what is actually meant by such foreclosure and states that this occurs 
when ‘actual or potential competitors are completely or partially denied profitable access to 
a market’ (para.58). The Commission seems to have made a distinction between (lawful) 
foreclosure and (unlawful) “market distorting foreclosure” which ‘likely hinders the 
maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition and thus have as a likely effect that prices will increase or remain at a supra-
competitive level’ (para.58). The recognition of such distinction suggests that mere harm to 
competitors will no longer automatically translate into harm to competition in the 
enforcement of Art.102. 
The real emphasis of the Discussion Paper seems to be, however, on the harm to 
competition limb of the framework, since it hardly seeks proof of harm to consumers.
178
 
The Discussion Paper seems to infer consumer harm from the abusive conduct itself; it is 
primarily concerned with how conduct leads to foreclosure of the market, but is silent on 
how such foreclosure gives rise to consumer harm. In the definition of “market distorting 
foreclosure”, the Commission assumes that such foreclosure likely generates effects on the 
market and thus has a likely effect on consumer welfare. This contradicts with the earlier 
statements according to which harm to competition and harm to consumers should be 
separately proved, meaning that consumer harm should not be simply assumed from harm 
to competition. In this respect, the Discussion Paper rather fails to address the very reason 
of its existence, which is to seek proof of consumer harm caused by abusive conduct 
instead of a formalistic approach to the form of conduct. 
In addition to the general framework of abusive conduct, the Discussion Paper 
contains separate and more detailed analyses for “the most common abuses”. These include 
“predatory pricing” (paras.93-133), “single branding and rebates” (paras.134-176), “tying 
and bundling” (paras.177-206) and “refusal to supply” (paras.207-242). For each of those 
examples; the Discussion Paper, like the EAGCP Report, tends to first state that they are 
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‘common’ or ‘normal’ practices that ‘often have no anti-competitive effects’ and/or ‘benefit 
consumers’, but later discusses the possible situations in which they may generate anti-
competitive effects on the market and on consumers. These examples are presented as 
potentially abusive practices based on the Commission’s past experience with Art.102; 
however, the recognition of the situations where they play efficiency-enhancing roles is in 
line with the modernisation. 
To sum up, the Discussion Paper is the first substantive product of the 
modernisation. In fact, it was intended to form the basis of possible Guidelines on the 
enforcement of Art.102 in the later stages of the modernisation process. It must be because 
of this reason that, despite having no enforcement status, it has been extensively analysed in 
the literature and ambitiously discussed by academics and practitioners in numerous 
conferences. The Discussion Paper mostly remains loyal to the existing case law on market 
definition and determination of dominant position, but includes a lower level of economic 
arguments than originally advocated by the EAGCP Report. The focus on the analysis of 
the effects of conduct, several references to consumer welfare, a lack of reference to the 
special responsibility and extensive analysis of specific types of potentially abusive conduct 
are the contributions of the Discussion Paper to the modernisation of Art.102. 
Conclusion 
Taking the view that understanding the Guidance lies beneath understanding a priori the 
modernisation of Art.102, Chapter 1 introduced the modernisation of Art.102. In this 
Chapter, the analytical and theoretical framework of Art.102 were analysed in Section 1.1, 
the reasons as to why the approach of the Commission and the EU Courts to Art.102 before 
the modernisation gave rise to heavy criticisms in the literature and paved the way for 
modernisation were discussed in Section 1.2 and finally the stages of the modernisation 
were explained in Section 1.3. Section 1.1 observed that there was a need for at least 
guidance, if not modernisation, on the enforcement of Art.102, because of the fact that the 
text of the Article was silent on the meaning of abuse and on the objective(s) of the Article, 
the definition of abuse by the CJEU was unsatisfactory and provided no methodology for 
identifying its scope, distinguishing “competition on the merits” from abusive conduct was 
challenging and there was a lack of coherent analytical approach to the Article in the case 
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law. Section 1.2 observed that mainly because of the old case law on Art.102 which has 
been criticised for being formalistic and lacking economic arguments or efficiency 
considerations, the Commission engaged in the modernisation of Art.102 with a view to 
bringing the Article into line with the modern economic thinking on unilateral conduct. 
Finally, Section 1.3 observed that the modernisation of Art.102 began in 2003 and started 
within the DG Comp, and the earlier products of the modernisation appeared only in 2005 
once the reform in the area of merger control was completed. 
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CHAPTER 2 – THE EFFECT OF THE MODERNISATION PROCESS 
ON THE COMMISSION’S APPROACH TO ART.102 
Introduction 
Chapter 2 addresses the research question as to what changes have occurred in the 
Commission’s approach towards the interpretation of abuse of a dominant position with the 
modernisation of Art.102. This Chapter explores the general outcome of the modernisation 
of Art.102 and sheds light on the Commission’s new reading of Art.102. Chapter 1 showed 
that mainly because of the past decisions of the Commission and judgments of the EU 
Courts on Art.102 which have been criticised for being formalistic and lacking economic 
arguments or efficiency considerations, the Commission engaged in the modernisation of 
Art.102 with a view to bringing the Article into line with the modern economic thinking on 
unilateral conduct. Built upon the findings of Chapter 1, Chapter 2 furthers the discussion 
and aims to analyse the changes in the Commission’s substantive assessment of abuse of a 
dominant position in the backdrop of the modernisation process. 
Chapter 2 identifies three fundamental changes in the Commission’s substantive 
assessment under Art.102 and analyses each change in a different section. The Chapter is 
therefore divided into three sections: Section 2.1 addresses the shift from special 
responsibility of dominant firms towards the concept of efficiency. This Section begins by 
exploring the origin of special responsibility which has been long reiterated in case law. It 
proceeds with a directly related issue which concerns whether competition should be 
viewed as a process or an outcome as this differs between the economic freedom and the 
consumer welfare objectives. Lastly, it examines the rise of efficiency in the assessment of 
abusive conduct. Section 2.1 observes that the modernisation of Art.102 is instrumental in 
the shift towards efficiency and since efficiency has been brought to the fore, special 
responsibility seems to be no longer necessary, if not contradictory, in the enforcement of 
Art.102 and this eventually results in competition to be viewed as an outcome. 
Section 2.2 analyses another change in the Commission’s substantive assessment, 
namely the shift from a form-based approach towards an effects-based approach. This 
Section first introduces the traditional form-based approach under Art.102 by showing 
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some striking examples from case law, continues with the description of the effects-based 
approach and the advantages it offers, as well as the drawbacks it may entail, and finally 
touches upon the increasing use of economics in the assessment of abusive conduct which 
has triggered the shift towards the effects-based approach. Section 2.2 observes that the 
modernisation of Art.102 has given a fresh impetus to the use of economic analysis in the 
assessment of abusive conduct and the traditional form-based approach, which is no longer 
regarded as an appropriate approach, has been replaced with the effects-based approach, 
which is the result of advances in economic thinking in the area of unilateral conduct. 
Section 2.3 deals with the last fundamental change in the Commission’s substantive 
assessment, namely the shift from harm to competitors towards consumer harm. This 
Section first provides a discussion of the standard of harm under Art.102 which has a 
bearing on how abuse is defined despite not being articulated in the text of the Article. It 
proceeds with the harm to competition versus harm to competitors dilemma which caused a 
great deal of controversy before the modernisation. Lastly, it sheds light on the growing 
concern for consumer harm with the modernisation. Section 2.3 observes that the 
modernisation has placed a strong emphasis on the proof of consumer harm as part of the 
assessment of abusive conduct under Art.102, and while there are still doubts as to whether 
harm to competition is one and the same thing as consumer harm, the use of harm to 
competitors as shortcut to prove harm to competition has lost ground. 
2.1.  From Special Responsibility of Dominant Firms to Efficiency 
2.1.1. The Origin of Special Responsibility 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the enforcement of Art.102 has been heavily influenced by the 
Ordoliberal philosophy. In other words, the key policy that has underpinned the EU’s 
regulation of dominant firms is to protect the economic freedom of other market 
participants.
1
 Under the economic freedom objective, a “special responsibility” seems to 
have been attributed to dominant firms, though the text of Art.102 does not refer to such 
concept. The idea of special responsibility was first raised by the CJEU in Michelin I where 
the Court held that ‘[a] finding that an undertaking has a dominant position is not in itself a 
recrimination but simply means that, irrespective of the reasons for which it has such a 
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dominant position, the undertaking concerned has a special responsibility not to allow its 
conduct to impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.’2 
Here the CJEU emphasised, which has been long reiterated in the case law since 
then, that holding a dominant position is not in itself contrary to Art.102, but the 
undertaking which holds a dominant position on the relevant market is under an obligation 
to refrain from carrying out abusive conduct on account of its “special responsibility”. This 
term was elucidated by the GCEU: ‘[S]pecial responsibility means only that a dominant 
undertaking may be prohibited from conduct which is legitimate where it is carried out by 
non-dominant undertakings.’3 However, this statement is not very helpful in assessing what 
type of substantive assessment is needed to rule conduct as an abuse. The boundaries of 
special responsibility were therefore not drawn very clearly by the Court. 
In a narrow sense, the idea of special responsibility can be interpreted as saying no 
more than that Art.102 imposes obligations on dominant firms which are not imposed on 
non-dominant firms; whereas a wider interpretation would suggest that a dominant firm 
must refrain from any action which would increase its market power and harm competitors, 
even where the conduct is efficiency-based.
4
 The origin of this doctrine can be traced back 
to Ordoliberalism: The Ordoliberal approach presumes that dominant firms are capable of 
altering the competitive structure of the market and therefore they must bear a “special 
responsibility” not to harm that structure through their abusive conduct. In other words, a 
dominant firm has a special responsibility because its conduct bears an inherent risk for the 
market, competitors, customers and ultimately consumers, since its impact and incidence 
determine ‘the rules of the game’.5 
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The idea of attributing a special responsibility to dominant firms depends very 
much on how a dominant position is perceived. Under the economic freedom objective, the 
perception is that dominance itself signifies a state of poor competition.
6
 Because of 
dominance, the impact of the dominant firm’s conduct both on the remaining competition 
in the market and on consumers is exponentially greater.
7
 For that reason, if dominance 
already weakens the state of competition prevailing in the market, then there is no real need 
of analysing the effects of an allegedly abusive practice in detail.
8
 Thus the raison d’etre of 
imposing such responsibility on dominant firms seems to bypass often complex assessment 
of effects of conduct on the market and/or on consumers once a dominant position is 
determined. As one commentator rightly observes: 
‘In fact, the whole policy rationale underlying the European abuse of dominance (if not the entire 
European antitrust law) reverts to the understanding that certain conduct whose intrinsic character is 
difficult to assess may be particularly detrimental if put into practice by a stronger firm or by two or more 
undertakings jointly. The rationale for this is the acknowledgment that if a certain conduct is adopted by a 
firm who holds a position of substantial economic and commercial strength on the market, such conduct 
risks disrupting competition because the effect it is able to produce in the market is directly proportioned 
to the strength of the undertaking. With specific regard to Article [102], these ideas have led EU courts to 
determine the “special responsibility” doctrine…’9 
 The close link of this doctrine with the economic freedom objective may lead to the 
questioning of its existence once the focus of the assessment of abusive conduct under 
Art.102 shifts towards the analysis of effects of conduct on consumer welfare in line with 
the consumer welfare objective. This doctrine seems to attest the priority of structure of the 
market over performance of market participants.
10
 If priority is given to the structure of the 
market and competition is valued as a process rather than an outcome, there will be no 
room for the consideration of efficiencies that might be generated by the conduct and the 
market will always be better-off with more competitors. Any special responsibility will 
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then be irrelevant to the determination of liability, if a competition authority or a court asks 
the correct question as to whether the conduct has exclusionary effects on the market.
11
 
In line with the essence of the modernisation, the Discussion Paper does not 
attribute any special responsibility to dominant undertakings and makes no reference to 
such throughout the document. By contrast, the Guidance articulates this from the outset, in 
the first paragraph.
12
 In general, the Guidance did not go as far as the Discussion Paper in 
terms of the Commission’s commitment to consumer welfare and also refers on many 
points to concepts from the economic freedom objective, special responsibility being only 
one of them.
13
 Attributing a special responsibility to dominant firms is not in line with the 
effects-based approach and actually causes an unnecessary inconsistency in a consumer 
welfare-oriented document like the Guidance. Nevertheless, this is justifiable considering 
the fact that the Commission could not contradict the judgments of the EU Courts, where 
this doctrine is widely established, through the use of a soft law instrument.
14
 
All in all, special responsibility is the last bastion of an obsolete approach which 
should now be jettisoned in favour of the modernisation of Art.102.
15
 To date, the 
Commission and the EU Courts have relied on the doctrine of special responsibility under 
the traditional form-based approach to Art.102 to sanction perfectly sound commercial 
practices that are otherwise considered pro-competitive, without having to prove the anti-
competitive effects of such practices.
16
 With the modernisation, this concept seems to be no 
longer necessary, if not contradictory, in the enforcement of Art.102 through the lens of the 
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effects-based approach. In this respect, special responsibility is not mentioned in the 
Discussion Paper, and in the Guidance it seems to have practically lost its major traditional 
role it has played in the case law. 
2.1.2.  Competition as a Process vs. Competition as an Outcome 
A directly related issue to the shift from the special responsibility towards efficiency is the 
perception of “competition” which seems to differ between the economic freedom and the 
consumer welfare objectives. The modernisation of Art.102 has raised the important 
question among scholars as to whether competition is a “process of rivalry” between 
undertakings in a given market or an “outcome” which is supposed to bring benefits to 
consumers. The answer is hugely important as it will determine the approach towards 
abuse: If competition is a process, or an “institution”, it will have an intrinsic value which 
will form the basis of its protection. In this case, rivalry among firms will be the focus of 
Art.102. On the other hand, if competition is an outcome, or an “end result”, such as low 
prices or better products, it will be protected not for its own sake, but for the benefits that 
may be derived by consumers. In this case, the protection of consumer welfare will be the 
focus of Art.102. 
 Even decades before the modernisation, the role attributed to competition differed 
remarkably between the schools of thought in competition law and economics in the US. 
The Harvard School, under its famous “Structure-Conduct-Performance” (SCP) 
paradigm,
17
 postulates that the structure of a market determines the firms’ conduct, which 
in turn influences the performance of that market. Taking a structuralist approach, the 
Harvard School views competition as a “process”. If the market structure is that of a 
monopoly, then the market will be conducive to monopolistic conduct, but if it is 
pluralistic, meaning that there are a certain amount of competitors in the market, then the 
conduct will be less likely to be monopolistic. It argues that a high level of concentration in 
a market will facilitate the exercise of monopoly power, whereas the market will be more 
                                                          
17
 The SCP paradigm became dominant in the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s, and was associated with Harvard 
economists such as Joe Bain, Edward Mason and Carl Kaysen. See generally Gormsen, L. L. (2010a) A 
Principled Approach to Abuse of Dominance in European Competition Law, CUP, United Kingdom, p.30. 
61 
 
 
 
competitive with a low level of concentration.
18
 Rivalry is thus seen as an essential part of 
competition. 
 The Harvard’s School view of competition law and economics was “replaced” by 
the Chicago School’s line of thinking which questioned some of the principles previously 
established by the Harvard School. The Chicago School
19
 rejects the SCP paradigm and 
argues that the assessment of abusive conduct should be based on its effects on competition 
or on efficiency. It questions the idea of competition being a process and finds it 
inappropriate to presume competitive harm from high levels of concentration in the market. 
Rather, competition is regarded as an outcome, which either brings benefits to or harms 
consumers, as the case with price increases, output limitations and so on. The conduct is not 
considered exclusionary when it benefits consumers despite reducing the pluralistic 
structure of the market. Protecting the structure of the market in itself is inconsistent with 
the efficiency-oriented Chicago School, which believes in the goal of efficiency.
20
 
Turning back to the EU, the economic freedom objective is motivated primarily by 
a concern for the structure of the market and competition as a process. Ordoliberalism treats 
competition as an institution, and the paramount concern is harm to the structure of the 
market, evidenced through the relative position of rivals.
21
 Position of rivals is 
determinative in this objective: If competition is understood as a process, then the number 
of competitors in a given market will show the sign of competition in that market. Rivalry 
matters so much that a particular market structure should be guaranteed, which most 
usually translates as a certain number of competitors.
22
 The pluralistic structure of the 
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market is assumed to turn into more competition in the market, at least in the short run. 
Accordingly, the higher the number of competitors in a market, the more competitive the 
market becomes. 
Proponents of the consumer welfare objective view competition as an outcome, 
providing consumers with a variety of cheaper and better products. In line with this line of 
thought, what matters are the outcomes for consumers that competition in a particular 
market delivers, not the particular form that the competitive process takes.
23
 Whilst the 
competitive process is important as an instrument, its protection is not an aim in itself; the 
ultimate aim is the protection of consumer welfare, as an outcome of the competitive 
process.
24
 When competition is understood as an outcome, the number of competitors in the 
market will not be a necessary indication of competition. Reduction in the number of 
players in the market is not deemed as anti-competitive in itself; the observation that the 
absence of a sufficient number of competitors can lead to consumer harm is now ‘trite’.25 
It has been argued that in line with the idea of competition being a process, the 
Commission and the EU Courts have firmly believed that there is no effective competition 
where there are no competitors.
26
 In their decisions and judgments thus far, they seemed to 
have been inclined to protect competition in the market as a process, through protecting the 
structure of the market or structure of competition.
27
 In this respect, in her oft-quoted 
opinion in British Airways, Advocate General (AG) Kokott regarded competition as an 
“institution”. When British Airways raised the objection that the Commission had to prove 
that the allegedly abusive conduct had actual effects on competition, AG Kokott opined 
that: 
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‘Article [102]… is not designed only or primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual 
competitors or consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as such (as an 
institution), which has already been weakened by the presence of the dominant undertaking on the market. 
In this way, consumers are also indirectly protected. Because where competition as such is damaged, 
disadvantages for consumers are also to be feared.’28 
As can be seen, Art.102 has been thought by the AG Kokott to protect competition 
as a process or an institution. Clearly, competition is not protected as an outcome which 
benefits consumers. Consumer interests are almost considered as a by-product while the 
real focus of the Art.102 is to protect the process of rivalry in the market, or competition as 
such. Rivalry is assumed to bring benefits and by protecting rivalry, consumers are thus 
indirectly protected. Evident from this Opinion, competition is thought to be weakened by 
the mere presence of a dominant undertaking, which is a clear indication of the economic 
freedom objective. This Opinion was delivered in 2007 before the Guidance, while the 
modernisation was still underway. Some judgments after the Guidance still show the 
emphasis on the protection of competition, sometimes without competition being referred 
to as an institution, but apparently with more consideration of the position of consumers.
29
 
To sum up, the answer to the question as to whether competition is a process of 
rivalry or an outcome is not theoretical; on the contrary, it will determine the approach 
towards abusive conduct under Art.102. Traditionally, the Commission and the EU Courts 
have regarded competition as a process and intervened when the allegedly abusive conduct 
in question threatened the structure of the market in the absence of any detailed assessment 
on possible benefits of the conduct on consumer welfare. A shift from the doctrine of 
special responsibility towards the concept of efficiency requires, and will eventually result 
in, competition to be viewed as an “outcome”. The Guidance now states that the 
Commission will direct its enforcement to ensuring that ‘consumers benefit from the 
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efficiency and productivity which result from effective competition between 
undertakings’.30 
2.1.3.  The Way to the Concept of Efficiency 
The rise of the concept of efficiency in the assessment of abusive conduct first took place in 
the US. Starting from 1980s, the US courts have relied almost exclusively on their 
assessment of whether conduct reduces efficiency and the analysis of claims of exclusion 
focused overwhelmingly on efficiency consequences.
31
 The US Supreme Court’s reasoning 
in Aspen unequivocally put the emphasis on this concept. The Court held that ‘[i]f a firm 
has been “attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than efficiency,” it is fair to 
characterize its behavior as predatory.’32 Accordingly, when exclusion is the result of the 
firm’s efficiency, the allegedly abusive conduct constitutes lawful pro-competitive conduct. 
Equally, when the conduct is ‘not motivated by efficiency concerns’ or ‘not related to any 
apparent efficiency’ or the dominant firm in question fails to ‘offer any efficiency 
justification’, then it will amount to an abuse.33 Also, Microsoft suggests that pro-
competitive conduct involves ‘greater efficiency’, whereas abusive conduct involves no or 
less efficiency, but the decisive factor is efficiency in any case.
34
 
The concept of efficiency has almost become a ‘basic antitrust principle’ in the 
US.
35
 By contrast, both the Commission and the EU Courts have historically taken a very 
sceptical view in response to efficiency arguments.
36
 This is due to the predominantly 
pursued objective of economic freedom which regards efficiency as a by-product rather 
than an aim in itself. The modernisation of Art.102, however, appears to have brought 
                                                          
30
 Guidance, para.5 (emphasis added). 
31
 Kovacic, W. E. (2007) ‘The Intellectual DNA of Modern U.S. Competition Law for Dominant Firm 
Conduct: The Chicago/HarvardDouble Helix’, Colombia Business Law Review, 1(1), p.19-20. 
32
 Aspen Skiing Co. v Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 US 585 (1985), para.605 (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted). 
33
 ibid. 
34
 In Microsoft, while discussing the burden of proof in the case at hand, the Court of Appeals held that if the 
monopolist asserts that ‘its conduct is indeed a form of competition on the merits because it involves, for 
example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal-then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut 
that claim.’ United States v Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 346 (D.C. Cir. 2001), para.355 (emphasis added). 
35
 Kirkwood, J. B. (2013) ‘The Essence of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from 
Anticompetitive Conduct’, 81 Fordham Law Review, p.2432. 
36
 Bellis, J. F. and Kasten, T. (2010) “Will Efficiencies Play an Increasingly Important Role in the Assessment 
of Conduct Under Article 102?”, in Etro, F. and Kokkoris, I. (eds.), Competition Law and the Enforcement of 
Article 102, OUP, Great Britain, p.131. 
65 
 
 
 
efficiency to the fore in the assessment of abusive conduct. Even before the publication of 
the Discussion Paper, the former Competition Commissioner Kroes stated from the outset 
that the Commission ‘must find a way to include efficiencies in [its] analysis.’37 Evidently, 
the modernisation process has been instrumental in the move towards efficiency in the EU, 
in spite of some references to this concept in some decisions and judgments before the 
modernisation process started. 
Although efficiency was discussed in EU competition law before the modernisation, 
it was not at the centre of the assessment, at least not in the US sense of this concept. As 
early as 1985, the Commission in AKZO decided that ‘[t]he maintenance of a system of 
effective competition does however require that a small competitor be protected against 
behaviour by dominant undertakings designed to exclude it from the market not by virtue of 
greater efficiency or superior performance but by abuse of dominance.’38 According to this 
finding, if conduct is not the result of ‘greater efficiency’, it should constitute an abuse. 
Similarly, in Irish Sugar, the GCEU held that in order for the protection of commercial 
position of a dominant firm to be lawful, it must be at the very least based on ‘criteria of 
economic efficiency’.39 In the context of rebates, the GCEU explained that principally a 
dominant firm ‘can give discounts that relate to efficiencies, but cannot give discounts or 
incentives to encourage customer loyalty’.40 
There has been an increasing trend among both American and European 
commentators in favour of efficiency. Hovenkamp argues that antitrust enforcement should 
be designed in such a way as to prohibit conduct ‘precisely to the point that it is inefficient, 
but to tolerate or encourage it when it is efficient.’41 Posner puts forward that only when 
market power is used to ‘perpetuate a monopoly not supported by superior efficiency 
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should the law step in.’42 Whish contends that ‘if a firm ends up as a monopolist simply by 
virtue of its superior efficiency, this should be applauded, or at very least not be 
condemned.’43 Waelbroeck stresses that dominant firms are not prohibited to compete even 
aggressively ‘provided this is the result of this greater efficiency’.44 Nazzini takes a further 
step and insists that the definition of abuse as laid down in Hoffmann La Roche ‘establishes 
the general principle that conduct is abusive when it restricts competition by means other 
than behaviour based on efficiency’.45 
Efficiency analysis in competition law is scientific and well-grounded in economics. 
It is often used to indicate specific situations such as “productive efficiency”, “allocative 
efficiency” and “dynamic efficiency”.46 In all of these situations, the underlying idea is the 
same: They indicate a situation where a dominant firm have achieved success (and 
excluded its competitors) through its “hard work” and by doing better than its competitors. 
The fact that competitors’ businesses have been impaired, their competitiveness have been 
reduced or they have been driven out of the market, all of which are a central concern for 
the economic freedom objective, is disregarded under the consumer welfare objective due 
to the countervailing efficiency of the dominant firm which has brought consumers 
desirable outcomes such as lower prices, new or improved products, high quality goods or 
services and so on. As can thus be seen, where the emphasis is put on efficiency, 
competition will be ipso facto regarded as an outcome. 
To conclude, the concept of efficiency has gained greater prominence in the 
assessment of abusive conduct with the Chicago School which postulates that the objective 
of competition law should be efficiency and the maximisation of consumer welfare, and 
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any other objective is therefore irrelevant. While some references were made to this 
concept in the case law of the EU Courts albeit not in the US sense of this concept, the 
modernisation of Art.102 appears to be instrumental in the shift towards this concept from 
the economic freedom objective. The adoption of efficiency in the EU normally implies a 
rejection of the economic freedom objective and its doctrine of special responsibility, 
which has been gaining ground among a vast majority of European commentators.
47
 
Throughout the Guidance, the Commission now makes numerous references to efficiency 
and efficiency-related arguments.
48
 
2.2.  From a Form-based Approach to an Effects-based Approach 
2.2.1.  The Form-based Approach: A Doctrine that Has Been Much Relied Upon 
As a consequence of the shift towards the adoption of the consumer welfare objective with 
a strong reliance on the concept of efficiency, one of the fundamental changes in the 
Commission’s approach to abusive conduct under Art.102 with the modernisation is the 
embracement of the effects-based approach at the expense of the form-based approach. The 
form-based approach has been often relied upon in the Commission’s decisional practice 
and in many judgments of the EU Courts. The Commission and the EU Courts have been 
criticised for placing too much emphasis on the form of conduct and too little emphasis on 
its effects on the market and consumers. By the same token, Art.102 has been criticised for 
being formalistic and structuralist. The discussion and management of Art.102 cases are 
often organised by forms or categories of conduct.
49
 
As the name implies, the form-based approach requires that the form of the conduct 
of a dominant firm is subject to the assessment of abuse of a dominant position instead of 
its effects on the market, on competition or on consumers. In line with this approach, once 
the conduct is determined and the firm is found to be dominant on the relevant market, the 
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conduct is often found to be anti-competitive without actually proving whether it generates 
anti-competitive effects. Therefore all a competition authority or a court has to do is to rule 
the conduct as either abusive or lawful based on the category that the conduct is fit into.
50
 
This approach leads to allegedly anti-competitive practices being categorised under various 
headings, based on descriptions of behaviour that are likely to be prohibited regardless of 
the factual context or actual economic impact in any particular case.
51
 
A form-based approach does not mean that effects of conduct are utterly 
disregarded; more exactly it should mean that forms of certain types of conduct are 
considered highly likely to generate anti-competitive effects from the outset. Therefore 
from the enforcer’s point of view, there will be no need to prove those effects in every case 
once the form is determined. Even under an effects-based approach, there may be no need 
to fully examine detrimental effects on consumers if economic theory demonstrates that 
consumers are almost always harmed from certain types of conduct.
52
 This is mostly the 
case with price-fixing or market-sharing agreements among competitors, so called “object 
restrictions”, under Art.101 TFEU. However, in the area of unilateral conduct, such a per se 
illegality for abuse of a dominant position under Art.102 will not normally be the right 
approach.
53
 
Arguably, the form-based approach, as has been applied in the EU, has not served to 
this purpose. Under the influence of the economic freedom objective, the form-based 
approach resulted in certain types of conduct with exclusionary potential being condemned, 
not because they caused harm to consumers but because they excluded, or attempted to 
exclude, competitors from the relevant market. It has been argued that in general, the EU 
Courts were satisfied if the Commission showed the expected exclusionary effects of a 
given practice and as a result, practices with exclusionary potential were presumed to be 
abusive unless an objective justification for the practice in question could be put forward by 
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the dominant firm engaging in that practice.
54
 As discussed in Chapter 1, many of the past 
judgments of the EU Courts articulated a high level of formalism whereby the EU Courts 
reiterated that anti-competitive effects were not necessary for a finding of abuse.  
Also commentators have noted that a formalistic approach towards certain types of 
conduct, in particular loyalty rebates and exclusive dealing, was adopted in the case law. 
Spinks argues that the lawfulness of exclusive dealing depended first on whether the 
supplier is or is not in a dominant position, and if this condition is fulfilled, then exclusive 
dealing is generally prohibited by Art.102 where it is capable of affecting trade between the 
MSs.
55
 Lugard similarly contends that the treatment of exclusive dealing is traditionally 
marked by a stronger belief that exclusive dealing by a dominant firm is harmful and 
should be treated as unlawful under Art.102.
56
 Waelbroeck observes that there is a general 
tendency in the EU to simply presume systematic anti-competitive effects in the case of any 
rebate scheme of a dominant firm and to underestimate their pro-competitive effects.
57
 
Niels and Jenkins claim that the treatment of loyalty rebates illustrates the shortcomings of 
the form-based approach in EU competition law.
58
 Lastly, Zenger states that the treatment 
of loyalty rebates by the EU Courts ‘is bound to punish successful innovators and to protect 
less effective rivals from the inconveniences of the competitive process.’59 
In fact, the form-based approach is not entirely meritless; it has some redeeming 
features. The form-based approach may provide greater legal certainty and faster 
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resolutions than an effects-based approach.
60
 It may provide guidance to dominant firms on 
the forms of conduct that are or could be prohibited. It has been argued that enforcers 
should endeavour to provide firms with clear signs of which kinds of conduct are likely to 
be legal and which kinds are likely to be condemned.
61
 It is essential for companies to 
know firstly whether they are dominant and secondly what conduct they must avoid.
62
 In 
addition, the form-based approach helps competition authorities to utilise their scarce 
resources more efficiently and reduce their enforcement costs, which may appear very 
appealing from enforcers’ point of view. 
On the other hand, the form-based approach can occasionally be rigid in that it 
might not be conducive to companies adopting optimally efficient business practices.
63
 This 
in turn might discourage or chill pro-competitive conduct which would have otherwise 
benefitted consumers. With the adoption of a form-based approach, enforcers run the risk 
of forbidding courses of conduct that have no anti-competitive – or that wield pro-
competitive – effects.64 In addition to blocking ‘benign’ conduct, it can also allow 
detrimental conduct and thus end up with providing clarity at superficial level, rather than 
at fundamental level.
65
 There is always a risk that a list of prohibited forms of conduct may 
constitute ‘an uncomfortable “straight jacket” that would impede economic progress and 
development’.66 Past experience has shown that the form-based approach generally fails to 
protect consumer interests.
67
 
Consequently, the form-based approach to abusive conduct has been often relied 
upon in the Commission’s decisional practice and in many judgments of the EU Courts. 
Under the influence of the economic freedom objective, the form-based approach resulted 
in some types of conduct with exclusionary potential, in particular loyalty rebates and 
exclusive dealing, being condemned in the absence of any harm to consumers. From an 
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enforcer’s point of view, it is true that the form-based approach is easily administrable; 
however, it no longer seems to be an appropriate approach, when one takes into account the 
risk that Art.102 might actually discourage competition on the part of dominant firms as a 
result of an overly-formalistic analysis of their conduct. With the modernisation of Art.102, 
the Commission has aimed to replace the form-based approach with more up-to-date 
effects-based approach, which will be discussed immediately below. 
2.2.2.  The Effects-based Approach: A Better but Complex Assessment 
In an attempt to counteract the harsh criticisms levelled against the Commission and the EU 
Courts for being formalistic in many of their decisions and judgments, the modernisation of 
Art.102 involves a shift from the doctrine of special responsibility, which is a product of 
the economic freedom objective, towards the concept of efficiency, which is at the heart of 
the consumer welfare objective. Following the adoption of efficiency, analysing the effects 
of conduct on the market and on consumers stands out as the fundamental part of the 
assessment of abusive conduct in Art.102 cases. Since efficiency requires the assessment of 
effects of conduct on consumers, which is not the focus of the economic freedom objective, 
it is understood that apparently the form-based approach fails to serve to this end and 
therefore the adoption of the effects-based approach has gained ground in the EU. 
The effects-based approach to Art.102 implies that the assessment of each specific 
case is not undertaken on the basis of the form that a particular behaviour takes, but is 
based on the assessment of the anti-competitive effects generated as a result of the conduct. 
According to this approach, conduct should be condemned as abusive under Art.102 only 
where it could be demonstrated that it had, or was likely to have, a seriously anti-
competitive effect on the market.
68
 This approach has been widely advocated by the 
EAGCP Report which argues in favour of an effects-based approach to Art.102 and focuses 
on the examination of anti-competitive effects that harm consumers in each specific case.
69
 
The Report insists that formalism should be replaced with the assessment of effects, based 
on sound economics and grounded on facts. 
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The effects-based approach serves two purposes: It guarantees that the statutory 
provisions do not unduly thwart pro-competitive practices on the part of dominant firms, as 
the case with the economic freedom approach, and in the same vein, anti-competitive 
practices do not outwit legal provisions.
70
 This approach provides a more consistent 
treatment of abusive conduct, since the conduct is assessed in terms of its outcome and 
different practices which lead to the same result will therefore be subject to a comparable 
treatment.
71
 By focusing on effects rather than forms of conduct, an economics-based 
approach makes it more difficult for dominant firms to circumvent competition rules by 
way of attempting to achieve the same end results through the use of different unilateral 
practices.
72
 It would be highly problematic to simply define rules depending on the 
categorisation of conduct since a number of practices fit into multiple categories, which 
could lead to different outcomes depending on how they happened to be categorised.
73
 
The trans-Atlantic divide is clearly visible in the context of the analysis of effects of 
abusive conduct. In the US, exclusionary effects have to be proved, not as a hypothesis nor 
as a logical possibility, but as a reasonable possibility.
74
 It is accepted that ‘to be 
condemned as exclusionary, a monopolist's act must have an “anticompetitive effect”’.75 
However, the same cannot be said for the EU. The concept of effects has given rise to some 
of the most contentious issues under Art.102; in particular whether it is necessary to 
examine anti-competitive effects in all cases, what the standard for anti-competitive effects 
is or should be, and how the presence or absence of such effects should be measured.
76
 As 
discussed above, in general the EU Courts were satisfied if the Commission showed the 
expected exclusionary effects of conduct and as a result practices exclusionary potential 
were easily ruled as abusive.
77
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The effects-based approach requires the clarification of two questions: On what or 
who and to what extent must effects be demonstrated? Effects can be generated on 
consumers, competition or competitors.
78
 Adoption of the effects-based approach does not 
necessarily mean that effects should be generated on consumers. However, the effects-
based approach is closely associated with the consumer welfare objective which is 
concerned with effects on consumers as part of the assessment. In some cases, a reference 
is made to “competition” in addition to consumers in order to show the subject on which 
effects should be demonstrated. Often the reference to “effects on competition” is made to 
distinguish it from “effects on competitors”, which is disregarded under the consumer 
welfare objective. Some allegedly effects-based cases before the modernisation indicate 
that the Commission did adopt an effects-based approach, but considered the effects on the 
structure of the market rather than on consumers.
79
 
The extent to which effects must be demonstrated is another question raised after 
the adoption of the effects-based approach. It has been argued that an effect-based approach 
does not mean fully quantifying all the pro- and anti-competitive effects of the conduct in 
each case and then weighing these against each other, even though some economists may 
have created this impression.
80
 The use of an effects-based approach does not imply that 
complex economic or econometric analyses will be necessary in every case, although they 
can, of course, be useful tools.
81
 Implying that the standard of proof for effects that is 
sufficient to rule conduct as abusive need not to be high, the Commission stated that anti-
competitive effects can be shown by carefully analysing the factual developments in the 
relevant markets and the ways in which the conduct is likely to affect the market.
82
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On the other hand, an effects-based approach can be quite complex and may some 
have drawbacks, such as too little accountability, the risk of arbitrary treatment, under-
enforcement, poor predictability and low administrability.
83
 Detailed economic assessments 
may undermine legal certainty. To a certain extent, dominant firms should be given clear 
guidance in order to be able to judge the legality of their conduct vis-à-vis competition 
rules, especially when they are willing to pursue new business strategies. Furthermore, 
adopting an effects-based approach may complicate decision making and take longer for 
competition authorities to actually assess effects, and therefore risks being unenforceable in 
the end. From an enforcer’s point of view, Lowe states that a pure effects-based approach 
can be too costly in terms of enforcement and the Commission should also use proxies and 
presumptions to make enforcement more practical and swift.
84
 
All in all, analysing the effects of conduct on consumers stands out as the 
fundamental part of the assessment of abusive conduct with the shift towards efficiency and 
consumer welfare. The effects-based approach is the result of advances in economic 
thinking in the area of unilateral conduct and offers many benefits compared to a form-
based approach, despite the fact that it may undermine legal certainty and can be resource-
intensive for competition authorities and courts. The Guidance now proposes an approach 
focusing on the effects of the dominant firm’s conduct and reflects the Commission’s 
thinking as to the most effective application of Art.102 in the EU context in order to keep 
pace with the teachings of modern economics, the constantly evolving dynamics of markets 
and the industrial development of Europe.
85
 
2.2.3.  The Increasing Use of Economics in Assessing Abuse of a Dominant Position 
Economic considerations are more central to legal analysis in competition law compared to 
other bodies of law. Competition law is not purely legal; it is very much grounded in 
economics. Competition law consists of a set of rules that regulate business life and free 
                                                          
83
 Prieto, C. (2011) “Anticipated Enforcement of in France of the Commission’s Guidance on Article 82”, in 
Pace, L. F. (ed.), European Competition Law: The Impact of the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Great Britain, p.135. 
84
 Lowe (2007), p.8. 
85
 Press Release, “Antitrust: Guidance on Commission enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 to 
exclusionary conduct by dominant firms – frequently asked questions”, MEMO/08/761, Brussels, 3 December 
2008. 
75 
 
 
 
competition among undertakings in the market place by inter alia prohibiting certain forms 
of joint or unilateral conduct of market participants. The legal framework of the rules is 
determined by the law, but the content of those rules is mostly determined by economics. 
According to most economists, economics helps in putting flesh on the bare bones when 
one attempts to define the vague concepts in competition law such as “restriction of 
competition” under Art.101 TFEU or “abuse of a dominant position” under Art.102 which 
seem to have no content on their own.
86
 Competition law has surely benefitted in the last 
generation from an infusion of economic sophistication.
87
 
With the modernisation, economic considerations have gained an increasing 
prominence in the assessment of abusive conduct under Art.102. The basic tenets of the 
Ordoliberal philosophy neither cite, nor rely on any empirical economic evidence or micro-
economic theory; they appeared to be based on a philosophy of political or social 
economy.
88
 Meanwhile, confidence in the value of economics has promoted the use of 
consumer welfare as the normative reference point.
89
 The shift towards the consumer 
welfare objective has paved the way for the assessment of the effects of abusive conduct, 
which requires a more economics-based approach. Efficiency requires an effects analysis 
and a careful examination of consumer benefits that may be yielded by the allegedly 
abusive exclusionary conduct, not just the exclusionary effects on competitors. As the 
consumer welfare standard mainly considers the effect of conduct on prices and output, 
gathering data relevant to assessing the influence of conduct on price and output levels 
inevitably calls for the use of economic methods.
90
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 Because of the complexity of the assessment, an economics-based approach will 
naturally lend itself to a “rule of reason” approach to competition law, since careful 
consideration of the specifics of each case is needed, and this is likely to be especially 
difficult under “per se” rules.91 Under a per se illegality rule, which is reminiscent of the 
form-based approach, conduct is ex ante deemed as abusive without the need for a detailed 
inquiry into its effects on consumers; whereas under the rule of reason analysis, effects of 
the conduct are ex post evaluated through an elaborate economic analysis. Economists 
overwhelmingly agree that a rule of reason based approach is correct when dealing with 
unilateral conduct and have criticised the past policy under Art.102, since historically a 
number of practices under this Article had been effectively subject to a strong presumption 
of illegality.
92
 Most commentators have taken a quite negative stance against per se rules to 
govern abusive conduct.
93
 
Although most commentators agree on the use of the rule of reason approach in the 
area of unilateral conduct, the increasing role of economics in the assessment has been 
questioned as well. First, economic theories or laws are not a natural law like the Universal 
Law of Gravitation which can be tested; instead they often rely on hypothesis and 
assumptions that are only accepted by an overwhelming majority of economists.
94
 
Economists often differ in their assessment of efficiencies and effects, given the variety of 
economic models and their underlying assumptions. Furthermore, while the economic 
theory has produced a unified set of predictions regarding the impact of the agreements 
between competitors or horizontal mergers, there is no unified theory of foreclosure in the 
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case of exclusionary practices: The same practice can be pro-competitive or anti-
competitive depending on the circumstances.
95
 
Dabbah claims that although economists have made an important contribution to the 
understanding of competition law, they have proved to be simply unable to develop theories 
suitable for the economic reality of markets and taking into account the implications of 
variability of different business strategies, market behaviours and structures.
96
 Riziotis 
argues that economic analysis is based on models, which as such deviate from reality, and 
their outcome varies depending on how many and which variables one takes into account.
97
 
According to the author, it is not rare that economics offers no clear answer, and therefore 
the role of economics in competition law decision making should not be over-estimated. 
Mertikopoulou stresses that economic analysis should be viewed not as an end in itself, but 
rather as a means of complementing the established legal analysis and maintains that a strict 
economic perception bears the risk of overlooking the general context and principles of EU 
competition law.
98
 
To conclude, there is almost unanimity on an assessment based on effects of 
conduct and on a rule of reason approach, as opposed to formalistic and per se illegality 
rules. However, the same unanimity does not exist on the level and rigour of economic 
analysis. While most competition economists attribute a very big role for economics in the 
analysis, competition lawyers tend to show a more reserved approach to the excessive use 
of economics at the expense of legal certainty and established legal principles. 
Nevertheless, the modernisation of Art.102 has given a fresh impetus to the use of 
economic and econometric analysis in the assessment of abusive conduct. A chief 
competition economist post was created in 2003 within the DG Comp in order to strengthen 
the economic expertise capabilities of the Commission.
99
 Also, many officials within the 
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DG Comp have an economics background, and decisions taken today devote much more 
space to economic evidence and argument than do those from even a few years ago.
100
 
2.3.  From Harm to Competitors to Consumer Harm 
2.3.1.  The Standard of Harm under Art.102 
As discussed in Chapter 1, when the Union dimension element and the dominant position 
element are omitted from the text of Art.102, the Article merely states that “any abuse shall 
be prohibited”. This shows that Art.102 does not articulate a standard of competitive harm, 
which could have helped to explain why certain conduct amounts to an abuse of a dominant 
position or why abuse is prohibited. Unlike Art.101 TFEU, there is no reference to “object 
or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition” in the text of Art.102. 
However, there may be no need for a “restriction of competition” element for conduct to 
constitute an abuse: If there is only one firm having 100 percent market shares in a market 
(monopolist), there will be no competition to restrict. In this case, the abuse cannot be 
exclusionary since there are no firms to exclude from the market. 
The traditional abusive practices in this scenario may be exploitative such as an 
increase in price, reduction in output or a lack of dynamic efficiency. It has been 
commented that in order to catch these types of conduct and encompass exploitative abuses, 
it was presumably thought appropriate by the original draftsman to exclude any reference 
under Art.102 to an “object or effect prevention, restriction or distortion of competition” 
element similar to that in Art.101 TFEU.
101
 However, some judgments in case law appear 
to make reference to such element even in the context of exclusionary conduct. The GCEU 
held in Michelin II that ‘in the light of the context of Article [102], conduct will be regarded 
as abusive only if it restricts competition.’102 In British Airways,103 the same Court held the 
view that ‘[i]t is sufficient in that respect to demonstrate that the abusive conduct of the 
undertaking in a dominant position tends to restrict competition.’ 
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In fact, to a great extent, the standard of harm has a bearing on how abuse is 
defined. In other words, abuse is defined by the harm it causes. The key part of the 
definitions of abuse set out by commentators centres on the standard of harm. Within this 
context, a group of commentators have defined abusive conduct as conduct which harms 
the structure of a market. According to Temple Lang, conduct which ‘affects the structure 
of a market’ is an abuse.104 Gerber argues that any conduct which ‘significantly affected the 
structure of competition could constitute a violation of Article [102].’105 Korah maintains 
that conduct which ‘adversely affects the structure of the market may be forbidden under 
Article [102].’106 Lastly, Rodger and MacCulloch state that any form of conduct which 
‘threatens the competitive structure of the market might be considered abusive.’107 
According to these commentators, conduct is abusive because it harms competition or the 
structure of the market. 
Another group of commentators refer to the position of competitors of a dominant 
firm when defining abusive conduct. Faull and Nikpay contend that conduct which ‘can, 
directly or indirectly, affect the competitive position of a competitor might be caught by 
Article [102].’108 Jones and Sufrin argue that any conduct ‘which excludes competitors 
from the market may be capable of constituting an exclusionary abuse, whatever form it 
takes.’109 On the other hand; some commentators, who are mostly competition economists, 
point to consumer harm as the governing standard of harm. Bishop and Walker highlight 
that abuse can be defined as ‘a dominant firm adopting a particular mode of behaviour that 
significantly reduces consumer welfare relative to the alternative of the firm not adopting 
that mode of behaviour.’110 
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With regard to the standard of harm under Art.102, the predominant view of the EU 
Courts has been the protection of the structure of the market.
111
 In the EU, competition laws 
have protected the competitive structure and dynamics of the market.
112
 Protection of this 
competition process is believed to preserve incentives to compete and to serve both 
consumers and market actors.
113
 An established element of EU competition law is the 
assumption that protecting competition will ensure that the interests of consumers will be 
safeguarded.
114
 The concern for the structure of the market is based on the assumption that 
once it excludes its competitors, a dominant firm might begin to charge high prices, which 
would not have been charged if the market had been subject to effective competition. For 
this reason, competitors deserve some degree of protection. While the Commission used to 
refer to consumers, the consideration of consumer interests was often vague, for example a 
natural consequence of harm to competition, rather than as a direct harm to consumers.
115
 
 To sum up, there has not been a coherent and unified approach to the standard of 
harm under Art.102. There is a divergence among commentators as to whom or what 
should be protected from: Competition (the structure of the market) or competitors or 
consumers. Harm to competitors and harm to competition are often associated with the 
economic freedom objective, while harm to consumers is widely advocated by the 
proponents of the consumer welfare objective. It should be pointed out that there may not 
be clear distinctions between those three concepts: Protection of competition leads to 
protection of competitors in some cases,
116
 and sometimes harm to competition and harm to 
consumers seem to mesh with one another.
117
 To date, the EU Courts’ position has been 
that a healthy and unimpaired competitive market structure is presumed to be in the 
interests of consumers. With the modernisation, the emphasis is placed on consumer harm 
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as the standard of harm under Art.102 and competition is aimed to be protected not for its 
own sake, but for the outcomes it may bring in the interests of consumers. 
2.3.2.  The Harm to Competition vs. Harm to Competitors Dilemma 
There is a fundamental dilemma between harm to competition and harm to competitors as 
to which should be the governing standard of harm under Art.102. As will be discussed 
below, it has almost become a motto in the field of competition law that “competition law 
protects competition, not competitors”. This implies that harm to competition will be taken 
into account instead of harm to competitors. On the other hand, competition ceases to exist 
and monopoly prevails in the absence of competitors, and protection of competition has the 
indirect effect of protecting competitors in some cases.118 There is always harm to 
competitors where there is harm to competition; however, harm to some competitors may 
not necessarily harm competition. Especially, the assumption of harm to competition from 
harm to competitors has been criticised by the proponents of the consumer welfare 
objective. On the whole, distinguishing harm to competition from harm to competitors is by 
its nature far from being an easy practice and in fact, what is harm to competition is not 
pure, scientific or absolute.
119
 
Protection of competitors is generally not endorsed in the US and a great deal of 
judgments has reiterated that US antitrust law is concerned with ‘the protection of 
competition, not competitors.’120 The US Court of Appeals held that ‘[t]he antitrust laws are 
for the benefit of competition, not competitors.’121 In another judgment, the same Court 
made it clear that ‘[t]he purpose of the antitrust laws as it is understood in the modern cases 
is to preserve the health of the competitive process… rather than to promote the welfare of 
particular competitors.’122 According to the Court, a practice is not ‘anticompetitive’ simply 
because it harms competitors; it is ‘anticompetitive’ only if it harms the competitive 
process.
123
 In the same vein, it was held that ‘to constitute a violation the monopolist's 
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activities must tend to cause harm to competition; unrelated harm to an individual 
competitor or consumer is not sufficient.’124 Lastly, the US Supreme Court found that 
conduct that ‘may impose painful losses on [competitors] is of no moment to the antitrust 
laws if competition is not injured.’125 
One of the criticisms that is most frequently levelled by US commentators at EU 
competition law is that it protects competitors whereas it should focus on the protection of 
competition, or of the competitive process. Easterbrook, a US commentator as well as a 
federal judge, states that competition is ‘a ruthless process’, and therefore the deeper the 
injury to rivals, the greater the potential benefit is.
126
 Accordingly, the injuries to 
competitors are ‘byproducts of vigorous competition’, but ‘the antitrust laws are not balm 
for rivals' wounds.’127 The view in the US is that competition law and policy should be 
about protecting competition, not about protecting or defending competitors which are not 
as efficient as dominant firms. Competition is about winners and losers and what is 
important is safeguarding not competitors per se, but the competitive process whereby more 
efficient firms win at the expense of less efficient rivals.
128
 By contrast, much of the 
decisional practice of the Commission and the case law of the EU Courts centre around the 
tendency to assume detrimental effects on consumers from the exclusion of competitors.
129
 
With the modernisation of Art.102, the focus of the assessment shifts towards 
efficiency triggering a movement towards harm to competition as the standard of harm. The 
idea of protecting competitors with a view to furthering competition in the market has lost 
ground after the embracement of the concept of efficiency and the introduction of the “as 
efficient competitor” test. Under this test, exclusionary conduct amounts to an abuse, if it is 
likely to exclude from the market an equally (or more) efficient competitor of the dominant 
firm.
130
 The underlying idea is that harm to inefficient competitors is not translated into 
harm to competition, while harm to competitors who are as efficient as the dominant firm 
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causes harm to competition. “As efficient competitors” are not protected for the sake of 
their freedom to compete in an open market; they are protected because their exclusion is 
likely to reduce consumer welfare. Protection of less efficient competitors is thought to 
translate into protection of competitors from the very essence of competition itself such as 
lower prices, better quality, choice and so on.
131
 
To conclude, a dilemma exists between harm to competition and harm to 
competitors and the choice between these two types of standard of harm is made in favour 
of the former, at least in the US. The shift towards efficiency requires that harm to 
competitors should not be used as a shortcut to prove harm to competition in the assessment 
of abusive conduct. It has been stressed that there is no economic support for the legal 
presumption that any harm to competitors arising from the conduct of a dominant firm 
necessarily harms competition.
132
 Instead, commentators have come to argue that if the 
allegedly abusive conduct can be seen as an improvement in a competitive offering, on any 
of the criteria of price, quality, or choice; it should not be condemned no matter what it 
does to competitors.
133
 The Guidance now recognises that ‘what really matters is protecting 
an effective competitive process and not simply protecting competitors’ (para.6) and adopts 
the “as efficient competitor” test for price-based exclusionary conduct in order to 
distinguish harm to competition from harm to competitors. 
2.3.3.  The Growing Concern for Consumer Harm 
Competition authorities all around the world are becoming more conscious of the impact 
that competition policy and law enforcement has on consumers.
134
 Consumer harm has 
come to the fore as a factor in the analysis when economists, with a principal focus on 
efficiency, assumed a leading role in antitrust scholarship.
135
 The modernisation of Art.102 
has placed a strong emphasis on the promotion of efficiency and consumer welfare. It has 
been observed that identifying consumer harm is the primary impetus of modernisation of 
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Art.102.
136
 With the modernisation; consumers, who have been often regarded by the EU 
Courts as the “ultimate beneficiaries” of Art.102 through the protection of competition as a 
process, are intended to be the “direct beneficiaries” through the protection of competition 
as an outcome. The growing concern for consumer harm mirrors that conduct should only 
be considered as abusive where it generates actual or likely consumer harm. 
Harm to consumers has been argued to be the necessary part of the assessment 
because almost all types of unilateral conduct restrict the economic freedom of competitors 
of the dominant firm by forcing them to be more competitive in order to win back business; 
however, only some of them actually harm consumers. If conduct is prohibited in the 
absence of consumer harm, there is a risk that pro-competitive activity might be prevented 
and deterred in the future, which might cause harm by denying consumers innovative and 
lower-priced products.
137
 Harm to consumers includes increased prices, missed 
opportunities to pay lower prices, passing-on off costs, the imposition of unfavourable sales 
conditions on consumers, and reductions in innovation, service, quality and choice.
138
 
However, the best evidence of consumer harm is evidence that the conduct has had a 
material effect on output and prices, such as reducing output or increasing prices.
139
 
Before the modernisation, the proof of consumer harm was not paid much attention 
by the Commission and the EU Courts.
140
 The established view was that the proof of actual 
consumer harm is not required since it can be inferred from harm to competition. Indeed, an 
established element of EU competition law is the assumption that protecting competition 
will ensure that the interests of consumers will be safeguarded.
141
 The direct actual or 
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potential effect of conduct on consumers is generally not considered.
142
 In the landmark 
British Airways judgment, the GCEU held that Art.102 ‘does not require it to be 
demonstrated that the conduct in question had any actual or direct effect on consumers’ and 
maintained that the Article ‘concentrates upon protecting the market structure from 
artificial distortions because by doing so the interests of the consumer in the medium to 
long term are best protected.’143 In sharp contrast, in the US, substantial and actual harm to 
consumers has to be proved before competition liability can be established.
144
 
Although consumer harm as part of the assessment of abusive conduct is currently 
in ascendancy, sometimes harm to competition and harm to consumers seem to mesh with 
one another and are used interchangeably. With the growing concern for consumer harm 
after the modernisation, the question arises as to whether both types of harm are jointly 
necessary for a finding of abuse,
145
 or harm to competition is one and the same thing as 
harm to consumers,
146
 or alternatively, harm to competition also causes harm to consumers 
at the same time. Unlike the first two situations both of which can be justifiable in some 
respects, the last one seems to set forth an assumption of consumer harm from the proof of 
harm to competition. This is actually the view taken by the EU Courts to date and is not in 
line with the main premises of the modernisation of Art.102 as it may lead to protection of 
competitors. 
Consequently, the modernisation has created a growing concern for the proof of 
consumer harm as part of the assessment of abusive conduct, and consumers have begun to 
be viewed as the “direct beneficiaries” in the enforcement of Art.102. An assessment based 
on harm to consumers means that the conduct should only be considered as abusive where 
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it generates actual or likely consumer harm. The Guidance states that the Commission will 
focus on ‘those types of conduct that are most harmful to consumers’ and ensure that no 
‘adverse impact on consumer welfare’ will be permitted (paras.5 and 19). Although the 
Guidance now includes harm to consumers into the assessment, it is rather unclear whether 
harm to competition and harm to consumers are jointly necessary or harm to competition is 
one and the same thing as harm to consumers under the Guidance.
147
 
Conclusion 
Chapter 2 highlighted the changes in the Commission’s substantive assessment of abuse of 
a dominant position under Art.102 in the backdrop of the modernisation process. This 
Chapter identified three fundamental changes in the Commission’s new reading of Art.102 
and analysed each of those three changes in three different sections: With the 
modernisation, the Commission has aimed to steer the enforcement of Art.102 from a 
reliance on the special responsibility towards a greater recognition of efficiency (Section 
2.1), from an approach based on the form of conduct towards an approach that is concerned 
with the effects of conduct (Section 2.2) and lastly from the presence of harm to 
competitors to the analysis of consumer harm (Section 2.3). Section 2.1 observed that the 
modernisation of Art.102 is instrumental in the shift towards efficiency and since efficiency 
has been brought to the fore, special responsibility seems to be no longer necessary, if not 
contradictory, in the enforcement of Art.102 and this eventually results in competition to be 
viewed as an outcome. Section 2.2 observed that the modernisation of Art.102 has given a 
fresh impetus to the use of economic analysis in the assessment of abusive conduct and the 
traditional form-based approach, which is no longer regarded as an appropriate approach, 
has been replaced with the effects-based approach, which is the result of advances in 
economic thinking in the area of unilateral conduct. Finally, Section 2.3 observed that the 
modernisation has placed a strong emphasis on the proof of consumer harm as part of the 
assessment of abuse under Art.102, and while there are still doubts as to whether harm to 
competition is one and the same thing as consumer harm, the use of harm to competitors as 
shortcut to prove harm to competition has lost ground. 
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CHAPTER 3 – GUIDANCE ON THE COMMISSION’S 
ENFORCEMENT PRIORITIES IN APPLYING ART.102 
Introduction 
Chapter 3 explores two sub-questions: Firstly, what has the Guidance brought to the 
enforcement of Art.102? Secondly, how has that enforcement moved forward since the 
publication of the Guidance? This Chapter is devoted to the analysis of the Guidance as the 
main outcome of the modernisation process and the culmination of the Commission’s 
efforts to modernise the manner it enforces Art.102. The Chapter is not confined to the 
mere analysis of the paragraphs of the Guidance. Instead it analyses the Guidance within a 
broader framework which includes the purpose behind adopting the Guidance, the legal 
regime of the Guidance in EU competition law, commentators’ criticisms that have been 
levelled against the Guidance, the specific contributions of the Guidance to the enforcement 
of Art.102, and lastly the legal and institutional landscape which has shaped the post-
Guidance period in the aftermath of its official publication in early 2009. 
Chapter 3 is divided into three sections. Section 3.1 is on the purpose and the legal 
regime of the Guidance. This Section critically analyses the purpose of the Guidance by 
shedding light on its paragraphs with a view to showing as to what extent the effects-based 
and consumer welfare-oriented spirit of the modernisation is reflected throughout the 
Guidance. It then discusses the legal regime of the Guidance as a soft law instrument vis-à-
vis the case law of the EU Courts. Lastly it examines commentators’ responses to the 
Guidance in the literature as the Guidance has caused a great deal of controversy arising 
from its title to its substantive content. Section 3.1 observes that the Guidance was carefully 
worded as “Guidance” instead of “Guidelines” and although it is said to contain only 
“enforcement priorities” of the Commission, many of its paragraphs offer interpretations 
that differ significantly from the EU Courts’ case law on various points which leads one to 
the conclusion that the Commission intended to shape the future direction of the law on 
Art.102. 
Section 3.2 provides an overview of the contributions of the Guidance to the 
enforcement of Art.102 and examines the four elements which have been introduced as the 
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major contributions in this respect, namely the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure, the 
“as efficient competitor” test, efficiency defence and detailed assessments on specific forms 
of abusive exclusionary conduct. These four elements stand out as the most novel parts of 
the Guidance and aim at steering the enforcement of Art.102 from an Ordoliberal 
foundation towards an effects-based approach with a consumer welfare standard. Section 
3.2 observes that all of the four contributions of the Guidance are actually designed to 
promote an effects-based and consumer welfare-oriented enforcement of Art.102 which 
aim to achieve a substantive assessment of abusive conduct based on the effects it generates 
on consumers with the help of economic and econometric analysis. 
Section 3.3 explores the post-Guidance period from 2009. This Section is based on 
the premise that the enforcement of the Guidance is as important as its publication; 
therefore a discussion on the legal and institutional landscape which has shaped the post-
Guidance period is essential. It explores the initial expectations from the post-Guidance 
period, as well as the reaction of the EU Courts to the Commission’s new reading of 
Art.102. The Commission’s own practice in the post-Guidance period is given special 
consideration; whether the Commission has complied with the principles in the Guidance, 
whether the post-Guidance decisions are in accordance with the Commission’s 
“enforcement priorities”, how the allegations of abuse have appeared and how the cases 
have been assessed are extensively discussed in this Section. Section 3.3 observes that Art.9 
Regulation 1/2003 commitments mark another, albeit informal, stage in the modernisation 
of Art.102, as the Commission’s increasing use of such commitments has outstripped many 
practical discussions that were expected to take place after the issue of the Guidance but 
instead created new problems on the appropriateness, legal review and excessive use of 
commitments in Art.102 cases. 
3.1.  The Purpose and the Legal Regime of the Guidance 
3.1.1.    Guidance on Enforcement Priorities Rather than “Guidelines on Art.102” 
The Guidance is the culmination of the Commission’s efforts to modernise the manner it 
enforces Art.102 to unilateral conduct by dominant firms. As it is issued in the context of 
modernisation, evidently its purpose should be to further the modernisation. Chapter 2 
outlined the changes in the Commission’s approach towards the interpretation of abuse of a 
89 
 
 
 
dominant position with the modernisation Art.102 and showed, to a certain extent, what can 
be expected from the Guidance. In this respect, one expects the Guidance to show the 
Commission’s overall willingness to adopt a more economics-based approach, by 
articulating and clarifying some level of economic analysis or principles guiding its future 
enforcement of Art.102. It is worth looking at the Guidance itself on determining its 
purpose. Pursuant to para.2 of the Guidance: 
‘…Alongside the Commission's specific enforcement decisions, it is intended to provide greater 
clarity and predictability as regards the general framework of analysis which the Commission employs in 
determining whether it should pursue cases concerning various forms of exclusionary conduct and to help 
undertakings better assess whether certain behaviour is likely to result in intervention by the Commission 
under Article [102].’ 
Para.2 implies that the general purpose of the Guidance is to show the 
Commission’s general framework of analysis of abusive conduct which is expected to be 
more clear, predictable and foreseeable after the issue of the Guidance. This paragraph does 
not mention anything about the economics-based approach or the consumer welfare 
objective as the hallmarks of the modernisation of Art.102; this was expressed in the 
Commission’s Press Release more clearly.1 Para.5 states that under its general framework 
of analysis, the Commission will ‘focus on’ abusive conduct which is ‘most harmful to 
consumers’ with a view to ensuring that ‘markets function properly and that consumers 
benefit from the efficiency and productivity which result from effective competition 
between undertakings.’ 
Further to this end, para.6 seems to be related to the aim of the Commission, rather 
than that of the Guidance, in the enforcement of Art.102. Accordingly, ‘the emphasis’ of 
the Commission’s enforcement of Art.102 is on ‘safeguarding the competitive process in 
the internal market’ and ensuring that dominant undertakings do not exclude their 
competitors ‘by other means than competition on the merits’ (para.6). Rather than 
articulating an economics-based approach as normally expected, the Guidance uses the 
term ‘competitive process’ which is generally protected as a value in itself under the 
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economic freedom objective.
2
 It is noteworthy that the Guidance does not refer to, for 
example, “safeguarding the interests of consumers”, which could have been more in line 
with the main premises of the modernisation. 
However, para.6 continues to state that safeguarding the competitive process may 
require competitors, ‘who deliver less to consumers’, to leave the market. This is consistent 
with the generally accepted proposition that it will not be an abuse, if competitors are 
driven out from the market as long as the dominant firm is competing on the merits. The 
phrase “who deliver less to consumers” is particularly used to indicate the difference 
between “as efficient competitors” and inefficient or not yet “as efficient competitors”. 
Exclusion of “as efficient competitors” and inefficient or not yet “as efficient competitors” 
will then be subject to a different treatment. This is more in line with the consumer welfare 
approach which takes account of the extent of efficiency of competitors as it is deemed to 
have a bearing on the benefits they may bring to consumers. 
Although the purpose of the Guidance does not appear to be crystal clear, meaning 
that it is sending mixed signals between the consumer welfare and economic freedom 
objectives, it is clear that the Guidance is dealing with the Commission’s “enforcement 
priorities”. Turning back to para.2, the Guidance begins by stating that it sets out 
enforcement priorities that will guide the Commission’s action in applying Art.102.3 This 
confirms the title of the Guidance which is, as indicated before, “Guidance on the 
Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings”. The language in other sections of the 
Guidance is also indicative of the Commission’s willingness to set out its enforcement 
priorities.
4
 
Enforcement priorities indicate that the Commission has made it clear from the 
outset that it will prioritise certain cases over others. Actually, this is not an uncommon 
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practice of administrative bodies in their decision making process. Objectively speaking, 
resources of competition authorities are often limited. There may be few case handlers who 
may not manage to deal with all aspects of each and every case. By contrast, dominant 
firms defend themselves with reputable lawyers who have negotiation skills, probably 
superior to those of the Commission. They also hire economists who often complicate 
matters by making complex economic assessments and explaining different economic 
models through a pile of documents. Under these circumstances, it is ideal that scarce 
resources of competition authorities are used more efficiently and only in cases where this 
is necessary. 
On the other hand, because it sets out the enforcement priorities of the Commission, 
the Guidance does not constitute “Guidelines” in a legal sense. As it is not “Guidelines on 
the application of Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings”, it should not offer a new interpretation of the existing case law on Art.102.5 
Sounding like a disclaimer, para.3 stresses that the Guidance is not intended to constitute a 
statement of the law and is without prejudice to the interpretation of Art.102 by the EU 
Courts. This follows from the fact that the Commission may only act within its legal remit 
and cannot strike down the previous judgments of the EU Courts, no matter how 
incompatible they can be with the Guidance. But unlike the Discussion Paper, the Guidance 
is an official document and has an enforcement status.
6
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At this point, one could argue as to how a more economics-based approach can be 
reconciled with the existing formalistic case law of the EU Courts. Adoption of such an 
approach inevitably requires a certain degree of departure from the de lege lata law on 
Art.102. Since the Guidance is not labelled as “Guidelines” and only sets out enforcement 
priorities in this respect, it is arguable whether it is indeed the appropriate or ideal tool for 
the transition to the economics-based approach. If the EU Courts do not alter their 
interpretation, the Commission cannot legally do this on its own as an administrative body. 
This is because the Treaty gives the legal right to interpret what is an abuse and what is not 
an abuse of a dominant position under Art.102 to the CJEU;
7
 the Commission ensures the 
application of Art.102 under the judicial review of the GCEU and the CJEU. 
As the Commission was constrained by the interpretation of Art.102 by the EU 
Courts and the established jurisprudence thus tied its hands, the only viable option 
remained to the Commission was to set out its enforcement priorities by prioritising cases 
which are potentially more harmful to consumer welfare or eligible for the adoption of an 
economics-based approach. By prioritising cases which it deems as more detrimental to 
consumers so as to avoid protecting competitors, the Commission might be able to shape 
the future enforcement of Art.102 in a more consumer welfare-oriented direction. 
Nevertheless, such a change of direction would require the demonstration of some level of 
substantive analysis, which ought to be more grounded in economics. Therefore, the 
Commission had to demonstrate something more than enforcement priorities. 
In fact, a closer look at the Guidance shows that it does more than to set out 
enforcement priorities; it also includes the Commission’s views on certain points from the 
outset. For example, para.73 states that it is less likely for a dominant firm to engage in 
predation, if the conduct concerns a low price applied generally for a long period of time.
8
 
This paragraph is not related to an enforcement priority as it is more concerned with a 
situation where the conduct in question is deemed as less abusive, if not wholly legitimate. 
In a way, many paragraphs like this paragraph offer a new or different interpretation and 
eventually bring the Guidance closer to the level of Guidelines. It is noteworthy that the 
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Guidance refers to past judgments of the EU Courts to substantiate its arguments when 
there are overlaps, but tends to stick to its own arguments whenever it departs from the case 
law.
9
 
Some sections of the Guidance are drafted just like judgments and offer an 
interpretation of the law which is different from some of the past judgments of the EU 
Courts. The Commission merely uses the phrase “enforcement priority” and states that it 
will consider a certain practice as an enforcement priority if the conditions of its new 
criteria are met. To take but one example, para.81 states that the Commission will consider 
refusal to supply as an enforcement priority if (i) the refusal relates to a product that is 
“objectively necessary” to be able to compete effectively on a downstream market,10 (ii) is 
likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition on the downstream market and (iii) 
is likely to lead to consumer harm. This sounds more like substantive criteria for refusal to 
supply to amount to an abuse, rather than the Commission considering it as an enforcement 
priority. 
All in all, the purpose of the Guidance can be summarised as providing greater 
clarity and predictability on the Commission’s general framework of analysis of abusive 
conduct, as well as showing some level of analysis and guiding principles for the most 
harmful types of abusive conduct that will be tackled by the Commission with a view to 
safeguarding the competitive process in the internal market. The Guidance only sets out the 
Commission’s enforcement priorities mostly because this was the only thing the 
Commission could do within its legal remit vis-à-vis the existing formalistic judgments of 
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 For instance, the Commission seems to disregard the presence of “recoupment” in predation cases (which is 
considered by many scholars as a necessity under the consumer welfare approach), and in order to escape 
possible criticisms, it refers to a judgment of the GCEU, according to which recoupment was not treated as an 
essential element in establishing predation as an abuse of a dominant position. Fn.6 linked to para.71 
explicitly states that ‘[t]his was confirmed in Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International v Commission (Tetra Pak 
II) [1994] ECR II-755... where the [GCEU] stated that proof of actual recoupment was not required…’ On the 
other hand, the Guidance makes no reference to case law at all for “anti-competitive foreclosure” which is at 
the heart of the document. 
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refusal to supply as stated in Case C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v Mediaprint [1998] ECR I-7791. The third 
condition also does not exist in the established case law; the relevant case on this matter speaks of the refusal 
preventing the appearance of a new product for which there is potential consumer demand, but not exactly 
“consumer harm” as the Commission sets out in the Guidance. Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P RTE 
and ITP v Commission (Magill) [1995] ECR I-0743. 
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the EU Courts. While the Guidance is said to contain only enforcement priorities, many of 
its paragraphs offer interpretations that differ significantly from the case law on various 
points which leads one to the conclusion that the Commission has aimed to shape the future 
direction of the law on Art.102. 
3.1.2.  Commentators’ Responses to the Guidance 
The issue of the Guidance has attracted a significant amount of attention among scholars, 
practitioners and business representatives. Indeed the Guidance has caused a great deal of 
controversy and did not fully please everyone; even scholars who are happy with its 
publication nevertheless drew attention to some contradictions in it. On the whole, 
proponents of the consumer welfare objective and of the effect-based approach welcome 
the Guidance and are mostly satisfied with the focus on the effects of abusive conduct on 
consumers and efficiency considerations. On the other hand, the opponents object to the 
publication of the Guidance which, in their view, disregards the established jurisprudence 
of the EU Courts. Criticisms have been levelled against many aspects of the Guidance 
ranging from its title to its substantive content. 
The first ground for criticism is the fact that the Guidance opts for a more 
economics-based approach into abuse of a dominant position under Art.102 and few 
proponents of the form-based approach have criticised the Commission for not complying 
with the established case law. The second ground for criticism is related to the setting out 
of enforcement priorities and some commentators, while happy with the effects-based 
approach, have objected to the issue of the final document as “Guidance”, instead of 
“Guidelines”. The third and the last ground is more concerned with the substantive content 
of the Guidance, and some commentators have challenged the rigour and sophistication of 
the Commission’s assessment of abusive conduct. 
To start with the first group of criticisms; Mestmäcker, who is a pupil of one of the 
founding fathers of Ordoliberalism, clearly takes a negative stance against the Guidance 
and argues that in spite of the Commission’s disclaimer that the document is not intended to 
constitute a statement of law, it nevertheless and inevitably deals with the interpretation of 
Art.102 and the major principles developed during almost half a century case law and 
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administrative practice.
11
 Similarly, Pace accused the Commission of distorting the EU 
Courts’ case law to make it fit the new and different interpretation of Art.102, which is in 
marked contrast with both the EU Courts’ case law and the wording of the Article itself.12 
Gormsen takes the view that the Commission’s new interpretations in the Guidance 
ignore the case law of the EU Courts and accuses the Commission of acting outside of its 
remit.
13
 The author expresses the view that she does not disagree with the Commission’s 
move to an effects-based approach, but insists that the case law also takes into account 
“object” and “intent”, and pays attention to structure of the market; therefore, consumer 
welfare cannot be the ultimate goal of Art.102 by means of the Commission’s soft law. She 
draws attention to the legal uncertainty created by the Guidance and contends that a 
dominant firm will still have to follow the existing case law, but also know that the 
Commission has begun to interpret Art.102 differently. For all these reasons, the author 
respectfully suggests that the Commission withdraws the Guidance. 
Notwithstanding the departure from the case law, some commentators have taken a 
positive stance towards the Guidance. Whish regards the Guidance as ‘an invaluable 
contribution’, although he makes it clear that the EU Courts determine what is and what is 
not an abuse of a dominant position, and the Commission cannot contradict established 
jurisprudence.
14
 The author thinks that over a period of time, the Guidance will have an 
influence on the future orientation of Art.102 and will play an important part in the ‘soft 
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 Mestmäcker, E. J. (2011) “The Development of German and European Competition Law with Special 
Reference to the EU Commission’s Article 82 Guidance of 2008”, in Pace, L. F. (ed.), European Competition 
Law: The Impact of the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102, Edward Elgar Publishing, Great Britain, p.29. 
12
 Pace (2011), p.112. See also Witt, A. C. (2010) ‘The Commission's Guidance Paper on Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct - More Radical Than It Appears?’, European Law Review, 35(2), p.235 (‘The 
discrepancy between th[e] well-established case law and the Guidance Paper…along with non-legal nature of 
the Communication and its theoretical vagueness is likely to engender substantial legal uncertainty…’). 
13
 Gormsen, L. L. (2010b) ‘Why the European Commission's Enforcement Priorities on Article 82 EC Should 
Be Withdrawn?’, European Competition Law Review, 31(2), p.46-51. The author also claims that labelling the 
Guidance as “enforcement priorities” is a false dichotomy, because they are in effect “substantive 
Guidelines”. Similarly, Geradin argues that the Guidance provides a series of analytical principles of the type 
that would normally be found in guidelines. Geradin, D. (2010) “Is the Guidance Paper on the Commission’s 
Enforcement Priorities in Enforcing Article 102 TFEU Useful?”, in Etro, F. and Kokkoris, I. (eds.), 
Competition Law and the Enforcement of Article 102, OUP, Great Britain, p.50. 
14
 Whish, R. (2011) “National Competition Law Goals and the Commission’s Guidance on Article 82EC: The 
UK Experience”, in Pace, L. F. (ed.), European Competition Law: The Impact of the Commission’s Guidance 
on Article 102, Edward Elgar Publishing, Great Britain, p.161. 
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convergence’ of standards in the treatment of unilateral conduct within the EU.15 
O’Donoghue and Padilla seem to support the Commission’s departure from the case law 
and assert that a Commission document that did nothing more than to summarise the pre-
existing case law would have been self-defeating given that the main impetus for change 
was the unsatisfactory nature of the case law itself.
16
 Other commentators have also 
welcomed the Guidance, in particular its effects-based approach.
17
 
The second group of criticisms is mainly directed to the setting out of enforcement 
priorities and the title of the Guidance which, as argued, does not accurately reflect the 
content of the document. The term “Guidance” has been found as suggestive of assistance 
and advice, rather than rules.
18
 Some authors are of the opinion that the Guidance has an 
‘unusual’19 or ‘atypical’20 title that is ‘not recognised in any of the legislative acts as set out 
in the EU Treaties’.21 Pace contends that the title gives the impression that the objective of 
the Guidance is no longer, as it was in the Discussion Paper, to identify how Art.102 should 
henceforth be interpreted.
22
 According to the title, the objective of the Guidance is to 
identify the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Art.102, not to change the 
interpretation of that Article. The author finds the title of the Guidance in conflict with 
para.2 which shows that the purpose of the Guidance is to modify the interpretation of 
Art.102. 
By contrast, Whish and Bailey find the criticism that the Guidance failed to 
establish enforcement priorities ‘unconvincing’, and insist that the Guidance is not a set of 
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 ibid at p.162. 
16
 O’Donoghue, R. and Padilla, J. (2013) The Law and Economics of Article 102 TFEU, 2nd Edition, Hart 
Publishing, Great Britain, p.74 
17
 See Ridyard, D. (2009) ‘The Commission’s Article 82 Guidelines: Some Reflections on Economic Issues’, 
European Competition Law Review, 30(5), p.235 (‘It is useful and welcome to see a document from the 
Commission that has clearly been influenced by economic thinking, and that encourages the idea that a wide 
range of dominant firm conduct can usefully be analysed within a more general framework against 
exclusionary behaviour that leads ultimately to harm to consumers.’) and Ezrachi, A. (2009) “The 
Commission’s Guidance on Article 82 EC and the Effects Based Approach – Legal and Practical Challenges’, 
in Ezrachi, A. (ed.), Article 82 EC: Reflections on Its Recent Evolution, Hart Publishing, United Kingdom, 
p.53 (‘[T]he introduction of effects-based variant in the Commission’s analysis is to be welcomed.’). 
18
 Witt (2010), p.218. 
19
 Prieto, C. (2011) “Anticipated Enforcement of in France of the Commission’s Guidance on Article 82”, in 
Pace, L. F. (ed.), European Competition Law: The Impact of the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102, 
Edward Elgar Publishing, Great Britain, p.139. 
20
 Pace (2011), p.116. 
21
 O’Donoghue and Padilla (2013), p.75. 
22
 Pace (2011), p.106. 
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substantive Guidelines that slavishly describe the existing law on Art.102.
23
 Rather it 
explains, as the authors maintain, why the Commission would have a greater interest in 
prosecuting some cases than others; especially it explains that it is the likelihood that 
particular conduct could cause seriously anti-competitive foreclosure effects on market, 
thereby causing harm to consumers, that legitimates intervention by the Commission. 
According to Ezrachi, it is not by chance that the document was not entitled “Guidelines” 
and the current title reflects its hybrid nature, which must balance the difficult task of 
advancing new thinking while operating within the legal limitations imposed on the 
Commission.
24
 
Whether the Guidance could create legitimate expectations has given rise to another 
debate among commentators.
25
 Within this context, Gormsen states that by naming the 
Guidance as enforcement priorities, the Commission has tried to avoid creating legitimate 
expectations but the Guidance still creates legitimate expectations as to how the 
Commission will apply Art.102 in conjunction with the case law which supports a different 
interpretation.
26
 Blanco and Colomo claim that legal counsel of dominant firms can be 
expected to cite the Guidance on a regular basis as a valuable tool reflecting mainstream 
thinking.
27
 On the other hand, Kellerbauer argues that the Guidance cannot give rise to 
legitimate expectations as it does not assure dominant firms that their conduct would go 
unpunished, if it did not fall under the enforcement priorities.
28
 
The third and the last group of criticisms is levelled against the overall substantive 
content of the Guidance and the rigour of the analysis it makes. Commentators in this 
respect have criticised the Commission for not fully embracing the effects-based approach 
with a consumer welfare standard, thereby creating ambiguity in practice. Korah argues that 
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 Whish, R. and Bailey, D. (2012) Competition Law, 7
th
 Edition, OUP, Great Britain, p.176. 
24
 Ezrachi (2009), p.64. 
25
 For a discussion of legitimate expectations see infra “4.1.2. Increasing Legal Certainty and Ensuring 
Compliance”. 
26
 Gormsen (2010b), p.51. 
27
 Blanco, L. O. and Colomo, P. I. (2011) “Evolving Priorities and Rising Standards: Spanish Law on Abuse 
of Market Power in the Light of the 2008 Guidance Paper on Article 82 EC”, in Pace, L. F. (ed.), European 
Competition Law: The Impact of the Commission’s Guidance on Article 102, Edward Elgar Publishing, Great 
Britain, p.102. 
28
 Kellerbauer, M. (2010) ‘The Commission’s New Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 82 EC to 
Dominant Companies’ Exclusionary Conduct: A Shift Towards a More Economic Approach?’, European 
Competition Law Review, 31(5), p.185. 
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the Guidance does not decide whether efficiency (meaning consumer welfare) or the 
Ordoliberal notion of economic freedom with a special responsibility is the predominant 
function of competition.
29
 The author contends that more than one drafter has contributed to 
the Guidance as there are many references to efficiency and consumer benefit, but equally 
there are important references to the special responsibility as well. Similarly, Blanco and 
Colomo doubt whether the effects-based rules proposed in the Guidance represent a 
meaningful improvement on the status quo.
30
 
According to McMahon, while professing to shift towards a more economic 
approach and consumer welfare, the Guidance did not establish standards which are 
consistent with those terms as understood in US antitrust law or in traditional economic 
theories of competition law.
31
 Likewise, Petit puts forward that while the Guidance marks a 
welcome economic sophistication of the Commission’s Art.102 enforcement policy, it 
nonetheless often fails to go beneath the surface of modern antitrust economics and thus 
provide only limited guidance to firms and their counsel.
32
 O’Donoghue and Padilla assert 
that the Guidance is a welcome development in the sense that it recognises mere harm to 
rivals as the hallmark of competition, but there is very little articulation in the Guidance of 
what distinguishes legitimate competition from abusive conduct.
33
 Lastly, Witt claims that 
the Guidance is less assertive and far-reaching than the preceding soft law on Art.101 
TFEU and merger control, and its theoretical remarks are not stringently welfare-based.
34
 
In the view of this author, the Guidance is intended to bring the interpretation of 
Art.102 into line with the consumer welfare objective and to show Commission’s 
willingness to switch to an economics-based approach or, at the very least, give something 
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concrete for the proponents of the modernisation of Art.102 after the modernisation of the 
other two pillars of EU competition law. The Discussion Paper was a welcome 
development, but it was just a staff working paper. As the replies to the public consultation 
for the Discussion Paper show, a more formal document was hugely expected by the 
academia,
35
 businesses,
36
 as well as their advisers.
37
 In the absence of a formal document, 
the modernisation attempts would have been futile. Partly for those reasons, the 
Commission was under pressure to issue a formal document, one that would be in line with 
modern economic thinking in the area of unilateral conduct. 
However, the Courts’ case law differed on many points with the Commission’s new 
guiding principles and this fact tied the Commission’s hands. Adopting Guidelines on 
Art.102 was a dead-end: Guidelines offer an interpretation of law by an enforcer authority 
and cannot offer beyond what the courts have ruled.
38
 However, the Commission was 
clever: In order to operationalise the effects-based approach with the consumer welfare 
standard, the Commission resorted to its prosecutorial discretion. Since setting priorities 
was an ‘inherent feature of administrative activity’,39 the Commission found the solution by 
setting out its enforcement priorities in a document which it calls a “Guidance”. 
Consequently, the formal document was issued as “Guidance on the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities” rather than “Guidelines on Art.102”. 
3.2.  Contributions of the Guidance to the Enforcement of Art.102 
3.2.1. Anti-competitive Foreclosure 
Section III, Subsection B of the Guidance deals with the concept of “anti-competitive 
foreclosure” which is at the heart of the document and the foremost contribution of the 
                                                          
35
 See Competition Law Forum’s response (‘The Competition Law Forum urges the European Commission to 
issue Guidelines on Abuse of Dominance.’). Available at  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/054.pdf> [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
36
 See Vodafone’s response (‘Vodafone urges the Commission to continue the important work begun by the 
Discussion Paper and publish Guidelines as soon as possible.’). Available at  
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/067.pdf> [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
37
 See Baker and McKenzie LLP’s response (‘We recommend that the Commission give a strong, positive 
statement, that its guidelines reflect economic best practice… and that the guidelines will form the basis of its 
enforcement policy under Article [102].’). Available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/076.pdf> [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
38
 See infra “4.1. Guidelines as Soft Law Instruments: The Functions of Guidelines”. 
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 Case T-24/90 Automec Srl v Commission [1992] ECR II-2223, para.77. 
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Guidance to the enforcement of Art.102. Para.19 begins by stating that the aim of the 
Commission’s enforcement in relation to exclusionary conduct is to ensure that dominant 
undertakings do not impair effective competition by foreclosing their competitors in an 
anti-competitive way, thus having an adverse impact on consumer welfare. It continues to 
define as to what is meant by “anti-competitive foreclosure” as ‘a situation where effective 
access of actual or potential competitors to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated 
as a result of the conduct of the dominant undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking is 
likely to be in a position to profitably increase prices to the detriment of consumers.’ 
Normally, foreclosure is a generic term used in the context of exclusionary abuses 
in case law. However, the insertion of the adjective “anti-competitive” implies that the 
Guidance distinguishes between anti-competitive foreclosure and “normal” or “lawful 
foreclosure”.40 In both cases, actual or potential competitors of a dominant firm are 
excluded or eliminated from the relevant market; however, such exclusion or elimination 
harms consumers only in the context of anti-competitive foreclosure. This is because 
normal or lawful foreclosure is considered to only lead to harm to competitors. Foreclosure 
which does not harm consumers is thus permitted. It appears that the Commission adopts 
this concept as the standard for its intervention. The focus of the Commission’s analysis 
will be on cases where the conduct causes consumer harm. This is in line with the 
consumer welfare objective. 
Some commentators find the relationship between foreclosure and consumer harm 
unclear. One commentator asserts that the expression “thus having an adverse impact on 
consumer welfare” being placed after “anti-competitive foreclosure” in para.1941 is 
equivocal: It could mean either that the Commission has to show likely adverse effect on 
consumer welfare in order to identify an abuse or that the adverse impact on consumers is 
the expected consequence of anti-competitive foreclosure.
42
 The Guidance is argued to be 
not clear enough on ‘perhaps the most crucial issue regarding the enforcement of Article 
                                                          
40
 Whish calls the latter “mere foreclosure” and argues that this occurs where the dominant firm wins business 
as a result of its superior efficiency. Whish (2011), p.156. 
41
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102 TFEU, namely the basis on which a practice is to be found abusive.’43 Indeed, if harm 
to consumers is the expected consequence of anti-competitive foreclosure, then consumer 
harm would still be assumed from exclusion and the Guidance would not have improved 
the status quo. 
Having defined the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure in para.19, the 
Commission states in para.20 that it will normally intervene under Art.102 where, on the 
basis of cogent and convincing evidence, the allegedly abusive conduct is likely to lead to 
such foreclosure. The following seven factors are considered by the Guidance to be 
generally relevant to the assessment of anti-competitive foreclosure (para.20): 
i. The position of the dominant undertaking, 
ii. The conditions on the relevant market, 
iii. The position of the dominant undertaking's competitors, 
iv. The position of the customers or input suppliers, 
v. The extent of the allegedly abusive conduct, 
vi. Possible evidence of actual foreclosure, and 
vii. Direct evidence of any exclusionary strategy. 
Many of those seven factors are directly related to the analysis of foreclosure and 
will help the Commission to determine the effects of conduct in accordance with the 
effects-based approach it attempts to adopt. It appears that para.20 is concerned with the 
foreclosure element of “anti-competitive” foreclosure, rather than the consumer harm 
element. This is because those seven factors are concerned with the structure of the market 
and the motivation of a dominant firm, and are not related to the proof of consumer harm.
44
 
For instance, explaining the first factor, the Commission states that the stronger the 
dominant position, the higher the likelihood that conduct protecting that position leads to 
anti-competitive foreclosure (para.19). This is hardly relevant for the existence of consumer 
harm. Likewise, the finding of direct evidence of exclusionary strategy can be useful in 
proving foreclosure, but not consumer harm. 
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 ibid. 
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 See Geradin (2010), p.42 (‘[N]one of these factors relate to the assessment of the presence of consumer 
welfare, which is again quite surprising considering the emphasis placed on consumer harm in the definition 
of anti-competitive foreclosure…’). 
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In comparison to a long paragraph on foreclosure, the Guidance includes only one 
sentence on consumer harm: The identification of likely consumer harm can rely on 
qualitative and, where possible and appropriate, quantitative evidence (para.19). One could 
argue that the proof of consumer harm, which is the underlying reason of adopting the 
consumer welfare objective at the expense of the Ordoliberal philosophy, is not paid 
enough attention. The Guidance hardly requires proof of actual consumer harm and finds 
the proof likely” consumer harm sufficient.45 Throughout the Guidance, there is a self-
referencing circularity of argument that assumes that likely foreclosure, which appears to 
be sufficient, will be likely to harm consumers, and therefore no separate proof of any 
likely harm to consumers is required.
46
 
To conclude, the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure is the foremost 
contribution of the Guidance to the enforcement of Art.102. It is intended to mirror the 
consumer welfare-oriented spirit of the modernisation and requires the proof of consumer 
harm in order for conduct to amount to an abuse. Because this concept does not exist in the 
case law of the EU Courts, at least not in the sense of the Guidance, the Guidance carefully 
notes that establishing anti-competitive foreclosure is “the Commission’s enforcement 
activity” (para.19). Although the distinguishing feature of this concept stands out as 
consumer harm, the Guidance in fact is mostly silent on the proof of consumer harm, but is 
more concerned with the structural factors in establishing that foreclosure. Placing the 
emphasis on structural factors and turning a blind eye to consumer harm obviously sits at 
odds with the real purpose of the Guidance, as well as with the spirit of the modernisation. 
3.2.2. The “As Efficient Competitor” Test 
One of the most notable contributions of the Guidance to the enforcement of Art.102 is the 
adoption of the “as efficient competitor” test for as the standard for intervention to price-
                                                          
45
 See Petit (2009), p.496 (‘[T]he Commission’s Guidance places a lesser emphasis [compared to foreclosure 
of the market] on the factors that should be taken into account to demonstrate a likely “consumer harm”.’) and 
Nazzini, R. (2011) The Foundations of European Union Competition Law: The Objective and Principles of 
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 Marsden, P. (2010b) “Some Outstanding Issues from the European Commission’s Guidance on Article 102 
TFEU: Not-so-faint Echoes of Ordoliberalism”, in Etro, F. and Kokkoris, I. (eds.), Competition Law and the 
Enforcement of Article 102, OUP, Great Britain, p.56. 
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based exclusionary conduct. According to the Guidance, in order to prevent anti-
competitive foreclosure, the Commission will normally intervene where the conduct in 
question is capable of hampering competition from competitors which are considered to be 
as efficient as the dominant firm (para.23). In other words, in the context of price-based 
exclusionary conduct, anti-competitive foreclosure occurs only where an “as efficient 
competitor” is excluded from the market. If an “as efficient competitor” can compete 
effectively with the price-based conduct of the dominant firm, the Commission will infer 
that such conduct is unlikely to have an adverse impact on effective competition and thus 
on consumers (para.27). The trails of this test can be found in some early judgments of the 
EU Courts;
47
 however, with the Guidance, it is envisaged as the standard test for assessing 
price-based exclusionary conduct. 
The idea that the exclusion of “as efficient competitors” can be used to prove the 
required standard of harm constitutes the starting point of this test. Under this test, conduct 
amounts to an abuse, if it is likely to exclude from the market an equally (or more) efficient 
competitor of a dominant firm. The rationale is that all exclusionary practices lead to 
foreclosure of the market to competitors, but the abusive exclusionary conduct is the one 
that leads to exclusion of “as efficient competitors”. If there is effective competition in a 
given market, more efficient firms will gain at the expense of less efficient ones, so the test 
appears to accord with protecting competition as distinct from the protection of 
competitors.
48
 Protection of less efficient competitors is deemed as detrimental to 
consumers for the loss of efficiency they would generate and foreclosure of less efficient 
competitors is generally unlikely to have harmful effects on consumers.
49
 Some 
commentators, however, have criticised this test for not actually taking into account 
consumer harm.
50
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 See, for example, Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie v Commission [1991] ECR I-3359, para.72 (‘...prices below 
average total costs... can drive from the market undertakings which are perhaps as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking but which, because of their smaller financial resources, are incapable of withstanding the 
competition waged against them.’) (emphasis added). 
48
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On the other hand, the Guidance also notes in para.24 that a less efficient competitor 
may also exert a constraint which should be taken into account when considering whether 
particular price-based conduct leads to anti-competitive foreclosure. This paragraph is a 
departure from the “as efficient competitor” test laid down in para.23, and protects the 
exclusion of less efficient (or more likely, not yet as efficient) competitors in certain 
circumstances. This is hardly surprising given the fundamental premise of the test which 
presumes that less efficient competitors are generally not capable of stimulating 
competition in the market. However, it is possible for not yet as efficient competitors to 
become efficient in the short- or long-run. This is more likely the case when such firms 
have recently entered the market and are yet to become as efficient. This departure from the 
“as efficient competitor” test has been both criticised51 and supported.52 
To conclude, the “as efficient competitor” test is a departure from automatically 
inferring harmful effects and added ‘an extra layer of scrutiny’ compared to the form-based 
approach.
53
 The Guidance adopts this test as the standard by which pricing abuses are 
assessed; non-pricing abuses are not subject to this test. The test is generally helpful in 
protecting competition, instead of competitors; however, its impact on consumers is 
equivocal. Normally the test only protects as efficient competitors, but the Guidance is 
clear that under certain circumstances, the protection of not yet as efficient competitors will 
also be taken into account. This case-by-case approach inevitably creates uncertainty for 
dominant firms and therefore makes the Guidance a less reliable tool, but on the other hand 
such an exemption might be useful in some cases where specific facts of the case in 
question might justify the protection of not yet as efficient competitors vis-à-vis the pricing 
conduct of dominant undertakings. 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
be harmed places excessive reliance on uncertain modelling approaches, is too simplistic and is likely to lead 
to over-intervention.’) and  Korah, V. (2007) An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, 9th 
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3.2.3. Efficiency Defence 
Another contribution of the Guidance to the enforcement of Art.102 is the special emphasis 
placed on the dominant firm’s “efficiency defence” in the assessment of exclusionary 
conduct. The Guidance states that the Commission will take into account claims put 
forward by a dominant firm that its conduct is objectively justified, indispensable and 
proportionate to the goal it pursues (para.28). The Guidance lists two ways as to how a 
dominant firm can avail itself of this objective justification: By either demonstrating that 
the conduct in question is “objectively necessary” or proving that the conduct produces 
substantial “efficiencies” outweighing its anti-competitive effects on consumers, which is 
commonly known as the “efficiency defence”. Therefore, a dominant firm may benefit 
from two different types of justification. In addition to the general factors stated in 
paras.28-31, the Guidance envisages some additional factors on efficiencies in the sections 
dealing with specific forms of conduct.
54
 
Para.29 provides more details on the first option, “objective necessity”. 
Accordingly, conduct may be considered objectively necessary, for example for health or 
safety reasons related to the nature of product in question; however, this will be determined 
on the basis of factors external to the dominant firm. It is normally the task of public 
authorities to set and enforce public health or safety standards and for this reason, a 
dominant firm is not allowed to take steps on its own initiative to exclude products which it 
regards as dangerous or inferior to its own product (para.29). Objective necessity as a 
justification for allegedly abusive conduct is already envisaged in the case law. There are 
cases where a dominant firm’s argument on objective necessity was in fact not disputed,55 
but was rejected on the merits, as well as cases where the allegedly abusive conduct was in 
fact objectively justified.
56
 The Guidance reiterates the existing judgments in this respect. 
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With regard to the second option, it has been widely argued that historically, 
efficiencies have not played a significant role under Art.102.
57
 The efficiency arguments 
were often rejected
58
 and it was stressed that the Treaty did not provide an exemption 
clause in the context Art.102, as it did under Art.101(3) TFEU.
59
 In the landmark British 
Airways judgment where the dominant firm’s argument on efficiency was discussed (but 
not upheld), the CJEU referred to ‘objective economic justification’ and examined  whether 
anti-competitive effects of the allegedly abusive conduct may be counterbalanced by 
‘advantages in terms of efficiency’.60 Accordingly, if anti-competitive effects bear no 
relation to ‘advantages for the market and consumers’ or go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain those advantages, that conduct must be regarded as an abuse.
61
 Evidently, the 
efficiency defence envisaged in this judgment calls for a balancing test, under which anti-
competitive effects of the conduct should be counterbalanced by the efficiencies generated. 
By contrast, the efficiency defence envisaged in the Guidance appears to be more 
sophisticated than the one in British Airways and its conditions are stricter as well. Pursuant 
to para.30 of the Guidance, a dominant firm may justify its conduct which leads to 
foreclosure of competitors on the ground of efficiencies that are sufficient to guarantee that 
no net harm to consumers is likely to arise. For a successful efficiency defence, the 
following conditions must be cumulatively met: (i) efficiencies have been, or likely to be, 
realised as a result of the conduct concerned, (ii) the conduct is indispensable to the 
realisation of those efficiencies, (iii) the efficiencies brought about by conduct outweigh 
anti-competitive effects and (iv) effective competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
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products concerned is not eliminated. The evidentiary burden of proof is on the dominant 
firm (para.31).
62
 
The Commission’s recognition of the efficiency defence in the Guidance is in line 
with the effects-based approach and is a movement away from a formalistic assessment of 
abusive conduct. It allows dominant firms to bring to the table the efficiencies that result 
from their conduct in order to justify what may otherwise constitute an abuse.
63
 This is 
crucial because most conduct that leads to foreclosure also generates some efficiency gains. 
In practice, it is difficult to find any behaviour which does not present a number of 
efficiencies and whether the behaviour amounts to an abuse or not depends, therefore, 
greatly on its possible foreclosure effect on the market to its real efficiency.
64
 Recognition 
of the efficiency defence under Art.102 also brings this Article more into line with the 
efficiency-oriented enforcement of Art.101(3) TFEU, as well as to ensure the coherence of 
EU competition law.
65
 
Some commentators expressed their dissatisfaction with the role and conditions of 
the efficiency defence in the Guidance, tough they raised no objections to the defence itself. 
Bellis and Kasten claim that efficiencies are unlikely to play a significant factor in the 
outcome of future cases since a dominant firm will still effectively need to defend itself 
against the Commission’s finding that it has engaged in conduct harmful to consumers.66 
The authors regard this as a ‘task that has historically proven to be next to impossible’.67 
They observe that while anti-competitive effects can be presumed without any supporting 
quantitative evidence, efficiencies are subject to a cumulative four-part test, each part of 
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which must be established with a sufficient degree of probability and on the basis of 
verifiable evidence. 
In conclusion, the consideration of efficiencies is an essential part of an effects-
based approach
68
 and the Guidance clearly permits them as a defence. In order for an 
efficiency defence to be successful, a dominant firm must demonstrate that efficiencies are 
likely to be realised as a result of the conduct which is indispensible to their realisation and 
outweigh any likely negative effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected 
markets, and finally the conduct must not eliminate effective competition. Although the 
recognition of the efficiency defence is in line with the effects-based approach, the 
conditions set forth in the Guidance seem difficult to be cumulatively met. Despite the fact 
that the EU Courts have so far appeared rather reluctant to dominant firms escaping liability 
on the basis of efficiencies once their conduct excludes competitors, the efficiency defence 
is still rooted in the case law. Whether the EU Courts would adopt the conditions set forth 
in the Guidance or simply rely on the earlier British Airways judgment remains to be seen. 
3.2.4.  Detailed Assessments on Specific Forms of Abusive Exclusionary Conduct 
The Guidance is the first formal document which contains extensive analyses of specific 
forms of abusive conduct in the enforcement of Art.102 available to all sectors of the 
economy.
69
 After the sections on the assessment of market power and the general approach 
to exclusionary conduct, the Guidance provides more detail on the assessment of some 
individual examples of exclusionary conduct, namely exclusive dealing (paras.32-46) tying 
and bundling (paras.47-62) predation (paras.63-74) and refusal to supply and margin 
squeeze (paras.75-90). The Guidance makes it clear beforehand that the Commission will 
develop the analysis of the general factors mentioned in para.20, together with the more 
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specific factors described under the context of these specific forms of conduct and any 
other factors which it may consider to be appropriate (para.21). 
The Guidance does not analyse all types of exclusionary conduct which may fall 
within the scope of Art.102. Instead, it focuses on the abovementioned forms of conduct 
and explains that they appear to be ‘the most common’ types of exclusionary conduct based 
on the Commission’s experience (para.7).70 By including such a section, the Guidance 
implies that the specific forms of conduct in question are therefore potentially abusive 
under Art.102. It may well mean that the Commission will spend its limited resources more 
on these types of conduct vis-à-vis others and there will be even more decisions on them in 
the future enforcement of Art.102. This has been criticised by Temple Lang who insists that 
the Guidance discusses only ‘well-recognised kinds of exclusionary abuse’, and does 
nothing to help to deal with ‘new or unusual kinds of conduct, for which guidance would be 
most needed’.71 
It is noteworthy that nearly two-thirds of the length of the Guidance is devoted to 
the analysis of specific forms of conduct. Only four paragraphs are on the general approach 
to exclusionary conduct (paras.19-22), whereas 59 paragraphs deal with specific forms of 
conduct (paras.32-90). As discussed in Chapter 1, rather than enumerating specific forms of 
conduct that constitute an abuse, the text of Art.102 specifies some general illustrative 
patterns of abusive conduct such as imposing unfair prices, limiting production or applying 
dissimilar conditions. Although the approach in the Guidance may thus seem 
methodologically wrong, it is in fact normal and a common practice to analyse specific 
forms of conduct. This is because the discussion and management of Art.102 cases are 
organised by categories of conduct,
72
 and it can be observed that some forms of conduct 
have come to the fore based on their frequency in practice. It has been argued that soft law 
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instruments should give examples of practices that are potentially more harmful than other 
kinds of practices.
73 
Another reason for the inclusion of a section on the specific forms of conduct in the 
Guidance may be due to the fact that no single overarching economic or legal test, which 
can be successfully and consistently used to analyse all types of abusive conduct, has been 
developed so far.
74
 Instead there are particular tests for particular types of conduct, each 
having its strengths and weaknesses.
75
 The Guidance first introduces the concept of anti-
competitive foreclosure and factors that are relevant to the general assessment, then 
discusses in depth particular issues which are relevant in the context of the specific form of 
conduct in question. Therefore, the Guidance provides some conduct-specific tests and 
criteria
76
 and notes that they should nevertheless be interpreted within the general 
framework. This is mostly in line with the prevailing opinion in the literature that within an 
overall coherent framework, different operational tests can be used provided that there are 
no major differences in the treatment of practices leading to similar economic outcomes.
77
 
In the view of this author, in addition to those reasons, the fundamental reason is to 
clearly show some examples, like a case study, with a view to demonstrating how the 
Commission will apply its new effects-based approach in future cases. By articulating some 
economic analysis which takes into account the effects of conduct, the Commission would 
be able to prove that it has switched to an effects-based approach into Art.102 and 
abandoned its formalistic thinking. The rigour of the Commission’s economic analysis on 
those specific forms (most noticeable in the context of rebates)
78
 can be an indication of its 
commitment to apply an effects-based approach in practice, which was increasingly 
expected from the Commission with the modernisation. After all, it would not have been 
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convincing, if the Guidance had shown a mere statement of the Commission to adopt an 
economics-based approach in one single paragraph without attaching any evidence as to 
how this could be done in practice. 
Consequently, the Guidance provides additional guidance on some specific forms of 
conduct which are the most common categories of potentially abusive conduct. This is a 
pragmatic approach taken by the Commission which produced detailed guidance on the 
framework of analysis that will be applied to some categories of exclusionary conduct. 
While this aims to ensure a high level of certainty and obviously benefits dominant firms, it 
is arguable whether the emphasis placed on those types of conduct undermines the practical 
importance of other types of potentially abusive conduct. It appears that these types of 
conduct in the Guidance are considered as the highest enforcement priorities of the 
Commission. In sharp contrast, as Section 3.3 will show immediately below, the post-
Guidance period has mainly dealt with other types of conduct rather than the ones 
specifically mentioned in the Guidance. 
3.3.  The Enforcement of Art.102 in the Post-Guidance Period 
3.3.1.  Initial Expectations from the Post-Guidance Period 
The enforcement of Art.102 in the post-Guidance period was one of the most questioned 
issues in the context of Art.102 in EU competition law. Since the Guidance departed from 
the established case law, it was not quite predictable whether it would be complied with in 
practice. There were doubts as to whether the Commission itself would abide by its own 
Guidance and shape its future decisions in accordance with the consumer welfare and 
efficiency considerations in the Guidance, whether the EU Courts would endorse the new 
principles in the Guidance or instead follow their old formalistic case law, and finally 
whether the national competition authorities (NCA) and national courts (NC) would align 
their enforcement with the Guidance and make more use of the Guidance in shaping their 
decisions and judgments on Art.102. 
From the position of the Commission, after its long endeavours, it was normally 
expected that it would abide by its enforcement priorities it set out in the Guidance. 
However, there was a risk that the Guidance might not be complied with given the practical 
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difficulties in applying the effects-based approach. It is true that the effects-based approach 
as encapsulated in the Guidance was undeniably more demanding than the easy form-based 
option and also more resource-intensive from an institutional standpoint.
79
 If the 
Commission was to adopt its decisions based on the principles of the Guidance, it would 
have to examine effects of the conduct and weigh them against possible efficiencies the 
conduct creates so as to prove that the conduct leads to anti-competitive foreclosure. Such 
analysis might have to require complex economic and econometric evidence, and might 
complicate its decision making. 
By contrast, if the Commission based its decisions on the established case law, 
which was far less concerned with the proof of effects, it would not have to deal with 
whether conduct generates anti-competitive effects on consumers. This might be tempting 
in particular where the Commission did not have a strong case against a dominant firm.
80
 
By cutting down on economic analysis, it could save its limited resources for other cases 
and achieve a swift decision-making. Most importantly, given the state of the established 
case law, its decisions could have a high chance of being upheld by the EU Courts on 
appeal in the event that the Commission placed itself more into line with the case law than 
with the Guidance. On this point, Geradin contends that the Commission might be tempted 
to ‘opportunistically deviate’ from its effects-based approach to make its decision de facto 
‘appeal proof’, since in any event the case could be easily won on the basis of the 
formalistic case law.
81
  
The EU Court’s stance towards the Guidance was of utmost importance as the fate 
of the Guidance depended on its approval or rejection by the EU Courts. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, most of the past judgments of the EU Courts were often based on more 
traditional legal rules rather than economic assessments, and not concerned too much with 
effects on consumers or efficiency considerations. In fact, many of the strikingly formalistic 
judgments were handed down while the modernisation was ongoing.
82
 In one of those 
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judgments, AG Kokott even warned the Commission that even if its administrative 
practices were to change, it would still have to act within the framework prescribed for it by 
Art.102 as interpreted by the CJEU.
83
 It was widely argued that the Guidance was not 
binding on the EU Courts and any possibility of change depended on the Commission 
obtaining endorsement of its new approach from the EU Courts.
84
 
Although the Guidance was primarily related to the Commission’s own 
enforcement in dealing with the complaints, gradual endorsement of the Commission 
decisions based on the orientations in the Guidance would likely to result in a change in the 
objective of Art.102, which might not be easy vis-à-vis the other objectives in the 
established case law. Therefore, the future of the Guidance depended on whether the EU 
Courts would understand the tension between the more economic and seemingly better 
propositions in the Guidance and the legal rules they once created in their previous 
judgments which no longer appeared to reflect the advances in the modern economic 
thinking on unilateral conduct. Since the existing judgments in the case law are not binding 
on the CJEU or on the GCEU,
85
 the EU Courts could technically reconsider their old 
formalistic judgments in later cases and thus uphold the Commission’s new orientations in 
the Guidance, but it was also noted that the CJEU rarely departs from its earlier judgments 
in practice.
86
 
As NCAs and NCs are empowered to enforce Art.102 under Regulation 1/2003
87
 
and the Guidance aimed to reorient the enforcement of this Article, the future of the 
Guidance would have an impact on them as well. Considering the Commission’s overall 
experience with Art.102, the Guidance was expected to provide a useful point of reference 
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for NCAs in formulating their decisions on Art.102. It was argued that NCAs might be 
inclined to take their lead from the Commission, notwithstanding the established 
jurisprudence, as a result of their participation with the Commission in the European 
Competition Network.
88
 In addition, under Art.16 Regulation 1/2003, NCAs and NCs are 
not allowed to take decisions running counter to the decisions adopted by the Commission. 
This means that if the Commission issued decisions in line with the orientations in the 
Guidance, then the impact of the Guidance would be ultimately seen on the decisions of 
NCAs and NCs as they could not fundamentally contradict the decisions of the 
Commission. 
The Notice on the co-operation between the Commission and NCs also reminded 
that when applying EU competition rules, NCs would be bound by the case law of the EU 
Courts as well as by Commission Regulations.
89
 It stated that NCs might find guidance in 
Commission Regulations, Notices, Guidelines and Decisions which present elements of 
analogy with the case they are dealing with.
90
 As NCs were obliged to follow both the 
Commission’s soft law instruments and the established case law, it was argued that unless 
the EU Courts provided a clear and positive signal regarding the Guidance, a gap was 
expected to emerge between the Commission’s proposed analysis and the established case 
law.
91
 This highlighted another reason for the importance of the Guidance being endorsed 
by the EU Courts, otherwise NCs would be in a situation to make a choice between the 
Commission’s more economics-based decisions and the EU Courts’ formalistic judgments. 
3.3.2.  The Judgments of the EU Courts in the Post-Guidance Period 
Since the publication of the Guidance in late 2008, the EU Courts have handed down many 
judgments on Art.102 both as appeals to Commission Decisions (annulment actions) under 
Art.263 TFEU and preliminary rulings under Art.267 TFEU. The judgments in the post-
Guidance period seem to be sending mixed signals. Appeals to Commission Decisions, 
most of which were adopted before the Guidance, show a high level of formalism in line 
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with the old case law. The only exception in this respect is seen in judgments on margin 
squeeze. The EU Courts seem to have adopted an effects-based approach to margin squeeze 
and upheld the use of the “as efficient competitor” test as the appropriate test for pricing 
abuses, but taken a different view from the Guidance which treats margin squeeze more 
alongside refusal to supply. Whereas, preliminary rulings in this period show a high level 
of compliance with the principles in the Guidance in terms of effects-based assessments, 
efficiency considerations and the “as efficient competitor” test. 
Clearstream,
92
 Wanadoo,
93
 Solvay,
94
 Tomra
95
 and Intel
96
 are among the formalistic 
judgments in this period. In Clearstream, the GCEU reminded that the dominant firm in 
question had a particular responsibility not to allow its conduct to impair genuine 
undistorted competition on the common market, and found that there was no need to prove 
actual effects as it was sufficient for the Commission to show that the conduct ‘tended to 
restrict competition’.97 In Wanadoo, the CJEU upheld the decision of the GCEU which had 
taken a formalistic approach towards predatory pricing. The GCEU found abusive the 
pricing policy of the dominant firm in question and dismissed the arguments on economies 
of scale and learning effects as objective justification.
98
 In Solvay, loyalty rebates of the 
dominant firm were found ‘contrary’ to Art.102.99 The GCEU held the view that it was 
‘apparent from a consistent line of decisions’ that a loyalty rebate was ‘contrary’ to 
Art.102.
100
 It held that ‘the purpose’ of the rebates system was to ‘tie in customers’ and that 
it was ‘capable of having the effect of foreclosing competition’.101 
Loyalty rebates were also the issue in Tomra. In this judgment, the GCEU rejected 
the argument that the Commission proved the form of conduct rather than its effects.
102
 It 
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held that it was sufficient to show that the conduct ‘tended to restrict competition’ or were 
‘capable of having that effect’; the proof of ‘an actual impact on the relevant market’ was 
not necessary.
103
 Dismissing the appeal in its entirety, the CJEU made it clear that prices 
below costs, which is taken into account in the context of conditional rebates in the 
Guidance, were ‘not a prerequisite of a finding that a retroactive rebates scheme operated 
by a dominant undertaking is abusive’.104 In Intel, the GCEU heavily relied on Tomra to 
justify its arguments and took the view that loyalty rebates (referred to as “exclusivity 
rebates” in this judgment) ‘are by their very nature capable of foreclosing competitors’ 
when granted by a dominant undertaking.
105
 The Court held that it was therefore 
‘unnecessary to undertake an analysis of the actual effects of the rebates on competition’,106 
nor was it necessary to consider whether the decision was in line with the Guidance.
107
 The 
GCEU also objected to the use of the “as efficient competitor” test in the context of loyalty 
rebates and in non-pricing abuses in general.
108
 
Judgments and preliminary rulings on margin squeeze cases appear to be distinct 
from other types of abusive conduct and more in line with the economic theory. The EU 
Courts seem to have adopted an effects-based approach to margin squeeze and upheld the 
“as efficient competitor” test for assessing margin squeeze.109 Interestingly, they even 
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the European courts’ most progressive decisions on effects in the context of Article 102 TFEU’... [they] 
‘clearly constitute important endorsements of the more economics-based approach’.) (emphasis added) and 
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overturned the Commission’s argument that the very existence of margin squeeze was 
sufficient regardless of its effects.
110
 In Deutsche Telekom, the CJEU clarified that anti-
competitive effects need to be shown for a margin squeeze to be ruled as an abuse; the very 
existence of the conduct is not sufficient.
111
 The Court maintained that ‘in the absence of 
any effect on the competitive situation of competitors, a pricing practice such as that at 
issue cannot be classified as exclusionary’.112 The CJEU made it thus clear that effects 
cannot be inferred; the proof of potential effects is required. In addition, the Court endorsed 
the use of the “as efficient competitor” test by deciding that the Commission was required 
to demonstrate effects on ‘competitors who are at least as efficient as the dominant 
undertaking’.113 These findings were also reiterated in later margin squeeze cases such as 
TeliaSonera
114
 and Telefónica.115 
On the other hand, the overall treatment of margin squeeze as an abuse in itself ( 
stand-alone abuse) in all of those cases is clearly stricter than the Commission’s lenient and 
less interventionist approach in the Guidance which instead treats it more alongside refusal 
to supply, as a form of constructive refusal to supply. Margin squeeze and refusal to supply 
are grouped under the same section in the Guidance (para.80) meaning that conditions 
which would make refusal to supply an abuse are therefore the same for margin squeeze. 
Notwithstanding, the GCEU held in Telefónica that the Commission was not required to 
demonstrate that Telefónica charged excessive prices for its wholesale products or 
predatory prices for its retail products.
116
 Therefore, the treatment of margin squeeze in the 
Guidance sits at odds with its current treatment by the EU Courts in the post-Guidance 
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period. This validates the opinion of AG Mazák who stated that Guidelines, in this respect 
the Guidance, ‘may form a useful point of reference’, but cannot bind the EU Courts.117 
The CJEU issued an important preliminary ruling in the post-Guidance period 
which, according to some authors, has begun writing ‘a new chapter in the epic tale of 
unilateral conduct control’.118 In Post Danmark, questions on predatory and selective 
pricing were referred to the CJEU. The Court first accepted that ‘not every exclusionary 
effect is necessarily detrimental to competition’.119 Stressing the role of efficiency, the 
Court then stated that competition on the merits may lead to ‘the marginalisation of 
competitors that are less efficient and so less attractive to consumers from the point of view 
of, among other things, price, choice, quality or innovation.’120 It also upheld the use of the 
“as efficient competitor” test as the appropriate test for predatory pricing.121 In addition, the 
Court listed the conditions of efficiency defence more into line with those in the Guidance, 
than those in its earlier British Airways judgment.
122
 Lastly, the Court took into account 
long-run average incremental costs, which are the relevant cost benchmark under para.26 of 
the Guidance, in addition to average total costs, which have been the relevant cost 
benchmark in the established case law on predatory pricing.
123
 
All in all, to date the post-Guidance period has shown that appeals to Commission 
Decisions show a high level of formalism in line with the old formalistic case law. This is 
hardly surprising since the relevant Commission Decisions were mostly adopted prior to 
the Guidance, and it would be unexpected if the EU Courts applied the principles in the 
Guidance to the case in question where the Commission had not applied them in the first 
place.
124
 One notable feature of this period was that the law on margin squeeze has 
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developed more in line with modern economic thinking, but its treatment has differed from 
what the Guidance had envisaged for it. In addition, preliminary rulings in this period 
appear to ‘echo key aspects of the Guidance’,125 though deriving sound conclusions from 
only two preliminary rulings can be disputed. The “as efficient competitor” test (only in the 
context of pricing abuses), efficiency considerations and some new cost benchmarks seem 
to have found support from the EU Courts, but the judgments are still not as much 
consumer-welfare oriented or effects-based as the Guidance. One can therefore argue that 
the Guidance seems to be endorsed in part by the EU Courts. 
3.3.3. The Role of the Commission in the Post-Guidance Period 
After the Commission’s long endeavours during the modernisation of Art.102, one would 
expect the Commission to abide by the Guidance and comply with its enforcement 
priorities, thereby shaping its future decisions accordingly. The Commission was expected 
to make effects-based assessments, demonstrate theories of harm based on the concept of 
anti-competitive foreclosure, prove consumer harm and otherwise make more use of the 
Guidance. Up until the modernisation, the overwhelming majority of cases concerned Art.7 
Regulation 1/2003 prohibition decisions as a result of which fines were imposed on 
dominant firms who were in breach of Art.102 together with a requirement to bring the 
infringement to an end by means of mostly behavioural remedies. However, this Section 
analyses the Commission’s practice in the post-Guidance by exploring its Art.9 Regulation 
1/2003 commitment decisions, Art.7 Regulation 1/2003 prohibition decisions and rejection 
of complaint decisions/case closures. 
3.3.3.1. Art.9 Regulation 1/2003 Decisions 
The role of the Commission in enforcing Art.102 in the post-Guidance period appears to be 
quite different than what was expected. The most notable difference in practice is not 
substantive, but procedural. The difference is not the adoption of a more-economics based 
approach as expected, but the increasing use of commitments under Art.9 Regulation 
1/2003. In recent years, the Commission has issued many Art.9 decisions whereby 
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undertakings had entered into legally binding commitments with the Commission who then 
closed the investigation without having to prove any infringement and impose fines, in 
contrast to conventional Art.7 decisions which usually end with a finding of infringement 
and fines imposed on undertakings. Art.9 decisions are one of the most noted developments 
in the post-Guidance period which have arguably outstripped the practical discussions after 
the Guidance and altered the agenda for Art.102 in terms of substance and enforcement.
126
 
For this reason, the use of commitments marks another stage in the modernisation of 
Art.102, albeit informal. 
Art.9 decision ‘is a formal settlement solicited by a company under investigation 
and agreed by the Commission where its enforcement priorities justify this choice.’127 It 
involves accepting binding commitments for a certain period of time by the Commission, 
as well as their monitoring as a result of which undertaking will be subject to fines and/or 
periodic penalty payments if they fail to comply with their commitments.
128
 As AG Kokott 
noted, the objective of Art.9 ‘is to ensure a quick and effective resolution of the 
competition problems while avoiding a considerable investigation and assessment effort on 
the part of the Commission’, as a result of which undertakings ‘are quickly given legal 
certainty and can avoid the finding of an infringement of competition rules’.129 Table 1 
shows the Art.7 and Art.9 decisions of the Commission on Art.102 in the post-Guidance 
period between 2008 and September 2014: 
Table 1 – Commission Decisions on Art.102 in the Post-Guidance Period130 
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 Art.7 Prohibition Decisions Art.9 Commitment Decisions 
 
2008 
- 
German Electricity Balancing Market
131
 
German Electricity Wholesale Market
132
 
 
2009 
Intel
133
 
RWE Gas Foreclosure
134
 
Gaz de France
135
 
Rambus
136
 
Microsoft (Tying)
137
 
 
2010 
- 
Long-term Contracts France
138
 
Swedish Interconnectors
139
 
E.ON Gas
140
 
ENI
141
 
2011 Telekomunikacja Polska
142
 
Standard & Poor’s
143
 
IBM Maintenance Services
144
 
2012 - 
Rio Tinto Alcan
145
 
Reuters Instrument Codes
146
 
2013 - 
CEZ
147
 
Deutsche Bahn I
148
 
Deutsche Bahn II
149
 
2014 Motorola
150
 Samsung
151
 
As can be seen from Table 1, the number of Art.9 decisions far outweighs the 
number of Art.7 decisions with 18 commitment decisions against only 3 prohibition 
decisions in the post-Guidance period.
152
 The Commission issued at least one commitment 
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decision each year, but the same cannot be said for prohibition decisions. 18 commitment 
decisions in 7 years mean that the Commission has issued on average 3 commitment 
decisions per year after the publication of the Guidance, while it issued only 3 prohibition 
decision in 7 years. An average of 3 commitments per year is huge considering the fact that 
the Commission issued a total of 3 commitment decisions on Art.102 before the post-
Guidance period.
153
 In short, Table 1 indicates that Art.9 has become the predominant 
enforcement tool of the Commission in applying Art.102 in the post-Guidance period. The 
increasing use of commitments naturally begs the questions as to why the Commission has 
favoured Art.9 in the post-Guidance period and whether this dramatic change of policy is 
deliberate or merely coincidental. 
Although it is hard to predict the state of mind of the Commission, the reason for 
the Commission’s tendency to use Art.9 seems to be more than one. Within this context, 
Botteman and Patsa have identified five potential reasons: (i) the Commission’s growing 
confidence in the parameters of the commitment procedure; (ii) the introduction of a more 
effects-based approach in Art.102 cases; (iii) a need to improve competitive conditions in 
certain regulated industries; (iv) the preference for quick remedies that are easily 
implemented in fast-evolving markets such as information technology (IT) markets and (v) 
the policy orientation of the Commissioner responsible for competition policy and their 
cabinet.
154
 Given the fact that Art.9 decisions issued thus far deal with regulated industries 
and fast-evolving IT markets in line with (iii) and (iv),
155
 it may well be that more than one 
reason has played a role in this respect. This Section does not purport to determine the real 
reason(s) behind the Commission’s increasing use of Art.9 decisions. Instead it elaborates 
upon whether (ii) acted as a potential reason. 
                                                          
153
 Case COMP/A.39.116/B2 Coca-Cola [2005] OJ L253/21; Case COMP/B-2/38.381 De Beers [2006] OJ 
L205/24; and Case COMP/B-1/37.966 Distrigaz [2008] OJ C9/8. 
154
 Botteman, Y. and Patsa, A. (2013) ‘Towards a More Sustainable Application of Commitment Decisions’, 
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 1(2), p.351. Colomo puts forward another reason and points to dominant 
firms’ incentive to reach negotiated solutions and avoid lengthy proceedings with little chances of success 
considering the ever-growing amount of fines imposed in Art.102 TFEU cases. Colomo, P. I. (2013) ‘The 
Law on Abuses of Dominance and the System of Judicial Remedies’, Yearbook of European Law, 32(1), 
p.405. 
155
 It should be noted that 9 out of those 18 commitment decisions concern the energy sector, while 4 of them 
concern IT markets. Indeed, the Commission’s propensity to divert competition enforcement procedures in 
order to meet the regulatory targets it failed to achieve through the legislative procedure has been highlighted 
as a potential reason for the commitments in energy sector. Moullet, P. (2013), ‘How Should Undertakings 
Approach Commitment Proposal in Antitrust Proceedings’, European Competition Law Review, 35(2), p.87. 
123 
 
 
 
On the one hand, the increasing use of commitments in the post-Guidance may 
signal the fact that Art.9 commitments complement the modernisation of Art.102. One 
could argue that the effects-based approach with a greater recognition of efficiency gains 
and an emphasis on the impact of conduct on consumer welfare as adopted by the Guidance 
necessitates a case-by-case analysis and Art.9 facilitates such an analysis.
156
 Commitment 
decisions involve the consideration of specific facts of the case in question and allow the 
Commission and the undertakings concerned to mutually design a remedy which can be 
best tailored to address the competition concern(s) in question. As will be discussed below, 
since commitment decisions are de facto insulated from judicial review, the Commission 
may steer the enforcement of Art.102 through its own line of reasoning in a way that is 
compatible with the modernisation.  
On the other hand, Art.9 commitments may be a ‘convenient way to circumvent the 
economic complexity and resource-intensive fact-gathering inherent to infringement 
actions’ on the part of the Commission.157 As discussed in Chapter 2, the effects-based 
approach requires that the Commission will be under a heavy burden of proof to develop 
theories of harm and support them with economic evidence. However, in the context of 
commitment decisions, the Commission does not have to do this. Because the Commission 
would have to spend more resources in Art.102 cases, it may have deliberately relied on 
Art.9 decisions which helped it to loosen its burden to prove the alleged abuse to the 
required degree under the Guidance. Should the Commission in its commitment decisions 
renege on its rigorous analysis of the dominant position and/or of abuse as it set forth in the 
Guidance, the increasing use of Art.9 may well represent a change backwards in the 
modernisation of Art.102. 
Indeed, a careful analysis of commitment decisions shows that they often contain 
inadequate information as to how the dominant position has been determined and how the 
abuse of that position has been demonstrated. They refer to “preliminary assessments” of 
the Commission and include expressions such as ‘the Commission provisionally concluded 
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that’, ‘the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that’, ‘the Commission took the 
preliminary view that’, and ‘the Commission’s preliminary view is that’ and so on. In 
commitment decisions, the Commission often concludes ‘without having reached a 
definitive view’. Undertakings ‘appear to be dominant’158 or are ‘considered to hold a 
dominant position’159, and ‘may have abused’ 160 their dominant positions or, alternatively, 
‘the Commission has concerns as to compatibility with [Art.102] of practices’.161 Some 
decisions point to ‘potentially abusive behaviour’162 as the subject of commitments. The 
preliminary assessments in commitments constitute only a prima facie opinion of the 
Commission,
163
 rather than the proof of a robust theory of harm to the required degree. 
It can be observed from the commitment decisions that the Guidance played either a 
marginal role or no role at all. The Commission showed a tendency to rely on the case law, 
instead of the Guidance. In ENI, while listing the conditions for refusal to supply to amount 
to an abuse, the Commission referred to the Bronner judgment of the CJEU,
164
 rather than 
the Guidance.
165
 Similarly, in Microsoft (Tying), the Commission cited the Microsoft 
judgment of the GCEU,
166
 rather than the Guidance while listing the conditions for tying to 
amount to an abuse.
167
 By contrast, in Rio Tinto Alcan, the Commission listed the 
conditions for tying in line with the Guidance, but without citing the Guidance.
168
 Instead, 
the established case law on tying was stressed. Also, the Commission used the Guidance’s 
terminology of “anti-competitive foreclosure” and the conditions of efficiency defence in 
the Guidance, but again made no reference to the Guidance even in footnotes.
169
 
The same is true for the proof of consumer harm as well. As discussed above, the 
Guidance has been criticised for failing to pay adequate attention to the proof of consumer 
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harm.
170
 It can be seen that commitment decisions do not pay particular attention to it 
either. In E-ON Gas, the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that E-ON’s 
“long-term capacity bookings” constitute a bottleneck at the entry point into E-ON’s 
network, ‘possibly leading to considerable consumer harm.’171 In Rio Tinto Alcan, the 
Commission’s preliminary assessment was that ‘the scope of foreclosure is substantial and 
may be sufficient for creating consumer harm.’172 In Reuters Instrument Codes, Thomson 
Reuters’ conduct was preliminary found ‘liable to cause consumer harm and foreclose 
competition’ in the relevant market.173 So the commitments issued thus far appear to have 
lagged behind the Guidance in terms of the proof of consumer harm. It is also noteworthy 
that especially the cases in IT markets were initiated upon complaint by competitors, which 
may mean that the “protection of competition, not competitors” principle of the Guidance 
might not have been adequately respected by the Commission.
174
 
Types of abuses and theories of harm, too, deserve mention. Especially the 
commitment decisions in the energy sector involve complex economic and legal issues, as 
well as seemingly new forms of exclusionary and exploitative conduct. These involve 
“long-term capacity bookings”,175 “capacity withdrawal”,176 “capacity hoarding”177 and 
“strategic underinvestment”.178 Since these decisions mainly concerned with energy 
incumbents, allegations often centred on refusal to access to networks. Other cases also 
involve new forms of abuses such “abuse of standard-essential patents” including “patent 
ambush”179 and “seeking injunction relief contrary to FRAND commitments”.180 Other than 
refusal to supply, exclusive dealing
181
 and margin squeeze,
182
 tying is the only “most 
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common” type of abusive conduct.183 No commitment decision exists thus far on predatory 
pricing or rebates. Therefore, in the post-Guidance period, the Commission has mainly 
dealt with seemingly new forms of potentially abusive conduct on which there is hardly any 
guidance in the Guidance. 
Many of these seemingly novel forms of potentially abusive conduct have raised 
novel competition concerns and it is not clear whether they actually amount to an abuse 
under Art.102.
184
 As commitment decisions are tend to be shorter than infringement 
decisions in terms of their length and do not extensively discuss findings and theories of 
harm, it is doubtful whether they are of much practical significance for future stakeholders 
other than the undertakings directly affected by them. Though Art.9 decisions do not 
require undertakings to waive their rights of appeal, they are less inclined to challenge their 
own voluntary commitments, and therefore these decisions are de facto insulated from 
judicial review.
185
 The tendency to resolve cases via commitment decisions leaves the EU 
Courts with reduced scope to control the way the Commission handles its cases.
186
 The 
main supervision of commitments is done by monitoring trustees appointed by the 
Commission, but they do not have the right to dispute whether the commitments are 
appropriate; they only observe whether commitments have been complied with. Taking 
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those into account, the procedural change in the enforcement will have a bearing on both 
the substantial evolution of decisions on Art.102 and the modernisation. 
Too much reliance on commitment decisions poses a crucial risk that the existing 
formalistic case law will continue to govern the law on Art.102 leaving little room for EU 
competition law to be brought into line with modern economic thinking on unilateral 
conduct as envisaged by the modernisation. Concerning the fact that most of the novel 
issues and theories of harm in commitment decisions thus far are not properly given 
guidance under the Guidance, this risk is exacerbated. In the wake of transition to the 
effects-based approach, judicial review of Commission Decisions is more important than 
ever.
187
 The question remains as to whether the modernisation of Art.102 was worth the 
effort if the Commission was to make increasing use of Art.9 commitments, as they involve 
only preliminary assessments and not so robust theories of harm which are tried to be 
supported with insufficient economic evidence, rather than well-founded effects-based 
assessments with an emphasis on consumer harm.
188
 Surely, the Commission could have 
made such use in the first place without having had to engage in years reviewing Art.102. 
Consequently, the post-Guidance period has been shaped in a completely different 
legal and institutional landscape than what was expected and Art.9 has stood out as a 
predominant enforcement tool for the Commission in this period. Against this background, 
one can reasonably argue that the use of commitments marks another stage in the 
modernisation of Art.102, albeit informal, as commitment decisions have outstripped many 
practical discussions that were expected to take place after the issue of the Guidance but 
instead given rise to new problems on the appropriateness, legal review, monitoring and 
excessive use of commitment decisions on Art.102.
189
 If the Commission reneges on the 
Guidance in Art.9 commitments and continues to satisfy with “preliminary assessments” 
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scepticism and caution. Budzinski and Kuchinke (2012), p.265-292. 
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 Commentators have even begun to speak of a need for a Notice dedicated exclusively to commitments 
decisions in EU competition law for the sake of good administration and legal certainty. See Botteman and 
Patsa (2013), p.367. 
128 
 
 
 
instead of making rigorous effects-based assessments, the contributions of the Guidance to 
the modernisation of Art.102 would not be adequately reflected to Commission Decisions, 
which should have instead been the lifeblood of the new reading of Art.102 vis-à-vis the 
EU Courts’ formalistic judgments in the first place. At the end, this informal stage would 
be unlikely to be a positive stage in contrast to the previous successful stages and may 
result in a change backwards in the modernisation of Art.102. Limiting the use of 
commitments might yield positive results, but further research is needed in this respect.
190
 
3.3.3.2. Art.7 Regulation 1/2003 Decisions 
As for the Art.7 decisions in the post-Guidance period, the first decision that was issued 
after the publication of the Guidance is Intel. Because the Commission initiated legal 
proceedings against Intel before the Guidance was published, it is noted in the decision that 
the Guidance was not technically applied.
191
 The Commission claimed that its decision was 
nevertheless in line with the Guidance.
192
 In Intel, the Commission reached the conclusion 
that Intel’s rebates constituted “loyalty rebates” and therefore they were ‘in themselves 
sufficient to find an infringement under Article [102] according to the case law’ in the 
absence of any objective justification.
193
 However, the Commission went on to analyse the 
anti-competitive effects of those rebates in the market. In doing so, the Commission made 
references to the Guidance’s concept of anti-competitive foreclosure and demonstrated 
whether Intel’s rebates were ‘capable of causing or likely to cause anticompetitive 
foreclosure (which is likely to result in consumer harm)’.194 
 To this end, ‘one possible way’ according to the Commission was to ‘conduct an as 
efficient competitor analysis’.195 The Commission applied the “as efficient competitor” test, 
                                                          
190
 It has been argued that commitment decisions should be seen as a marginal tool available to antitrust 
authorities to be used to solve specific (and less serious) infringements. Pera, A. and Carpagnano, M. (2008) 
‘The Law and Practice of Commitment Decisions: A Comparative Analysis’, European Competition Law 
Review, 29(12), p.671. Botteman and Patsa claim that in cases involving novel issues or untested theories of 
harm that effective restraints to the use of commitments are needed. Botteman and Patsa (2013), p.369. 
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 Intel, para.916 
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 See Press Release, “Antitrust: Commission imposes fine of 1.06 billion euros on Intel for abuse of 
dominant position; orders Intel to cease illegal practices - questions and answers”, MEMO/09/235, Brussels 
13 May 2009. 
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 Intel, para.925. 
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 ibid. 
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 ibid (emphasis added). 
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but also noted that this was ‘not indispensable for finding an infringement under Art[102] 
according to the case law’.196 Nor did the Commission find indispensable the demonstration 
of actual effects for a finding of infringment as this was not required in the case law or in 
the Guidance.
197
 It is noteworthy that the Commission’s assessment of rebates mirrored the 
section on “conditional rebates” in the Guidance (paras.37-46). However, when listing the 
conditions of the efficiency defence, the decision cited the British Airways judgment of the 
CJEU rather than para.30 of the Guidance on efficiencies.
198
 On appeal, the GCEU took a 
negative stance against the use of the “as efficient competitor” test in the context of loyalty 
rebates, which was used by the Commission only ‘for the sake of completeness’,199 and 
adopted a form-based approach by taking the view that loyalty rebates ‘are by their very 
nature capable of restricting competition’ and of ‘foreclosing competitors’.200 
In the second Art.7 decision, in Telekomunikacja Polska, the Commission decided 
that Telekomunikacja Polska committed an abuse by way of a refusal to deal and a series of 
related practices such as proposing unreasonable conditions, delaying the negotiation 
processes, rejecting orders in an unjustifiable manner and refusing to provide reliable and 
accurate information to alternative operators. In this decision, the Commission seems to 
have adopted an effects-based approach and demonstrated detrimental effects of the alleged 
abuse on consumers, while noting at the same that the proof of consumer harm was ‘not 
necessary in order to prove an abuse’ under the case law.201 Telekomunikacja Polska 
claimed that there was no Union interest and the Commission had no grounds for action, 
but the Commission rejected this claim by pointing to the Guidance that its refusal to 
supply would be considered as an enforcement priority.
202
 However, when establishing the 
abuse, the Commission did not refer to the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure. On the 
other hand, the Commission referred to the Guidance when assessing the objective 
necessity defence.
203
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In the last Art.7 decision, in Motorola, the Commission explicitly stated that ‘the 
present Decision meets the Commission’s enforcement priorities’.204 Despite this claim, a 
careful analysis of the decision shows that there is hardly any reference to the Guidance. In 
some of its paragraphs, the decision referred to effects of the conduct in question, seeking 
injuction relief for standard essential patents, but it appears that the analysis of effects 
remained weak as the Commission noted quite contrary to the fundamentals of the effects-
based approach that Art.102 ‘prohibits behaviour that tends to restrict competition or is 
capable of having that effect, regardless of its success’.205 The Commission also cited some 
old formalistic judgments of the EU Courts and emphasised the special responsibility of 
dominant firms.
206
 Furthermore, when establishing the abuse, the Commission was silent 
on the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure. In addition, when listing the conditions of 
the efficiency defence, the decision cited the Post Danmark judgment rather than para.30 of 
the Guidance.
207
  
All in all, a limited number of Art.7 decisions were issued by the Commission vis-à-
vis a vast number of Art.9 decisions in the post-Guidance period. Intel is the best example 
of the successful application of the Guidance in this period, though the Commission’s 
decision was upheld not because the GCEU endorsed the Commission’s assessment of 
loyalty rebates in the Guidance, but because the established jurisprudence have long 
condemned loyalty rebates since Hoffmann La Roche. The Commission seems to have 
adopted a “just in case” approach in those Art.7 decisions in that it tried to prove anti-
competitive effects and consumer harm so as to comply with the Guidance, but also noted 
at the same time that what it was doing was in fact not required by the case law. It is hard to 
argue that the Guidance fully influenced the outcome reached in those decisions, as the 
Commission did not consistently apply the contributions of the Guidance in every case: The 
concept of anti-competitive foreclosure was mentioned in Intel but not in Telekomunikacja 
Polska or Motorola, and the conditions of the efficiency defence (or objective necessity) 
were based on the Guidance in Telekomunikacja Polska but not in Intel or Motorola. 
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3.3.3.3. Rejection of Complaints and Case Closures 
The final practice of the Commission in the post-Guidance period comprises the decisions 
on rejection of complaints and on case closures. It has been long acknowledged by the EU 
Courts that the Commission is not required to conduct an investigation of each complaint it 
receives and has therefore discretion in the treatment of complaints made to it.
208
 The 
Commission is not obliged to adopt a decision once it receives a complaint, therefore not all 
investigations result in Art.7 or Art.9 decisions when there is no sufficient degree of Union 
interest. In addition, Commission decisions on rejection of complaints are essential in order 
to thoroughly analyse the impact of the Guidance in the post-Guidance period. The (non-
)enforcement of the Guidance could be observed in the complaints that the Commission has 
rejected to pursue since the reason(s) to reject such complaints could be because of the 
Commission’s new reading of Art.102 following the Guidance.  
 Shortly after the publication of the Guidance, the Commission rejected the 
complaint made by the European Federation of Ink and Ink Cartridge Manufacturers 
(EFIM) against various manufacturers of inkjet printers and cartridges inter alia for an 
alleged violation of Art.102 by attempting to exclude other manufacturers from the 
aftermarkets for supply of cartridges and/or toners through patenting strategies and similar 
tactics.
209
 Based on some of its former rejection decisions on the same issue, the 
Commission closed the complaint due to the insufficient likelihood of establishing the 
proof of an infringement of Art.102 as there was no prima facie evidence that none of the 
undertakings had a dominant position in the primary market for ink jet printers. The 
Guidance was not relied on in this case, but the Commission stated that it aims to ‘focus on 
conduct which is likely to harm competition, and consequently consumers’, but this did not 
appear to be the case in the case at issue.
210
 
 The Commission also rejected the complaint made by Ryanair against the Dublin 
Airport Authority (DAA) and Aer Lingus inter alia for an alleged violation of Art.102 
through excessive pricing, discrimination, bundling and a manifest failure to satisfy 
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demand.
211
 In the decision, the Commission left open the definition of the market and 
determination of the dominant position, and focused more on the abuse element. The 
investments into Dublin airport provided the background to the alleged infringements. 
Firstly, the Commission decided that there was no indication of excessive pricing on the 
part of the DAA. The Commission maintained that there was no discrimination either 
because there was no application of dissimilar conditions to equivalent parties and DAA 
also lacked the incentive to discriminate. In addition, there were no separate products, as 
required for bundling, as well as no foreclosure in this particular case as DAA was not in 
competition with the airlines. With regard to the last allegation, there was no manifest 
failure to satisfy demand since Ryanairʼs complaint only involved a service which was not 
provided at a price that it considered appropriate. 
 The Commission came to the conclusion that there were insufficient grounds for 
conducting a further investigation into the alleged infringements and it would be 
disproportionate to further investigate Ryanairʼs claims. The Guidance was also not relied 
on in this case. In fact, three out of four allegations of Ryanair comprised types of abusive 
conduct which were left outside the scope of the Guidance. Only bundling as an 
exclusionary practice could have been examined under the Guidance, but the case involved 
a situation where the alleged bundling had taken place in the downstream market where the 
alleged dominant firm was not present. Although the Guidance is silent on its application 
when bundling takes place in a downstream market, it makes it clear in the context of 
refusal to supply that it only deals with the situation where the dominant firm competes on 
the downsteam market together with its downstream competitors with whom it refuses to 
supply (para.76). Therefore, the alleged bundling would have been hardly examined under 
the Guidance, had the Guidance been applied in this decision. 
 In SU/CEZ, the Commission rejected the complaint of SU against the Czech 
electricity incumbent, CEZ, concerning the allegations of discriminatory pricing, predatory 
pricing and imposition of unfair trading conditions.
212
 The case hardly concerned the (non-
)enforcement of the Guidance and the Commission decided to take no further action as the 
complainant repeated before the Commission the same allegations which had already been 
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dealt with and eventually rejected by the Czech Competition Authority.
213
 Furthermore, the 
Commission rejected the complaint against Greece and the Greek Organisation of Football 
Prognostics (OPAP) concerning an infringement of Art.102 in conjunction with Art.106 
TFEU through the grant and exercise of an exclusive licence concerning the operation of 
video lottery terminals.
214
 The case hardly concerned the (non-)enforcement of the 
Guidance either and the appeal before the GCEU on the grounds of breach of duty to 
investigate with due care and diligence and of duty to state reasons on the part of the 
Commission was rejected.
215
 
As for the case closures, the most important case is Velux where the Commission 
closed the investigation it launched ex officio into Veluxʼs inter alia allegedly abusive 
rebates, bonuses and reimbursements.
216
 The Commission found that Velux enjoyed wide 
brand recognition and had a very strong position in the relevant market for sales of roof 
windows and accessories in different MSs. The Commission observed that Veluxʼs rebate 
scheme was incremental (each unit exceeding the threshold earned the rebate), standardised 
(described in the general conditions and offered to all customers irrespective of their 
specific circumstances) and the increments were small (starting from 0.5% to a top rate of 
5%). Under the Guidance, incremental rebates are less likely to lead to anti-competitive 
foreclosure than retroactive rebates (paras.37 and 40), just as standardised rebates are less 
likely to lead to such foreclosure than individualised rebates (para.45). Because the 
customers could get a maximum rate of only 5%, the estimated effective price for 
competitors was close to the average price of Velux, suggesting that competitors would 
likely to match Velux’s rebates. 
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Having analysed the rebates of Velux in the light of the Guidance, the Commission 
found that the price that the competitors would have to offer to compensate the loss of 
rebate when the customer would switch its demand from Velux was above the long-run 
average incremental costs of Velux. According to para.43 of the Guidance, in such 
situations the rebate scheme in question would not normally be capable of foreclosing the 
market in an anti-competitive way. So the Commission decided that the rebates granted by 
Velux allowed “as efficient competitors” to compete profitably. The Commission 
concluded that such a rebate scheme would be unlikely to generate exclusionary effects and 
to give rise to anti-competitive foreclosure, thus having an adverse impact on consumer 
welfare. The case was welcomed in the literature and according to some commentators, the 
case ‘puts flesh on the bones of the [Guidance]’217 and ‘shows how the approach advocated 
in the [Guidance] can be applied in practice’.218 There are five other less important case 
closures regarding the application of Art.102; however, in none of those cases did the 
Commission provide any information on how the (non-)enforcement of the Guidance had 
an impact on the closure of those cases.
219
 
 Consequently, what was expected from the rejection decisions and case closures of 
the Commission in the post-Guidance period was to clearly see the Commission’s exercise 
of its enforcement priorities it had set out in the Guidance in the cases which it decided not 
to pursue. However, the analysis of the Commission’s rejection decisions and case closures 
in this period leads to disappointment. Among several rejection decisions, the trails of the 
Guidance are visible only in one decision, Velux. Even in Velux, there is no formal public 
information and how the Guidance had an impact on the outcome can be understood only 
from secondary sources. Rather than the substantive assessments of the Guidance, mostly 
procedural issues have influenced the rejection of the complaints made to the Commission. 
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Decisions on case closures in this period lead to even more disappointment. In none of 
those cases did the Commission provide adequate information on why the case in question 
was closed other than posting a brief note that it closed the case. There is no information on 
how the (non-)enforcement of the Guidance had an impact on the closure of those cases. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 3 was devoted to the analysis of the Guidance as the main outcome of the 
modernisation and the culmination of the Commission’s efforts to modernise the manner it 
enforces Art.102. Within a broad framework, it analysed the purpose behind adopting the 
Guidance, the legal regime of the Guidance and the criticisms of commentators’ that have 
been levelled against the Guidance in Section 3.1, the specific contributions of the 
Guidance to the enforcement of Art.102 in Section 3.2 and finally the legal and institutional 
landscape which has shaped the post-Guidance period in Section 3.3. Section 3.1 observed 
that the Guidance was carefully worded as “Guidance” instead of “Guidelines” and 
although it is said to contain only “enforcement priorities” of the Commission, many of its 
paragraphs offer interpretations that differ significantly from the EU Courts’ case law on 
various points which leads one to the conclusion that the Commission has aimed to shape 
the future direction of the law on Art.102. Section 3.2 observed that all of the four 
contributions of the Guidance are actually designed to promote an effects-based and 
consumer welfare-oriented enforcement of Art.102 which aims to achieve a substantive 
assessment of abusive conduct based on the effects it generates on consumers with the help 
of economic and econometric analysis. Finally, Section 3.3 observed that Art.9 Regulation 
1/2003 commitments mark another, albeit informal, stage in the modernisation of Art.102, 
as the Commission’s increasing use of such commitments has outstripped many practical 
discussions that were expected to take place after the issue of the Guidance but instead 
created new problems on the appropriateness, legal review and excessive use of 
commitments in Art.102 cases. 
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PART II 
CHAPTER 4 – ADOPTING GUIDELINES IN RELATION TO ART.6: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 
Introduction 
Chapter 4 provides answers to the first main research question as to whether there is a need 
for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkey and whether the Guidance can or should be 
used as a model for such Guidelines. To this end, it addresses three sub-questions: First, 
what are the likely benefits and costs of adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6? Second, 
what is the impact of Turkey’s duty to harmonise with the EU acquis on the adoption of the 
Guidance as Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkish competition law? Lastly, what are 
the opinions of the internal staff of the TCA, lawyers, judges and academics in Turkey on 
the adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6? This Chapter takes both a theoretical and a 
practical approach in seeking answers to the relevant research question, and is enhanced by 
the qualitative empirical data obtained from the research interviews. 
Chapter 4 is divided into three sections: Section 4.1 is concerned with the general 
role of Guidelines as soft law instruments in the enforcement of EU competition law and 
draws conclusions for Turkey. This Section examines the functions of Guidelines in theory 
and analyses the benefits they offer, as well as the drawbacks they entail, to enforcers of 
competition law rules and to undertakings as the addressees of those rules. In the light of 
the functions of Guidelines, the Section makes some remarks on the adoption of Guidelines 
in relation to Art.6 in the example of Turkey. Section 4.1 observes that the TCA and other 
State authorities in Turkey have explicitly stressed the need for adopting Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6, which would theoretically provide transparency and predictability, 
increase legal certainty and minimise inconsistencies in the decisions of the TCA, while 
resulting in a voluntary restraint on the discretion of the TCA. 
Section 4.2 sheds light on the impact of Turkey’s potential accession to the EU in 
an attempt to determine whether the Guidance should be used as a model when adopting 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6. This Section takes the view that the approximation of 
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Turkish competition law with the entire body of EU competition law as required by the 
accession regime may have a bearing on the transposition of the Guidance into Turkish 
competition law. First, the Section outlines the accession process of Turkey to the EU with 
a focus on competition policy as a negotiation chapter. Then it explores the reforms made 
by Turkey in this process and shows the past experience of the country with the 
harmonisation of the EU acquis. Lastly, it examines whether Turkey is legally required to 
adopt the Guidance as Guidelines in relation to Art.6 as part of its duty to harmonise its 
national competition law with the EU acquis. Section 4.2 observes that mostly because of 
the sui generis nature of the Guidance as a soft law instrument, Turkey’s duty of 
harmonisation under the Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey Association Council does not 
de jure require the country to transpose the Guidance into Turkish competition law. 
Section 4.3 examines whether there is a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in 
practice. This Section reports the findings of interviews carried out with (1) the internal 
staff of the TCA; (2) the lawyers who specialise in competition law cases in Turkey; (3) the 
judges within the 13
th
 Chamber of the Council of State; and (4) the academics who have 
their research interests in Art.6 or have published widely on competition law in Turkey. 
Their practical experience together with their theoretical knowledge assists this Section in 
determining whether there is a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in practice. Section 
4.3 observes that while both the enforcers of Art.6 and the legal counsel of the undertakings 
as the addressees of Art.6 felt the need for Guidelines that would provide much-needed 
guidance in the enforcement of Art.6, the judges seemed rather reluctant to the adoption of 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6 and took the view that such Guidelines would have a limited 
impact on the judicial review of the Art.6 decisions of the TCA. 
4.1. Guidelines as Soft Law Instruments: The Functions of Guidelines 
4.1.1. Providing Transparency and Predictability 
Almost every legal system has two different sets of legal instruments (legal norms) at its 
disposal depending on their legal force: Legally binding instruments (formal law) and non-
binding legal instruments (informal law). A number of different legal instruments exist in 
different legal systems under different names. In EU law, Art.288 TFEU is the foundational 
provision listing the EU’s legal instruments as “regulations, directives, decisions, 
138 
 
 
 
recommendations and opinions”.1 In addition to “recommendations and opinions”, many 
different forms of non-binding legal instruments such as “Notices”, “Guidelines”, and 
“Frameworks” and so on also exist in EU law as “soft law” 2 instruments. Especially in the 
area of State aids, the Commission has published a wide variety of Guidelines setting out 
its policies in interpreting the scope of the related State aid provisions in the TFEU 
(Arts.107-109). Formal and informal law are commonly used together to develop Union 
policy and attain EU goals in any particular area.
3
 
Guidelines elaborate the position of an enforcer on how it will interpret the 
governing legal norm(s).
4
 As an example of soft law, Guidelines are issued to increase the 
transparency and predictability of enforcement action, usually in cases which are not 
specifically covered by formal law.
5
 They are also used to consolidate the day to day 
decisional practice of an enforcer, since not all of its decisions may come to the notice of 
their addressees. Having a suitable set of Guidelines is important, as they can contribute 
towards predictability of actions and consistency of decisions.
6
 Once certain rules are set 
out in Guidelines, it may become easier to identify enforcement activity which departs from 
those rules, thereby providing a further check on the transparency of the enforcer. More 
often than not, the adoption of Guidelines indicates a move towards better and more 
effective administration on the part of enforcers. The publication of Guidelines and useful 
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5
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6
 Vettas, N. and Kourandi, F. (2010) “On the Economics of Non-horizontal Mergers”, in Lianos, I. and 
Kokkoris, I. (eds.), The Reform of EC Competition Law: New Challenges, Kluwer Law International, Great 
Britain, p.493. 
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guides to procedure has been regarded as an ‘achievement’ on the part of the Commission 
in terms of creating a far greater measure of transparency for its work.
7
 
However, better administration comes with the cost of a limited discretion enjoyed 
by enforcers. Once it has issued Guidelines, an enforcer wilfully forfeits its full discretion 
and is expected, or even bound, to exercise its discretion within the limits of those 
Guidelines. Although the EU Courts have endorsed the adoption of Guidelines by the 
Commission in its decisional practice,
8
 they have nevertheless taken the view that by 
adopting and publishing Guidelines, the Commission ‘imposes a limit on the exercise of its 
discretion and cannot depart from those rules under pain of being found, where appropriate, 
to be in breach of the general principles of law, such as equal treatment or the protection of 
legitimate expectations.’9 It was made clear that although Guidelines may not be regarded 
as rules of law which the Commission is always bound to observe, they may produce ‘legal 
effects’ ‘on certain conditions and depending on their content’.10 
4.1.2. Increasing Legal Certainty and Ensuring Compliance 
In addition to the transparency and predictability they create, Guidelines may increase legal 
certainty for their addressees and ensure a high level of compliance with the law.
11
 
Guidelines may help its addressees to be knowledgeable about the current state of law in a 
particular area, as well as about the interpretation of the law by enforcers and the likely 
administrative action they will take in situations defined in their Guidelines. Guidelines 
may thus guide the future behaviour of their addressees with a view to ensuring their 
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accepted that the Commission is bound by the Guidelines and Notices it has issued insofar as they do not 
depart from the rules in the Treaty and are accepted by the MSs. See Case C-91/01 Italy v Commission [2004] 
ECR I-4355, para.45, and Joined Cases C-75/05 and C-80/05, Germany and others v Kronofrance SA [2008] 
ECR I-6619, para.61. 
11
 See Vettas and Kourandi (2010), p.479 (‘By making the treatment of cases more predictable and increasing 
consistency among decisions in different cases, Guidelines have the goal of reducing legal uncertainty for the 
parties.’). 
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compliance and reducing their compliance costs. On the other hand, those who rely on 
Guidelines in an attempt to act effectively within the scope of legality expect that the 
criteria or legal tests set out in those Guidelines have been correctly interpreted and applied 
by enforcers. This may give rise to “legitimate expectations” on the part of the addressees 
of Guidelines, and the question as to how far their expectations will be protected in the eye 
of law gains significance. 
Increased legal certainty and compliance again comes with the cost of a limited 
discretion enjoyed by enforcers in that they may not easily depart from their Guidelines 
once these are published and announced to their addressees. Departures from Guidelines, 
where not justified with convincing evidence, may make the enforcement less predictable 
and lead to an unnecessary confusion amongst the addressees of those Guidelines. As a 
result of the inconsistency arisen out of unjustified departures, Guidelines may eventually 
fail to serve the functions intended by their publication. In EU law, the EU Courts have 
opted for the protection of legitimate expectations
12
 as they have taken the view that the 
Commission cannot depart from its Guidelines in an individual case without giving reasons 
that are compatible with the principle of equal treatment and the protection of legitimate 
expectations.
13
 The Commission’s failure to adhere to its policy it has set out in its 
published Guidelines may result in the annulment of its decisions.
14
 
4.1.3. Shaping the Law 
For Guidelines to serve the functions intended by their publication, the relation between the 
content of Guidelines and case law is of significance. Normally Guidelines describe the 
current decisional practice and case law on a particular area, but they can also provide 
                                                          
12
 It is settled case law in EU law that the right to rely on the principle of the protection of legitimate 
expectations extends to any individual in a situation where the EU authorities have caused them to entertain 
legitimate expectations. Case 265/85 Van den Bergh en Jurgens and Van Dijk Food Products v Commission 
[1987] ECR 1155, para.44;  Case C-152/88 Sofrimport v Commission [1990] ECR I-2477, para.26; and Case 
T-220/00 Cheil Jedang Corp v Commission [2003] ECR II-2473, para.33. 
13
 Case C-189/02 P, Dansk Rørindustri and others v Commission [2005] ECR I-5425, para.209-211 and Case 
C-167/04 JCB Service v Commission [2006] ECR I-8935, para.208. See also Case T-23/99 LR AF 1998 A/S v 
Commission [2002] ECR II-1705, para.245 (‘…the Commission has created a legitimate expectation amongst 
undertakings that the criteria set out in that notice will be applied, and is now therefore bound to apply 
them.’). 
14
 Bacon, K. (2009) “Compatibility of Aid - General Principles”, in Bacon, K. (ed.), European Community 
Law of State Aid, OUP, Great Britain, p.121. 
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detailed and extensive analysis of the interpretative methodology to be used in enforcing 
the legal provisions.
15
 In other words, they may not be a simple restatement of the existing 
case law. In many cases, Guidelines merely codify an enforcer’s existing practice in the 
light of its experience gained through individual decisions in a particular field, rather than 
setting out completely new policies.
16
 However, they can also diverge from the case law for 
instance when the enforcer perceives some judgments as misguided and may deem it as 
necessary to introduce new concepts, such as particular economic theories, which have not 
yet been the subject of substantial discussion in judicial settings.
17
 
It has been argued that Guidelines are a far more significant part of the antitrust 
legal development process than their technical status as mere non-binding guides for 
prosecutorial discretion would suggest.
18
 Accordingly, they have an important influence in 
refining, revising and rejecting the existing case law. Refining Guidelines can clarify a 
complex legal analysis or interpolate between rulings.
19
 A revision involves changes that 
are more substantial than refinements but in which the Guidelines remain somewhat 
consistent with some existing case law.
20
 Quite controversially, Guidelines may also 
diverge substantially from the law by rejecting the law.
21
 The appropriateness of the last 
function of Guidelines was fiercely debated in the EU when the Guidance was found to 
have ignored the case law of the EU Courts and the Commission was accused of distorting 
the case law to make it fit the new interpretation of Art.102.
22
 
4.1.4. Guidelines in the Example of Turkey 
In the Turkish legal system; acts (statutes), statutory decrees, regulations, by-laws, 
communiqués and other legally binding instruments comprise formal law; while 
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 Lianos, I. (2010) “‘Judging’ Economists: Economic Expertise in Competition Law Litigation: A European 
View”, in Lianos, I. and Kokkoris, I. (eds.), The Reform of EC Competition Law: New Challenges, Kluwer 
Law International, Great Britain, p.187. 
16
 Bacon (2009), p.120. 
17
 Greene, H. (2006) ‘Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of Merger Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse’, 
William and Mary Law Review, 48(3), p.780.  
18
 ibid at p.777. 
19
 ibid at p.828. 
20
 ibid at p.829. 
21
 ibid. Cf. Gormsen (2010a), p.159 (‘[G]uidelines are only valid if they do not conflict with the courts’ 
interpretation of the treaty provisions.’). 
22
 See supra “3.1.2. Commentators’ Responses to the Guidance”. 
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instructions, guidelines, advanced rulings, opinions and other non-binding legal instruments 
under different fields of law comprise informal law. Guidelines are used especially in the 
context of competition law and the TCA has issued many Communiqués and Guidelines on 
different areas. In contrast to agreements and merger control on which the TCA has issued 
many Communiqués and Guidelines, there had been no formal or informal legal instrument 
in the area of abuse of a dominant position in Turkish competition law since April 2014. 
This naturally begged the question as to how this lack of a legal instrument on Art.6 could 
be justified considering the amount of Communiqués and Guidelines available on Arts.4 
and 7 of the Act.
23
 
One indication of a need for Guidelines is perhaps the expression of such a need by 
the stakeholders in the first place. The TCA explicitly stressed the need for Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6 in its recent Strategic Plan 2014-2018.
24
 More importantly, this document 
points out that an increase in the number of Communiqués and Guidelines in Turkish 
competition law was expected by the consultancy firms, law offices, lawyers, academics, 
non-governmental organisations, consumer groups and some undertakings in Turkey who 
were consulted by the TCA for the purposes of this document.
25
 The need for Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6 was also mentioned by the President of the TCA in the President’s 2014 
Message.
26
 In addition, the State Supervisory Council recommended the adoption of 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6 with a view to ‘aligning Turkish competition law with the 
                                                          
23
 Art.4 prohibits agreements and concerted practices between undertakings, and decisions of association of 
undertakings which have as their object, effect or potential effect the prevention, distortion or restriction of 
competition within the market. Art.7 prohibits mergers and acquisitions which create or strengthen the 
dominant position of one or more of the parties and as a result of which effective competition in the market is 
significantly impeded. 
24
 Available in Turkish at <http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Guncel/2014-2018-Rekabet-Kurumu-Stratejik-
Plani-yayimlandi> [accessed 30/09/2014], p.48 (‘There are uncertainties in areas such as market definition, 
determination of dominant position, standards on exclusionary abuses and competition harm. For this reason 
[the TCA] should develop policies and standards through decisions and Guidelines, share them with public 
and provide predictability for undertakings… it will be beneficial to prepare and publicise Guidelines 
regarding the assessments on Art.6.’). 
25
 ibid at p.24-27. 
26
 Available in Turkish at <http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Sayfalar/Baskanin-2014-Mesaji> [accessed 
30/09/2014] (‘It is envisaged that our efforts regarding the formation of secondary legislation will continue in 
the same way. In continuation of our earlier efforts, the publication of Guidelines concerning exemption and 
dominant position... is envisaged in 2014.’). 
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EU acquis, increasing legal certainty for undertakings and ensuring an effective 
enforcement of the Act’.27 
Having been issued in April 2014, the Guidelines on Art.6 will provide guidance on 
how the TCA will analyse abuse of a dominant position cases.
28
 The legal assessments that 
the TCA will make and the administrative actions that it will take under the Guidelines on 
Art.6 will provide transparency and predictability, and eventually lead to a better and more 
effective administration on the part of the TCA. In addition, the Guidelines on Art.6 will 
increase legal certainty in the area of abuse of a dominant position and will be likely to lead 
to a higher level of compliance on the part of dominant undertakings who will have more 
and better information as to which practices can potentially amount to an abuse and how 
their conduct is likely to be assessed by the TCA. The Guidelines on Art.6 will also provide 
guidance to competitors and customers of dominant undertakings, as well as consumers, 
when bringing their claims before the TCA and the appellate courts. 
On the other hand, the Guidelines on Art.6 will result in a voluntary limitation on 
the discretion of the TCA which will be expected, or obliged, to exercise its discretion 
within the framework of its Guidelines in line with general legal principles and the 
principle of legitimate expectations. The TCA will be in a position to avoid as much 
derogation as possible and will have to explain why it has intended to depart from its 
methodology or rules in the particular case. Also the Guidelines on Art.6 may incentivise 
rapporteurs within the TCA to deliver consistent opinions (which may then give rise to 
consistent decisions when approved by the TCA) in similar cases since they will be able to 
rely on one single document instead of having had to examine the entire case law having 
different outcomes on the subject matter they are dealing with. Within this context, they can 
eventually be helpful in minimising inconsistencies in decisions of the TCA.
29
 Therefore, 
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 Available in Turkish at <http://www.tccb.gov.tr/ddk/ddk38.pdf> [accessed 30/09/2014]. 
28
 Pursuant to para.3 of the Guidelines on Art.6, ‘the purpose behind the publication of these Guidelines is to 
explain the factors that the Board will take into account in applying Art.6 to abusive exclusionary conduct, to 
increase transparency and thus to minimise the uncertainties in the interpretation of the Article by the 
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 On the problem of inconsistency in the decisions of the TCA, see infra “4.3. Guidelines on Art.6 in 
Practice” and Chapter 5. 
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the cost arising out of limited discretion is theoretically expected to be outweighed by the 
benefit of consistency in decisions and increased legal certainty for undertakings. 
4.2. The Impact of Turkey’s Commitments to the EU on Adopting Guidelines in 
Relation to Art.6 
4.2.1. Accession of Turkey to the EU and Competition Law as a Negotiation Chapter 
The relations between Turkey and the EU started with Turkey’s application for associate 
membership to the then European Economic Community (EEC) in 1959.
30
 An association 
agreement, commonly known as the “Ankara Agreement”, was signed between the parties 
in 1963 and went into force in 1964.
31
 In the integration process of Turkey to the EU, the 
Ankara Agreement envisaged mainly three stages: a preparatory stage, a transitional stage 
and a final stage.
32
 With the completion of the preparatory stage, the Additional Protocol 
was signed in 1970 preparing the ground for further integration.
33
 At the end of the 
transitional stage, the establishment of a Customs Union between the EEC and Turkey was 
planned as the final stage. On 6 March 1995, the EC-Turkey Association Council
34
 issued 
the “Decision No 1/95” which created the Customs Union as effective from 31 December 
1995.
35
 
After the Customs Union, the eventual goal of Turkey became the membership to 
the EU as envisaged under Art.28 of the Ankara Agreement. A new era in EU-Turkey 
relations began after the European Council’s Helsinki Summit of December 1999 when 
Turkey was formally recognised as a “candidate country” for EU membership. At the 
Brussels Summit of December 2004, the European Council acknowledged Turkey’s 
                                                          
30
 For a good comprehensive history of EU-Turkey relations, see Akçay, B. and Büyüktanır, D. (2013) 
“Changing Dynamics of Turkey-EU Relations”, in Akçay, B. and Akipek, Ş. (eds.), Turkey's Integration into 
the European Union, Lexington Books, USA, p.1-30. 
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 Agreement establishing an Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey (signed at 
Ankara, 12 September 1963) [1964] OJ L217/3687. 
32
 ibid, Art.2(3). 
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establishing the Association between the European Economic Community and Turkey and on measures to be 
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progress in fulfilling the “Copenhagen Criteria” and defined the conditions for the opening 
of accession negotiations. In October 2005, the European Council adopted a Negotiating 
Framework which set out the principles governing the negotiations between the parties, 
thus formal accession negotiations for full membership were officially launched. As part of 
becoming a member of the EU, Turkey was required to harmonise its national legislation 
with the EU acquis which was split up into 35 negotiation chapters.
36
 
One of those negotiation chapters is related to competition (“8-Competition 
Policy”).37 Within the framework of the association regime, Turkey was required to put in 
place the necessary measures for the application of competition rules in the relevant 
Treaties. To this end, the Ankara Agreement indicated that principles laid down in the 
provisions on competition of the EEC Treaty must be made applicable in the association 
regime.
38
 The Additional Protocol envisaged that the EC-Turkey Association Council 
would adopt the conditions and rules for the application of the principles laid down in 
Arts.85, 86 and 90 of the EEC Treaty (now Arts.101, 102 and 106 TFEU).
39
 The Decision 
No 1/95 obligated Turkey to adopt a domestic competition legislation and to approximate 
the substantive competition provisions of the EC Treaty. According to Art.39 of the 
Decision No 1/95: 
‘(1) With a view to achieving the economic integration sought by the Customs Union, Turkey shall 
ensure that its legislation in the field of competition rules is made compatible with that of the European 
Community, and is applied effectively.  
(2) To comply with the obligations of paragraph 1, Turkey shall  
(a) before the entry into force of the Customs Union, adopt a law which shall prohibit behaviours of 
undertakings under the conditions laid down in Articles 85 and 86 of the E.C. Treaty. It shall also ensure 
that, within one year after the entry into force of the Customs Union, the principles contained in block 
exemption regulations in force in the Community, as well as in the case law developed by E.C. authorities, 
shall be applied in Turkey...’ 
As can be seen, Turkey undertook to ensure that competition legislation in Turkey 
operates effectively and in compliance with EU competition law. To this end, Turkey was 
                                                          
36
 As of September 2014; 14 chapters have been opened, 1 chapter has been provisionally closed, 17 chapters 
have been blocked by some MSs and the remaining 3 chapters are yet to be opened. For up-to-date 
information on the status of negotiation chapters, see <http://www.mfa.gov.tr/relations-between-turkey-and-
the-european-union.en.mfa> [accessed 30/09/2014].  
37
 Competition law is one of the main areas covered by association agreements the EU enters into with 
countries within and outside Europe, and is usually given an important supporting role: To support efforts 
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38
 The Ankara Agreement, Art.16. 
39
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inter alia obliged to enact national rules prohibiting agreements having as their object or 
effect the restriction, prevention or distortion of competition, and abuse of a dominant 
position.
40
 In order to fulfil its obligations towards the EU, Turkey enacted the Act on the 
Protection of Competition 1994. Adoption of competition law was a response to 
international obligations instead of internal factors within Turkey. Majority of the Turkish 
commentators take the view that the main driving force behind the enactment of this Act 
was Turkey’s legal duty to harmonise its domestic law with the EU acquis under the 
association regime.
41
 The Act borrowed extensively from the EU as the operative language 
of its provisions closely mirrors that of the competition provisions in the EU Treaties.
42
 
4.2.2. Reforms in the Accession Process: Implications from Turkey’s Previous 
Adoption of EU Block Exemption Regulations and Guidelines 
The Decision No 1/95 indicates a high degree of harmonisation of the competition 
legislation in Turkey with that of the EU with a view to achieving an economic integration. 
The Decision is intended to ensure that Turkey has the necessary legislative framework in 
place, one that is compatible with the EU acquis. As shown above, Art.39 of the Decision 
No 1/95 imposes an obligation on Turkey to adopt national provisions in line with Arts.85 
and 86 EEC (now Arts.101 and 102 TFEU). In addition, the Article also obligates Turkey 
to transpose the principles contained in block exemption Regulations of the EU, as well as 
to harmonise the case law of the EU Courts. Furthermore, Art.39 also refers to 
“Community frameworks and guidelines” in the context of State aids as part of Turkey’s 
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 Decision No 1/95, Arts.32-33. 
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 Aydın, U. (2012) ‘Between Domestic Factors and the EU: Explaining the Emergence of the Turkish 
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 See generally Doleys, T. J. (2012) ‘Promoting Competition Policy Abroad: European Union Efforts in the 
Developing World’, Antitrust Bulletin, 57(2), p.338 (‘[I]t is generally accepted that core substantive 
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duty of harmonisation.
43
 Therefore Turkey was required to transpose into its domestic legal 
order almost the entirety of EU competition law.
44
 
To this end, the TCA has kept up with developments in EU competition law by 
following the Commission’s secondary legislation and the case law of the EU Courts. It has 
adopted many block exemption Regulations applicable in the EU and transposed them into 
Turkish competition law in the form of Communiqués. In this respect, the TCA issued the 
Communiqué on the Mergers and Acquisitions Requiring the Authorisation of the Turkish 
Competition Authority 1997/1,
45
 Vertical Agreements Block Exemption Communiqué 
2002/2, Research and Development Agreements Block Exemption Communiqué 2003/2, 
Block Exemption Communiqué on Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices in the 
Motor Vehicle Sector 2005/4, Technology Transfer Block Exemption Communiqué 
2008/2, Block Exemption Communiqué in Relation to the Insurance Sector 2008/3 and 
Specialisation Agreements Block Exemption Communiqué 2013/3. The TCA has also 
issued other Communiqués in relation to procedural46 and domestic issues.47 
Especially in recent years, the TCA has been very active in issuing Guidelines in 
various areas. Some of those Guidelines are inspired by their counterparts in EU 
competition law such as Guidelines on the Definition of the Relevant Market 2008, 
Guidelines on Technology Transfer Agreements 2009, Guidelines on Vertical Restraints 
2009, Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements 2013, Guidelines on the 
Assessment of Horizontal Mergers 2013, Guidelines on the Assessment of Non-horizontal 
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 Art.39(2)(c)-(f). It should be noted that transposition of “Guidelines” is envisaged only in the context of 
State aids, but not in the context of Arts.85 and 86 EEC (now now Arts.101 and 102 TFEU). This can be 
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not “Guidelines” from a legal point of view. See also infra “4.2.3. The Transposition of the Guidance vis-à-
vis Turkey’s Duty of Harmonisation with the EU Acquis”. 
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Mergers 2013 and Guidelines on the General Principles of Exemption 2013. The TCA has 
also issued other Guidelines, mostly in the area of merger control.
48
 The recent practice of 
the TCA to issue Guidelines is modelled on the Commission’s practice of issuing 
Guidelines to guide undertakings.
49
 Following the imprints left by the European legal 
framework, the TCA is developing its own voice in enhancing legislative framework.
50
 
The abovementioned Communiqués and Guidelines demonstrate that Turkey has a 
fair track record of transposing the EU acquis. The TCA has transposed all of the EU block 
exemption Regulations into Turkish competition law and has been especially active in 
recent years in complementing the secondary legislation with soft law instruments. It is 
noteworthy that the vast majority of the abovementioned Communiqués and Guidelines 
relate to Art.4 and Art.7 of the Act. Abuse of a dominant position was the only area which 
was left without any formal or informal piece of guidance. Before the publication of the 
Guidelines on Art.6 in April 2014, it was expected that the TCA would also issue 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6 considering its previous adoption of EU block exemption 
Regulations and Guidelines. Eventually, the TCA’s growing trend to adopt Guidelines in 
recent years has paved the way for the issue of the Guidelines on Art.6. 
4.2.3. The Transposition of the Guidance vis-à-vis Turkey’s Duty of Harmonisation 
with the EU Acquis 
Considering Turkey’s duty to harmonise its domestic competition law with the entire body 
of EU competition law, the question as to whether Turkey as an official candidate for EU 
membership is legally obliged under the association regime to adopt the Commission’s 
Guidance as Guidelines in relation to Art.6 gains importance. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
the Guidance is primarily related to the Commission’s own enforcement in dealing with the 
complaints and informs about the future administrative practice of the Commission in the 
context of Art.102. Unlike the earlier documents in the modernisation of Art.102, the 
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Guidance has enforcement status but is not intended to constitute a statement of law. It is in 
no way legally binding on the EU Courts and on the MSs. It follows that it is a fortiori not 
binding on the TCA or on the Turkish Appellate Courts either. 
In this respect, the status of the Guidance in the context of the accession regime 
needs to be explored. First of all, the Guidance is not a “Block Exemption Regulation on 
the Application of Art.102”. According to its title, it is “Guidance on the Commission’s 
enforcement priorities” and is thus primarily related to the Commission’s own enforcement 
activity in applying Art.102. Second, the Guidance is not labelled as “Guidelines” either. 
Legally it is a “Communication from the Commission” instead of a “Notice”. For these 
reasons, it has been argued that the Guidance represents an ‘atypical’ or ‘unusual’ form for 
a soft law instrument.
51
 Accordingly, the Guidance has a sui generis nature as a legal 
instrument in EU competition law which is ‘not recognised in any of the legislative acts as 
set out in the EU Treaties’.52 It follows that from a legal point of view, the Guidance does 
not qualify as a block exemption Regulation or as Guidelines, and therefore does not come 
within the scope of Art.39(2)(a) of the Decision No 1/95. 
On the other hand, the same Article obligates Turkey to apply the principles 
contained in ‘the case law developed by the [EU] authorities’. Also, pursuant to Art.35 of 
the Decision No 1/95;
53
 the illegality of agreements, abuse of a dominant position and State 
aids under the association regime shall be assessed on the basis of criteria arising from the 
application of relevant competition provisions of the EU Treaties, as well as secondary 
legislation of the EU. In other words; the founding Treaties, Regulations, Notices and other 
legal instruments in EU competition law will be the primary source for the interpretation of 
the national law concerning agreements, abuse of a dominant position and State aids. 
Evidently, as far as Art.35 is concerned, Turkey’s national law on abuse of a dominant 
position should be in harmony with the statutory law on this area in the EU. Failure to 
assess unilateral conduct on the basis of criteria arising from the application of the rules of 
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Art.102 in Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkey will result in a breach of Art.35 of the 
Decision No 1/95. 
Because of the sui generis nature of the Guidance as a soft law instrument, it does 
not qualify as a piece of “secondary legislation” as envisaged in Art.35 either.54 This means 
that from a legal point of view Turkey is not required to implement the Commission’s new 
reading of Art.102 in the Guidance so long as it departs from the case law of the EU Courts, 
which is instead given the real importance under Art.39(2)(a). Therefore, the dilemma of 
following the tide towards the Commission’s new reading of Art.102 so as to keep up with 
the developments in modern economic thinking on unilateral conduct versus abiding by the 
case law of the EU Courts on Art.102 so as to be “on the safe side” is also the case with 
Turkey in transposing the Guidance into Turkish competition law. Though the Guidance is 
still expected to provide a useful point of reference for the MSs which are not allowed 
under Art.16 Regulation 1/2003 to take decisions running counter to Commission 
decisions,
55
 Turkey is currently an official candidate for EU membership. Since Turkey is 
yet to become a MS, this argument does not help Turkey to use the relevant Article in 
Regulation 1/2003 as a potential basis for transposing the Guidance either. 
Consequently, Turkey’s duty of harmonisation with the EU acquis does not de jure 
require the country to transpose the Guidance into Turkish competition law because the 
Guidance does not qualify as a block exemption Regulation, not even as Guidelines, within 
the meaning of Art.39(2)(a) of the Decision No 1/95. While Art.35 of the Decision No 1/95 
does de jure obligate Turkey to interpret its national law on abuse of a dominant position in 
harmony with the EU treaties and secondary legislation in the same area, the Guidance does 
not fall into the scope of this Article either. Under these circumstances, one can reasonably 
argue that the Guidance can be used as a model when preparing Guidelines in relation to 
Art.6 in Turkey, rather than should be used in this respect. As Chapter 5 will show, the 
Guidance has actually been used as a model by the TCA and the substantive content of the 
Guidance is firmly followed throughout the Guidelines on Art.6. After all considering the 
TCA’s efforts on the alignment of the enforcement of Art.6 with the Commission’s new 
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reading of Art.102 even before the Guidelines on Art.6 came out,
56
 it was highly unlikely 
for the Guidelines on Art.6 to show pivotal differences from its EU counterpart. 
4.3. Guidelines in Relation to Art.6 in Practice 
4.3.1.  Observations of the Internal Staff of the TCA 
First of all, the members of internal staff of the TCA were asked about their opinion on the 
current state of case law of the TCA and the Council of State on Art.6 as to whether it was 
clear and consistent or in need of reform. All interviewees within this group replied that the 
case law of the TCA was inconsistent; not even one interviewee argued otherwise. 
One senior competition expert summarised the state of the decisions of the TCA as 
follows: 
‘Our decisions are being widely criticised outside [the TCA]. I agree with those criticisms. 
Decisions are in conflict with each other. A robust body of case law has not been developed. Decisions do 
not follow each other on a regular basis. When there is a change in the case law, the reasons for such is 
often not explained... Depending on the rapporteurs, different expressions are being used in decisions.’57 
One member of the commission that prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 expressed 
that: 
‘Unfortunately when we look at the past decisions, we do not see a consistent body of cases. For 
example, one decision requires a specific set of conditions for a certain type of abuse, whereas another 
decision requires a different set of conditions for that abuse... Recent decisions are relatively more 
consistent.’58 
Evaluating the decisions of the TCA, one competition expert noted that: 
‘The biggest problem with the decisions of the TCA is the problem of consistency and thus the 
serious conflicts amongst decisions in terms of both the approach and the results...’59 
Drawing attention to a different subject, another member of the commission that 
prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 noted that: 
‘When we look at the expertise theses [of the competition experts within the TCA], we see that 
majority of those theses pointed to a need for a consistent body of decisions... The biggest problem is the 
lack of inconsistency in practice.’60 
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Second, with the exception of one interviewee,
61
 all of the interviewees found that 
the case law was not clear either. 
One competition expert expressed that: 
‘We all know that decisions are not sufficiently clear.’62 
Third, not all interviewees touched on the issue of reform in their replies. Majority 
of those who considered this issue responded that a reform was needed in this respect
63
 
with the exception of two interviewees who noted that there is no need for a reform despite 
the current state of the case law.
64
 
Making a comparison with the EU, one competition expert observed that: 
‘Reform is not needed, but the case law is nevertheless not clear. However, this is not peculiar to 
Turkish competition law. This is the same in the US and the EU... This area rather needs to be explained 
and I can say that there is unanimity on this.’65 
Likewise not all interviewees considered the state of the judgments of the Council 
of State in their replies, but those who did so noted that the issue with those judgments was 
not the fact that they were inconsistent or unclear; instead the real problem was that they 
were far from providing any guidance on Art.6.
66
 
One competition expert explained that: 
‘We see that generally Danıştay does not deal with substantive issues in the decisions [of the 
TCA]. For this reason, it is impossible to speak of detailed analyses in relation to Art.6 or of consistency. 
As a member of staff, I can say that the judgments of Danıştay are not sufficiently helpful to me in my 
cases. Therefore, we can say that the judgments of Danıştay are inconsistent and need some 
clarification.’67 
Another competition expert claimed that: 
‘The judgments of Danıştay are in no way guiding... [It] does not list the necessary conditions for 
a particular type of conduct to amount to an infringement...’68 
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With regard to the second interview question, the members of internal staff of the 
TCA were asked whether there was a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 or whether 
they felt the absence of such Guidelines based on their personal experience. Again all 
interviewees replied that there was a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6; not even one 
interviewee argued otherwise. It is worth noting that most interviewees used words like 
“absolutely”, “definitely” or “of course” to imply that there is a dire need of Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6. The most cited reasons for the issue of Guidelines in relation to Art.6 
stood out as “consistency”, “predictability” and “fulfilling the gap on Art.6 which was the 
only area left without any guidance”. 
One high-ranked official within the TCA illustrated that: 
‘Absolutely there is a need for Guidelines. For example in the area of mergers and acquisitions 
there are Communiqués and Guidelines which are more or less guiding. People can understand things 
without Guidelines in this area. But it is hard to understand Art.6 without Guidelines. You claim that 
predatory pricing is an abuse, but you have to explain what a predatory price is, which cost benchmarks 
are used, whether it directly amounts to an abuse when you sell below costs, for how long it should last 
etc... Guidelines are a must.’69 
Another high-ranked official explained that: 
‘In the absence of Guidelines, there would only be our past decisions. Of course we benefit from 
the literature when available, but most of the time we rely on our decisions. There may be inconsistencies 
in our decisions or our decisions may not be adequately guiding. This of course creates controversies and 
makes it difficult for our rapporteurs to write their decisions... Some guidance is necessary.’70 
One other high-ranked official highlighted their reasons for adopting Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6 as follows: 
‘Guidelines have benefits... Sometimes the members [of the Competition Board] change. The 
new members may have different approaches. They may not be aware of the past decisions. Guidelines 
will thus provide consistency in the case law. Since Guidelines refer to past decisions, this will allow 
[competition] experts to see how the case law has been developed. There are also inconsistencies among 
experts, not just the members...  Guidelines are needed to ensure consistency.’71 
One competition expert strongly advocated for the adoption of Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6 by stating that: 
‘When we look at the enforcement of the TCA, in areas such as procedure, fining, Art.4 or Art.7, 
different pieces of secondary legislation have been prepared in order to provide predictability. On this 
point, we can say that there is a lack of [guidance] in terms of Art.6... I definitely think that there is [a 
need for Guidelines]. As a member of staff, I do not know which criteria are taken into account when the 
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[Competition] Board assesses the abuse “X”. I look at the decision “A” and there are four criteria. I look at 
the decision “B” and there are four different criteria. Therefore, in order to solve this problem, there is a 
need for Guidelines....’72 
Another competition expert expressed that: 
‘For both enforcers... and undertakings as the addresses of the Act, I actually think that there is a 
need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 on what is an abuse, what is not an abuse, or how the allegation 
will be assessed and investigated.’73 
One other competition expert stressed that: 
‘I felt the need for Guidelines in every case I worked on.’74 
The members of the internal staff of the TCA were further asked whether the 
Commission’s Guidance should be adopted or Turkey should publish its own Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6. By using similar words, all of the interviewees expressed that Turkey 
should publish its own Guidelines, but should nevertheless benefit from the Guidance and 
from the EU experience in this respect. 
One senior competition expert said that:  
‘I can well say that we have to take into account that [the EU experience], because they have a 
much more experience than we have. There are much more cases, expertise etc. Evidently we have to take 
this into account, but of course Turkey’s own circumstances should be considered as well.’75 
One high-ranked official stressed that: 
‘I am not a big fan of adopting [EU] Guidelines in their entirety. But their general framework 
needs to be adopted. The fundamental reason for this is the EU’s considerable experience on the 
subject.’76 
Another high-ranked official expressed that: 
‘We should get the utmost benefit from the EU Commission’s regulation [the Guidance], but we 
have to adapt it [to our needs], and take into account the situation of our sectors and our structural or 
cultural issues...’77 
One competition expert stated that: 
‘I have doubts about adopting it [the Guidance] in its entirety, because the wording of our Act 
and the established enforcement thus far differ. For this reason, I think we have to consider our own 
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established case law, the wording of our Act etc. and make additions or alterations when necessary. Our 
draft Guidelines [on Art.6] were drafted accordingly.’78 
Although all of the interviewees responded that Turkey should publish its own 
Guidelines which should be modelled on the Guidance, not all interviewees mentioned 
what those needs were. 
Listing the needs of Turkey, one competition expert claimed that: 
‘We have to start with answering the question as to whether the economic situations in the EU 
and in Turkey are the same. They are not... I like the rationale of the Guidance... but its full adoption, and 
translation is a serious problem... There is a need to make an adaptation between the rationale of the 
Guidance and the accounting standards, statistics in use, the conditions of undertakings and barriers to 
entry in Turkey.’79 
One high-ranked official was of the opinion that: 
‘There are not so many things to change in the Guidelines in Turkey... Maybe only the 
determination of dominant position may differ. Abuse is similar to the EU. Their [EU’s] experience is 
more or less the same.’80 
Another high-ranked official briefly stated that: 
‘We do not have to add the fundamentals to the Guidelines [on Art.6]... if the Guidelines include 
some controversial points, this will at least provide guidance...’81 
Finally, the competition experts (Group 1(b)) among the internal staff of the TCA 
were additionally asked whether Guidelines in relation to Art.6 should be in the form of 
“enforcement priorities” just as the Guidance. Most of the interviewees who answered this 
question expressed that they should be in the form of “Guidelines”, while one interviewee 
insisted that it should set enforcement priorities just as the Guidance. 
Taking a negative stance against enforcement priorities, one competition expert 
stated that: 
‘Our Guidelines will be binding. I think that the EU’s Guidance is something that is stuck in the 
middle. It gives the impression like: “I think about this but it can also be this”. In order for our Guidelines 
to reach their goals, they should not be something that is stuck in the middle, but should be something 
binding.’82 
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One member of the commission that prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 explained 
that: 
‘They called it the Guidance... Their hands were more tied, because there were detailed 
judgments. Because they had to take into account the formalistic judgments, they prepared it as 
enforcement priorities. However, we preferred ours to be Guidelines in format, since the judgments of 
Danıştay did not deal with substantive issues.’83 
Another competition expert opted for Guidelines as follows: 
‘For the moment, it is better to issue Guidelines... The decision to set enforcement priorities is 
related to competition policy rather than being a matter of law... Which infringements to prioritise, which 
sectors to prioritise... are the subject of competition policy... These have to be considered in a strategic 
plan first. This has pluses and minuses... I think Guidelines [on Art.6] do not serve the purpose of 
prioritisation, therefore they have been published in accordance with their own purpose.’84 
On the other hand, one competition expert dissented that: 
‘Because it is difficult to define the concept of abuse of a dominant position or monopolisation, it 
seems useful to set enforcement priorities. This will leave more discretion to competition authorities... and 
will provide some clarity for market players on the things the TCA considers and prioritises. Publishing in 
the form of Guidelines may be problematic.’85 
4.3.2.  Observations of Lawyers 
To begin with, the lawyers who specialise in competition law cases in Turkey were asked 
about their opinion on the current state of case law of the TCA and the Council of State on 
Art.6 as to whether it was clear and consistent or in need of reform. All interviewees within 
this group replied that the case law of the TCA was inconsistent; not even one interviewee 
argued otherwise. 
One lawyer stated that: 
‘Unfortunately it is not clear or consistent... I think that the companies are in a terrible condition 
in terms of legal certainty and safety.’86 
Another lawyer took the view that: 
‘We cannot say that [the case law of the TCA is] so clear or consistent, we cannot say that this is 
peculiar to Turkey either.’87 
 Second, most lawyers also considered whether the case law was in need of reform 
and gave different reasons in this respect. Majority of the lawyers found that there was a 
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need for a reform. Among different interviewee groups, the lawyers were the only 
interviewees who were mostly concerned with a reform in the case law. 
One lawyer argued that: 
‘Based on the cases I am involved as a lawyer, I can say that there is certainly a need for a 
reform... I mean that rather than changing the rules, there is a need for reform because of some weaknesses 
on how the TCA and Danıştay achieve results with the facts in their decisions.’88 
Another lawyer expressed that: 
‘There is a need for reform on how the TCA will apply each subparagraph [of Art.6], the 
conditions it will consider, the tests it will apply and how it will use its discretion.’89 
One other lawyer said that: 
 ‘Sometimes it is possible to see conflicting decisions in relation to Art.6... For the question as to 
whether there is a need for reform, yes there is a need for reform within this context. In this respect, I think 
Guidelines are important.’90 
Not all lawyers considered the state of the judgments of the Council of State in their 
replies, but those who did so noted that the issue with these judgments was not the fact that 
they were inconsistent or unclear; instead the real problem was that they were far from 
providing any guidance on Art.6. 
One lawyer observed that: 
‘Especially when we look at the judgments of Danıştay on competition law in general and on 
Art.6 in particular, we see that they do not have that much experience... I think we have to spend much 
more time for the judiciary to guide the TCA and provide some fundamental points of reference in its 
assessments of Art.6.’91 
With regard to the second interview question, the lawyers were asked whether there 
was a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 or whether they felt the absence of such 
Guidelines based on their personal experience. Again all lawyers replied that there was a 
need for such Guidelines; no lawyer argued otherwise.  
One lawyer explained that:  
‘Yes, there is [a need for Guidelines]. Ultimately Art.6 is a short article consisting of 
subparagraphs and listing examples of abuse... For the undertakings to be in a position to know which of 
their practices are abusive and which of their practices are competitive; instead of individually analysing 
the TCA’s decisions and deriving some conclusions, I think it will be appropriate in terms of legal 
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certainty to include a summary of the TCA’s decisions and of the outcome of those decisions in 
Guidelines.’92 
Another lawyer provided good reasons as follows:  
‘The question as to what would happen if there were no Guidelines is somehow important. If 
there were no Guidelines; what kind of approach would be taken and how certainty would be provided as 
to whether the conduct is against the law etc. could only be determined by reviewing the past decisions of 
the TCA. But one of the very few points for which we can criticise the TCA is that there are weaknesses in 
terms of consistency of the law in its decisions... There are some detailed decisions of the TCA which 
thoroughly examine the subject in question, but in other cases we see that a certain approach that is 
adopted in one decision is abandoned in another decision, but we do not see any explanation on this 
difference between the former decision and the latter decision. In the absence of Guidelines, uncertainty 
would still remain in terms of shaping the law by only looking at the decisions. The existence of 
Guidelines is positive as it will transpose the case law into soft law.’ 93 
Although no lawyer argued that there was no need for Guidelines in relation to 
Art.6, it can be observed that some lawyers specified the elements for which some form of 
guidance was needed and thus limited the content of such Guidelines. 
One lawyer emphasised that: 
‘I do not think that there is a need for Guidelines on all aspects of Art.6. But for some specific 
types of abuses, Guideline would be appropriate. For instance, pricing abuses, predatory pricing or 
excessive pricing... loyalty-inducing rebates... or de facto exclusivity. However, for some types [of abuses] 
under Art.6, I do not think there is a need for a comprehensive guideline... [such as] refusal to deal...’94 
Finally, the lawyers were further asked whether the Commission’s Guidance should 
be adopted or Turkey should publish its own Guidelines in relation to Art.6. All lawyers 
expressed that Turkey should take into account the EU experience, but should still prepare 
its own Guidelines. 
One lawyer was of the opinion that: 
‘I do not think that the exact translation of the Guidance would be meaningful... Evidently, the 
EU Regulations should be an example, but an exact copy does not seem right to me. In any case, we have 
15 years of [competition] law enforcement in our country and there are many decisions as a result of that 
enforcement... Some principles can be derived from that.’95 
Another lawyer drew attention to the fact that:  
‘On the one hand, we have a duty to adapt the EU rules to the country in the accession process. 
On the other hand... competition law is the result of competition policy, which is the result of a country’s 
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economic policies... Where the domestic conditions differ from the EU, the content of Guidelines should 
differ accordingly.’96 
One other lawyer insisted that: 
‘Nothing can be adopted in their entirety any more... Rather than adopting in its entirety, it is best 
to filter according to our decisions... A little tailoring will be necessary.’97 
4.3.3.  Observations of Judges 
First of all, the judges within the 13
th
 Chamber of the Council of State were asked as to 
whether the current state of case law of the TCA and the Council of State on Art.6 was 
clear and consistent or in need of reform. Contrary to what the internal staff of the TCA and 
the lawyers argued, there is no unanimity among the judges in that some judges expressed 
that the case law of the TCA was consistent, while other judges stated that it was 
inconsistent. The judges were silent on the second part of the first interview questions and 
thus did not state whether the case law was in need of reform. 
One judge observed that: 
‘With regard to the decisions of the TCA, there are a vast number of decisions. I cannot say that I 
have come across with inconsistent decisions of the TCA. Maybe there are some [inconsistent decisions] 
under Art.4... but I do not see a remarkable inconsistency with regard to Art.6.’98 
 Another judge expressed that: 
‘When we look at the decisional practice of the TCA, it keeps up with the EU acquis. Even 
though there are inconsistencies, the decisions have been shaped in line with the EU enforcement.’99 
 Again unlike the internal staff of the TCA and the lawyers, some judges found that 
the case law of the Council of State was clear and consistent. 
 One judge took the view that: 
‘Danıştay does not issue enough decisions, but we can say that the existing decisions are clear 
and consistent.’100 
Second, the judges were asked whether there was a need for Guidelines in relation 
to Art.6 or whether they felt the absence of such Guidelines based on their personal 
experience. In sharp to contrast to what the internal staff of the TCA and the lawyers 
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responded, the judges did not think that there was a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6, 
nor did they feel the absence of such Guidelines. All judges expressed that the main 
consideration in their judicial review was the Act itself and no soft law material was 
relevant for the purposes of judicial review. 
One judge unequivocally expressed that: 
‘There is no need for Guidelines at the level of judicial authorities. The fundamental norm is 
statutes... The absence of Guidelines does not affect our judicial review. We have never felt a need for 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6. Guidelines are legal instruments that show how the TCA will apply Art.6. 
We take into account the Act [on the Protection of Competition 1994]... if there are elements contrary to 
our interpretations, we will not be bound by Guidelines. Guidelines can never be the fundamental norm. 
They can only be an auxiliary norm. Guidelines only bind the TCA itself, restrain its discretion and may 
help us in reviewing whether it has exercised its discretion within the limits of the law and based on 
objective criteria. Other than that they are of no use to us.’101 
Another judge argued similarly that: 
‘Guidelines only bind the TCA. They may provide predictability and foreseeability for 
companies, and may be useful for companies. However, they do not bind the courts. We are not interested 
in whether the TCA has applied its Guidelines or not. If there is anything against the Act, that is our 
concern. We will not be bound by Guidelines. I review the decisions on the grounds of infringement of the 
Act or other secondary legislation, but not infringement of Guidelines.’102 
Finally, the judges were asked the third interview question on the adoption of the 
Guidance or publication of Turkey’s own Guidelines in relation to Art.6. Similar to the 
internal staff of the TCA and the lawyers, all judges replied that Turkey should benefit from 
the Guidance, but should still publish its own Guidelines. 
One judge said that: 
‘The enforcement of the TCA is already parallel to the EU. If we are to say that we should depart 
from the EU in the context of Guidelines in relation to Art.6, this will not be logical. The best way is of 
course to prepare [Guidelines in relation to Art.6.] by taking into account the conditions that are peculiar 
to us, the decisions etc.’103 
Another judge took a similar position that:  
‘The Act was already adopted from the EU. This is also true for some secondary legislation... The 
experience of the EU must be taken into account, but by considering the conditions that are peculiar to 
Turkey, past decisions of the TCA, judgments etc. the Turkish enforcement can be harmonised.’104 
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4.3.4.  Observations of Academics 
The last interviewee group comprises the academics who have their research interests in 
Art.6 or have published widely on competition law in Turkey. Similar to other interviewee 
groups, the academics were asked as to whether the current state of case law of the TCA 
and the Council of State on Art.6 was clear and consistent or in need of reform. It can be 
observed that some academics found the case law of the TCA consistent, while others 
disagreed with this proposition. 
One academic expressed that: 
‘Not so clear, not consistent either. Despite the two negative answers, there is, however, no need 
for a reform. The rule [the prohibition in Art.6] slightly enables to make consistent interpretations within 
the rule itself. So, the issue is to a large extent an issue of interpretation.’105 
Another academic was more satisfied with decisions of the TCA and argued that: 
‘The decisions of the TCA have become more consistent in recent years, because they [the TCA] 
have begun to use the same input to make the same analysis... The decisions of the TCA are not fully 
consistent, but nevertheless consistent enough to derive some conclusions.’106 
Not all academics considered the state of the judgments of the Council of State in 
their replies, but those who did so stated that it was not consistent, but the real problem was 
the fact that the Council of State did not have enough expertise with Art.6. 
One academic observed that: 
‘I cannot say that the judgments of Danıştay are consistent, because Danıştay has not yet acquired 
the necessary expertise and has not yet gone beyond procedural issues towards substantial analyses... ’107 
Second, the academics were asked whether there was a need for Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6 or whether they felt the absence of such Guidelines based on their personal 
experience. Technically they answered this question in the affirmative, but it can be 
observed that they did not strongly advocate for the adoption of Guidelines in relation to 
Art.6 for different reasons. 
One academic took the view that: 
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‘We can say that there is a need for Guidelines... It is not an essential need, but it is nevertheless 
useful to have a document in Turkish language, provided that the TCA will be able to abide by the 
Guidelines it has published.’108 
Another academic expressed that: 
‘There may be a need for Guidelines for the general public, rather than for the undertakings, 
because too many complaints are made to the TCA and most of them do not actually reflect the dominant 
position. These increase the workload of the TCA. In order for both complainants and undertakings that 
are not in a dominant position to better understand, there is a need for Guidelines. Guidelines are always 
beneficial. However, since there are already cases on what dominant undertakings can or cannot do, I do 
not think that Guidelines will change much for them. In many sectors, we are in a position to count the 
dominant undertakings in Turkey on the fingers of one hand... They should do the relevant self-assessment 
and should know.’109 
Lastly, the academics were asked whether Turkey should adopt the Guidance or 
publish its own Guidelines in relation to Art.6. For this question, the replies were totally 
opposite in that some academics placed greater emphasis on Turkey’s own needs, while 
others opted for the adoption of the Guidance. 
One academic highlighted the need for a more national version of Guidelines as 
follows: 
‘When adopting statutes or regulation from other countries, this may make sense or may be 
appropriate. But Guidelines explain the details of an already established regulation. I prefer them to be 
more culture-specific, sector-specific and more national... Surely the main points [of the Guidance] can be 
taken into account, but by internalising the expertise from the national enforcement, I prefer “more 
Turkish” Guidelines.’110 
Another academic took a negative stance against Turkey’s publication of its own 
Guidelines by claiming that: 
‘Personally I do not think that there is a need for Guidelines which will be specific to Turkey. 
Eventually these are technical documents and largely based on economic theory. There is no difference 
between Turkey and the EU in terms of economic theory... It is for this reason that I earlier said the 
publication of Guidelines was not an essential need.’111 
4.3.5. Summary 
On the first question as to whether the current state of the case law of the TCA and the 
Council of State on Art.6 is clear and consistent or in need of reform, the overwhelming 
majority of the interviewees expressed that the decisions of the TCA were inconsistent; 
only one judge among all interviewees found the case law of the TCA consistent. One 
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competition expert and one academic noted that recent decisions of the TCA had become 
more consistent compared to earlier decisions. The interviewees tended to consider the 
clarity and consistency of the decisions together; only one competition expert gave separate 
answers to this question and found that the decisions of the TCA were clear. 
With regard to the case law of the Council of State; with the exception of the 
judges, all of the interviewees who answered this question argued that the issue with the 
judgments of the Council of State was not the fact that they were inconsistent or unclear; 
the real problem was that they were far from providing any guidance on Art.6. The second 
part of the first question as to whether the case law was in need of reform was not answered 
by almost half of the interviewees. Majority of the interviewees who considered this part of 
the question expressed that there was a need for reform; only one high-ranked official 
within the TCA, one competition expert and one academic objected to a reform 
notwithstanding the state of the case law on Art.6. 
On the second question as to whether there is a need for Guidelines in relation to 
Art.6 or whether the interviewees felt the absence of such Guidelines based on their 
personal experience, all members of the internal staff of the TCA and all lawyers replied 
that there was a need for Guidelines. Most members of the internal staff of the TCA and 
lawyers used words like “absolutely”, “definitely” or “of course” in this respect. The judges 
insisted that they did not feel the absence of Guidelines in relation to Art.6 and were rather 
reluctant to the issue of Guidelines in general. The academics agreed on the inconsistency 
of the case law, but expressed different views on the need for Guidelines. 
In addition; “consistency”, “predictability” and “fulfilling the gap on Art.6 which 
was the only area left without any guidance” were the most cited reasons among the 
interviewees for the adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6. In sharp contrast to the 
Guidance, the reasons that paved the way for the issue of the Guidance, namely switching 
to an effects-based approach and consumer welfare-oriented approach, were not considered 
among the reasons for the adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6. Only two members of 
the commission that prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 pointed to a move towards an effects-
based approach and a greater use of economic analysis in Art.6 cases as reasons for 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6. 
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On the third question as to whether Turkey should adopt the Guidance or publish its 
own Guidelines, the overwhelming majority of the interviewees expressed that Turkey 
should publish its own Guidelines in relation to Art.6, but should nevertheless benefit from 
the Guidance in this respect; only the academics gave little support for Guidelines that 
would be specific to Turkey. The interviewees tended to acknowledge the EU experience 
with Art.102 and took a reserved stance towards issuing fully independent Turkish 
Guidelines, while noting at the same time that Turkey’s own needs should not be 
disregarded. However, not all interviewees mentioned what those needs were. Different 
elements were mentioned in this respect and the proposed content of Guidelines in relation 
to Art.6 differed among the interviewees. 
Finally, on the first additional question as to whether Guidelines in relation to Art.6 
should be in the form of “Guidelines” or “enforcement priorities”, most of the interviewees 
who answered this question expressed that Guidelines in relation to Art.6 should be in the 
form of Guidelines in Turkey suggesting that the reasons in the EU for the preference of 
enforcement priorities did not exist in Turkey. Only one interviewee insisted that the TCA 
should set enforcement priorities just as the Guidance, not because of the formalistic 
judgments of appellate courts as in the EU, but because of the uncertainties with regard to 
the definition of abuse of a dominant position and the need for leaving more discretion to 
the TCA for this reason. 
To conclude, it can be observed that the replies of the internal staff of the TCA and 
the lawyers to all of the three main interview questions were almost identical. In other 
words, the enforcers of Art.6 and the legal counsel of the addresses of Art.6 seemed to be 
“speaking the same language”; they shared similar opinions and beliefs with regard to the 
inconsistency of the case law and the need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 which should 
take into Turkey’s own needs while benefitting from the Guidance. The judges provided the 
most radical answers by finding the case law of the TCA and the Council of State 
consistent and seemed rather reluctant to the adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6. 
The academics, while agreeing on the inconsistency of the case law, sent mixed signals on 
the need for Guidelines in that they did not object to the issue of Guidelines, but did not 
advocate for such a need as strongly as the internal staff of the TCA and the lawyers. 
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Conclusion 
Chapter 4 aimed to determine whether there is a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in 
Turkey and whether the Guidance can or should be used as a model for such Guidelines. To 
this end, the Chapter took both a theoretical and a practical approach: It both provided a 
discussion of the role of Guidelines as soft law instruments from a theoretical perspective 
and shed light on the opinions of different interviewee groups from a practical perspective. 
It discussed the functions of Guidelines in theory and analysed the benefits they offer, as 
well as the drawbacks they entail, to both competition authorities and courts as the 
enforcers of competition law rules and undertakings as the addressees of those rules in 
Section 4.1, examined the impact of Turkey’s potential accession to the EU on the adoption 
of Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Section 4.2 and lastly determined whether there is a 
need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in practice in Section 4.3. Section 4.1 observed that 
the TCA and other State authorities in Turkey have explicitly stressed the need for adopting 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6, which would theoretically provide transparency and 
predictability, increase legal certainty and minimise inconsistencies in the decisions of the 
TCA, while resulting in a voluntary restraint on the discretion of the TCA. Section 4.2 
observed that mostly because of the sui generis nature of the Guidance as a soft law 
instrument, Turkey’s duty of harmonisation under the Decision No 1/95 of the EC-Turkey 
Association Council does not de jure require the country to transpose the Guidance into 
Turkish competition law. Finally, Section 4.3 observed that while both the enforcers of 
Art.6 and the legal counsel of the undertakings as the addressees of Art.6 felt the need for 
Guidelines that would provide much-needed guidance in the enforcement of Art.6, the 
judges seemed rather reluctant to the adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6 and took 
the view that such Guidelines would have a limited impact on the judicial review of the 
Art.6 decisions of the TCA. 
166 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 – THE GUIDELINES ON ART.6 VIS-À-VIS THE 
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF TURKEY WITH ART.6 
Introduction 
Chapter 5 provides answers to the second main research question as to how Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6 can be best tailored to reflect Turkey’s experience with Art.6. To this end, 
it addresses three sub-questions: First, what have the Guidelines on Art.6 brought to the 
enforcement of Art.6 and to what extent, are they in harmony with the established case 
law? Second, are there any historical and/or current issues on Art.6 that should have been 
addressed in the Guidelines on Art.6? Lastly, what will be the future of the Guidelines on 
Art.6? Having determined a need for Guidelines in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 furthers the 
discussion by examining how those Guidelines can be best tailored to reflect Turkey’s 
experience with Art.6. To this end, it critically analyses the Guidelines on Art.6 in order to 
determine the extent to which they reflect the enforcement of Art.6 and discusses Turkey’s 
own needs which are left outside the scope of these Guidelines. Similar to Chapter 4, 
Chapter 5 is also enhanced by the qualitative empirical data obtained from the research 
interviews. 
Chapter 5 is divided into three sections: Section 5.1 provides a comparative analysis 
of the Guidelines on Art.6 with the Guidance and the established case law on Art.6. This 
Section examines the contributions of the Guidelines on Art.6, which are the same as those 
of the Guidance as a result of the transposition of the Guidance into Turkish competition 
law, in the light of the established case law on Art.6. In this respect, the role of the 
consumer welfare objective, effects-based assessments, anti-competitive foreclosure, the 
“as efficient competitor” test, efficiency defence and detailed assessments on specific forms 
of abusive exclusionary conduct in the enforcement of Art.6 are assessed. Section 5.1 
observes that majority of these contributions in fact already existed in the decisional 
practice of the TCA especially in the aftermath of the Guidance, and while the general 
assessments of the Guidelines on Art.6 are to a great extent in line with the case law on 
Art.6, the specific assessments on specific forms of exclusionary conduct largely differ 
from those in the case law. 
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Section 5.2 addresses the historical and/or current issues in the enforcement of Art.6 
in Turkey that were left outside the scope of the Guidelines on Art.6. As observed in 
Section 5.1, the substantive content of the Guidance is firmly followed in the Guidelines on 
Art.6 and the scope of the Guidelines on Art.6 thus mirrors the Guidance. This Section 
finds that the Guidelines on Art.6 included into its scope neither other types of abuses, such 
as exploitative abuses and discriminatory abuses; nor some other important elements, such 
as fines, private enforcement and the relation between competition law and sector-specific 
regulation, which are essentially left to the national laws of the MSs by the Guidance. In 
addition, as a result of the transposition of the Guidance into Turkish competition law, the 
Guidelines on Art.6 are silent on the most problematic areas in the enforcement of Art.6 in 
Turkey which are identified by both the author and different interviewee groups in Turkey. 
Section 5.2 observes that the absence of any guidance on the problematic areas that are 
peculiar to Turkish competition law undermines predictability and legal certainty as aimed 
by the Guidelines on Art.6 in the first place. 
Section 5.3 speculates on the future of the Guidelines on Art.6. This Section 
explores whether the TCA will abide by its own Guidelines in its future decisional practice, 
what the reaction of the appellate courts to the Guidelines on Art.6 in their judgments will 
be and finally whether the adoption of such Guidelines will be in general beneficial for 
Turkey. It takes the view that the enforcement of the Guidelines on Art.6 is as important as 
their publication. Considering the EU experience with the post-Guidance period which was 
far more different than what was expected, the issue as to whether the TCA will abide by 
and whether the appellate courts will endorse or reject the Guidelines on Art.6 gains 
significance. Section 5.3 observes that based on some of its previous decisions that referred 
to the Guidance and even the draft Guidelines on Art.6, the TCA is expected to abide by its 
Guidelines on Art.6 in its future decisions, just as the appellate courts are expected to raise 
no objections so long as the TCA interprets these Guidelines in accordance with the 
statutory text of the Act. 
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5.1. Comparative Analysis of the Guidelines on Art.6 with the Established Case Law on 
Art.6 in the Light of the Contributions of the Guidance
1
 
5.1.1. The Guidelines on Art.6 at a Glance 
“Guidelines on the Assessment of Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings” were published by the TCA on April 7, 2014.2 As will be seen throughout 
this Section, the Guidelines on Art.6 are drafted very similar to the Guidance in terms of 
both structure and substantive content, with the main exception that they are substantive 
“Guidelines” and do not set any enforcement priority in contrast to the Guidance. They 
contain 94 paragraphs in five sections: “1.Introduction”, “2.Dominant Position”, 
“3.Abuse”, “4.Objective Justification” and “5.Specific Forms of Abuses”. It can be seen that 
“1.Introduction” of the Guidelines on Art.6 corresponds to “I.Introduction” of the 
Guidance; “2.Dominant Position”, “3.Abuse” and “4.Objective Justification” are together 
included in “III.General Approach to Exclusionary Conduct” in the Guidance; “5.Specific 
Forms of Abuses” corresponds to “IV.Specific Forms of Abuses”; and “II.Purpose of This 
Document” is not given a separate section in the Guidelines on Art.6. Like the Guidance, 
the Guidelines on Art.6 suddenly end after Section 5 with no more additional remarks.
 
Section 1 (paras.1-6) outlines the text of Art.6, the purpose and the scope of the 
document. Section 2 (paras.7-21) concerns with the definition of the relevant market and 
the determination of dominant position, and takes into account the same factors as the 
Guidance does: “market position of the dominant undertaking and its competitors”, 
“barriers to entry or expansion” and “countervailing buyer power”. Section 3 (paras.22-29) 
is on the abuse element and includes a definition of abuse of a dominant position, outlines 
the effects-based approach, articulates the concept of “anti-competitive foreclosure” and 
lastly adopts the “as efficient competitor” test as the governing test for price-based 
exclusionary conduct. Section 4 (paras.30-33) deals with objective justification which 
includes “objective necessity” and “efficiency”. Lastly, Section 5 includes detailed 
assessments on “refusal to deal” (paras.35-49), “predatory pricing” (paras.50-60), 
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 This Section benefits from the following article that the author published elsewhere: Özkan, A. F. (2014a) 
‘Hakim Durumun Kötüye Kullanılması Kılavuzu'nun Kapsamlı Bir İncelemesi’, Rekabet Forumu, No 85, 
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 See Annex II. 
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“price/margin squeeze” (paras.61-63), “exclusivity/single branding” (paras.64-68), “rebate 
systems” (paras.69-81) and “tying” (paras.82-94). 
5.1.2. The Consumer Welfare Objective in the Enforcement of Art.6 
The move towards a more consumer-welfare oriented application of Art.102 is one of the 
fundamental premises of the modernisation of Art.102. The Guidance refers to consumers, 
interests of consumers and consumer detriment, but does not go far as the Discussion Paper 
which explicitly attributed the objective of protection of competition on the market as a 
means of enhancing consumer welfare to Art.102.
3
 Similar to the Discussion Paper, the 
consumer welfare objective has been given a major role in the Guidelines on Art.6. This is 
evident from the definition of abuse of a dominant position which is set out in para.22 of 
the Guidelines on Art.6 as ‘the dominant undertakings engaging in conduct which is likely 
to directly or indirectly reduce consumer welfare by taking advantage of their market 
power’. Para.2 of the Guidelines on Art.6 similarly states that ‘the Act prohibits consumer 
welfare-reducing practices carried out by dominant undertakings by taking advantage of 
their market power’. 
It can be seen that a strong emphasis is placed on the consumer welfare objective in 
Turkish competition law. The preamble of the Act makes references to “increased 
economic efficiency”, “consumer and total welfare”, “technological progress and 
innovation” and “the triumph of the successful, rather than the powerful” as the objectives 
to be pursued by the Act. In the “Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, 
Assessment of Dominance/Substantial Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies” 
prepared by the ICN in 2007, respondents identified different objectives of unilateral 
conduct laws. Within this context, Turkey pointed to “ensuring an effective competitive 
process”, “promoting consumer welfare”, “maximising efficiency” and “ensuring a level 
playing field for small and medium size enterprises”.4 Also in many domestic policy 
documents published by the TCA, the consumer welfare objective has been stressed. For 
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 See supra “1.3.3. Discussion Paper on the Application of Art.82 to Exclusionary Abuses”. 
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 ICN (2007) Report on the Objectives of Unilateral Conduct Laws, Assessment of Dominance/Substantial 
Market Power, and State-Created Monopolies, The Unilateral Conduct Working Group, 6th Annual 
Conference, Moscow, <http://internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc353.pdf> [accessed 
30/09/2014]. 
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example in “2013 Competition Letter”, the TCA made it clear that promoting consumer 
welfare is ‘among the main objectives and goals of competition law’.5 
The trails of the consumer welfare objective can also be seen in many decisions of 
the TCA. In Zincir Süpermarketler, the TCA made it clear that ‘the objective of 
competition law is to maximise total welfare and economic efficiency, thereby making the 
market economy work effectively’ and maintained that at this point ‘there is a consensus 
among competition authorities in the world that the decisive factor is consumer welfare’.6 
In UN RO-RO, the TCA stated that ‘it is impossible for competition law to remain 
indifferent to dominant undertakings benefitting from their dominant position and 
maintaining/strengthening this position in a way that decreases consumer welfare’.7 In 
TÜPRAŞ, it was stressed similarly to the abovementioned para.2 of the Guidelines on Art.6 
that ‘the Act prohibits consumer welfare-reducing practices carried out by dominant 
undertakings by taking advantage of their market power’.8 To conclude, the Guidelines on 
Art.6 are in conformity with the case law on the position of the consumer welfare objective. 
5.1.3. The Role of Effects-based Assessments in Art.6 Cases 
The Guidance is intended to contribute to the process of introducing a more economics-
based approach in EU competition law enforcement and outlines an effects-based approach 
for the application of Art.102 to abusive exclusionary conduct. As a result of the adoption 
of the Guidance, the effects-based approach will also govern the application of Art.6. 
Para.24 of the Guidelines on Art.6 states that ‘in the assessment of exclusionary conduct, in 
addition to the specific factors of the conduct in question, its actual or likely effects will be 
considered’. In fact, the effects-based approach in the Guidelines on Art.6 is more advanced 
than the one set out in the Guidance in that para.22 of the Guidance, which allows the 
Commission not to carry out a detailed assessment of effects and infer anti-competitive 
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 Available in Turkish at <http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/tr-TR/Sayfalar/2013-Yili-Rekabet-Mektubu> [accessed 
30/09/2014] (emphasis added). 
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 Zincir Süpermarketler, Decision no: 09-35/891-214, dated: 06/08/2009, p.7 (emphasis added). The TCA 
also stated in this decision that ‘the ultimate objective of the Act is to increase consumer welfare’. ibid at p.8 
(emphasis added). 
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 UN RO-RO, Decision no: 12-47/1413-474, dated: 01/10/2012, p.34 (emphasis added). 
8
 TÜPRAŞ, Decision no: 14-03/60-24, dated: 17/01/2014, p.32-33. 
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effects if the conduct creates no efficiencies and only raises obstacles to competition, does 
not exist in the Guidelines on Art.6. 
It can be observed that the TCA has become more disposed to make economic 
analysis in Art.6 cases especially after the publication of the Guidance which gave a fresh 
impetus to the use of economic analysis in Turkey. In 2011, a new department within the 
TCA, namely the Economic Analysis and Research Department, was founded. It has been 
seen that in some decisions, some members of the Competition Board wrote a dissenting 
opinion in which they demanded more economic analysis from the rapporteurs of the case. 
For example in Turkish Airlines/Pegasus, one of the dissenting members of the Board 
expressed that the assessments and economic analyses based on the existing information 
and evidence in the file were insufficient.
9
 Also high-ranked officials within the TCA 
confirmed that there has been an increase in the number of staff with a PhD in the 
economics of competition and that there has been a transition to econometric analysis from 
simple correlation or price and input analysis in the decisions of the TCA.
10
  
In this respect, one competition expert expressed that: 
‘It is hard to find the European judgments that have been criticised for their form-based approach in 
Turkey. In Turkey, maybe with a few exceptions, the effect on competition is discussed, the state of 
competitors as to whether they have been excluded, their markets shares have dropped, or prices have 
increased, is analysed and when appropriate, even the effect on consumer is discussed... In many cases, the 
effect on consumers, despite being not deep, is analysed... Therefore, I find the Turkish case law more 
advanced than the European case law.’11 
As early as 2006, the TCA accepted in Frito Lay that dominant firms have a special 
responsibility unlike non-dominant firms, but nevertheless stressed that the ‘correct 
assessment’ was to analyse actual or potential effects of conduct on the competitive process 
in the market.
12
 In TTNET/Avea, the TCA made it clear that for conduct to amount to an 
abuse, there must be ‘anti-competitive effects which would harm consumer welfare’.13 In 
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 Turkish Airlines/Pegasus, Decision no: 11-65/1692-599, dated: 30/12/2011, p.23. 
10
 Senyücel, O. (2012) “2011 Yılında Türk Rekabet Hukuku ve İktisadındaki Güncel Gelişmeler ve 2012’ye 
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that the special responsibility of dominant firms does not translate into a per se ban on the dominant firm’s 
exclusive dealings (the conduct in the decision) even if the object is to restrict competition. 
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 TTNET/Avea, Decision no: 08-57/912-363, dated: 09/10/2008, p.5 (emphasis added). 
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Turkcell GSM Kampanyaları, the TCA expressed that ‘how the practices of [the dominant 
firm] affected the market was thoroughly examined’.14 In Turkcell Biz Bize Kamu, the TCA 
reiterated that ‘in order to prove the existence of an exclusionary practice, the effects that 
are generated by the conduct of the dominant firm in question must be assessed’.15 In 
Doğan Yayın Holding, ‘the rebate systems… have been subject to thorough and qualitative 
assessments in terms of both their exclusivity potential and effects.’16 Consequently, 
although the TCA was already inclined to make economic analysis especially after the issue 
of the Guidance, it is expected that with the Guidelines on Art.6, the use of economic 
analysis in Art.6 cases will be institutionalised in Turkish competition law. 
5.1.4. Art.6 and Anti-competitive Foreclosure 
One of the contributions of the Guidance to the enforcement of Art.102 is the concept of 
anti-competitive foreclosure which describes the situation ‘where effective access of actual 
or potential competitors to supplies or markets is hampered or eliminated as a result of the 
conduct of the dominant undertaking whereby the dominant undertaking is likely to be in a 
position to profitably increase prices to the detriment of consumers.’17 Para.25 of the 
Guidelines on Art.6 articulates that ‘the core of the assessment that the TCA will make in 
relation to exclusionary conduct is to analyse whether the conduct of the dominant 
undertaking leads to actual or potential anti-competitive foreclosure’ and defines this 
concept as ‘the impediment to or the prevention of access of actual or potential competitors 
to supplies or markets to the detriment of consumers as a result of the practices of the 
dominant undertaking’. Similar to the para.20 of the Guidance, para.26 of the Guidelines on 
Art.6 lists seven factors that are considered as generally relevant to the assessment of anti-
competitive foreclosure: 
i. The position of the dominant undertaking, 
ii. The conditions on the relevant market, 
iii. The position of the dominant undertaking's competitors, 
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 Turkcell GSM Kampanyaları, Decision no: 09-60/1490-379, dated: 23/12/2009, p.60. 
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 Turkcell BizBize Kamu, Decision no: 10-21/271-100, dated: 04/03/2010, p.18 (emphasis added). In this 
decision, the TCA stressed that the special responsibility ‘should not be interpreted in a way that would lead 
to deprival of the dominant firm’s opportunity to compete’. ibid. 
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iv. The position of the customers or suppliers, 
v. The extent and duration of the allegedly abusive conduct, 
vi. Possible evidence of actual foreclosure, and 
vii. Direct and indirect evidence of any exclusionary strategy. 
The concept of anti-competitive foreclosure was alien to Turkish competition law 
until its gradual appearance in recent decisions. Some past decisions referred to “market 
foreclosure effects” and define them as ‘the dominant undertaking preventing the entry of 
new firms into the market and thereby eliminating potential competition through its written 
or oral agreements with its customers’.18 Similarly, in Turkcell GSM Kampanyaları, the 
TCA defined “market foreclosure” as ‘a strategic behaviour which prevents the entry of 
potential or actual competitors into upstream or downstream markets by one or more than 
one undertakings’.19 The decisions which were issued in the aftermath of the Guidance tend 
to make references to this concept: In Doğan Yayın Holding, the TCA reached the 
conclusion that the conduct in question ‘was contrary to Art.6 of the Act due to its anti-
competitive exclusion/foreclosure potential’.20 In UN RO-RO, it was stressed that ‘it is 
essential to examine whether anti-competitive foreclosure is likely’ as a result of the 
conduct in question.
21
 
As discussed above, in both anti-competitive foreclosure and “normal” or “lawful 
foreclosure”, actual or potential competitors of a dominant firm are excluded or eliminated 
from the relevant market; however, such exclusion or elimination harms consumers only in 
the context of anti-competitive foreclosure.
22
 The prohibition of anti-competitive 
foreclosure will therefore result in the exoneration of normal foreclosure which is in line 
with the consumer welfare-oriented spirit of the Guidelines on Art.6. While recent 
decisions of the TCA tend to make references to the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure 
especially after the issue of the Guidance in the EU, this concept is officially brought to the 
fore in the assessment of abusive exclusionary conduct with the Guidelines on Art.6. With 
the adoption of the Guidelines on Art.6, the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure will 
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 Frito Lay,  p.45. 
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 Turkcell GSM Kampanyaları, p.19. 
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 Doğan Yayın Holding, p.92. 
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 UN RO-RO, p.37. See also TTNET/Superonline, Decision no: 13-71/992-423, dated: 19/12/2013, p.47. 
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 See supra “3.2.1. Anti-competitive Foreclosure”. 
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henceforth be the governing standard for intervention by the TCA in the enforcement of 
Art.6. 
5.1.5. Art.6 and the “As Efficient Competitor” Test 
According to para.23 of the Guidance, in order to prevent anti-competitive foreclosure, the 
Commission will normally intervene where the conduct in question is capable of hampering 
competition from competitors which are considered to be as efficient as the dominant firm. 
Similarly, para.27 of the Guidelines on Art.6 states that in determining anti-competitive 
foreclosure, the TCA ‘will examine whether it is likely for a hypothetical (as efficient) 
competitor who is equally efficient as the dominant undertaking to be excluded from the 
market as a result of the conduct in question’. Para.28 of the Guidelines on Art.6 makes it 
clear that if an equally efficient competitor can compete effectively with the price-based 
conduct of the dominant undertaking, the TCA ‘will infer that such conduct is not likely to 
have an adverse impact on effective competition, and thus on consumers, and will therefore 
be unlikely to intervene’. 
In some of its past decisions, the TCA implicitly applied the “as efficient 
competitor” test without explicitly quoting the name of this test. As early as 2004, in Coca 
Cola, the TCA took the view that by pricing below its average total costs, a dominant 
undertaking may exclude ‘efficient competitors’ from the market.23 In TTNET Yaz 
Fırtınası, the TCA applied the “as efficient competitor” test in the context of margin 
squeeze.
24
 Similar to effects-based assessments, the “as efficient competitor” test has been 
more frequently applied in the recent decision of the TCA. In the decisions which were 
issued in the aftermath of the Guidance, the TCA applied the “as efficient competitor” test 
in the context of predatory pricing in Kale Kilit and explained that it adopted this test with a 
view to distinguishing ‘legal price competition from predatory pricing in a clear, 
understandable and foreseeable way’.25 
The “as efficient competitor” test was therefore not alien to Turkish competition law 
before the Guidelines on Art.6 came out. In the view of this author, the reason why this test 
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 Coca Cola, Decision no: 04-07/75-18, dated: 23/01/2004, p.41. 
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 TTNET Yaz Fırtınası, Decision no: 08-65/1055-411, dated: 19/11/2008. 
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did not come into prominence in the context of predatory pricing in Turkey is because the 
TCA has mostly focused on the “intention” and “recoupment” elements rather than on the 
calculation of costs in predation cases and tended to close the case due to a lack of intention 
or possibility of recoupment in the absence of detailed assessments on costs.
26
 In the 
context of margin squeeze, the role of this test is much more apparent and the TCA even 
made use of this test in the definition of margin squeeze as set out in TTNET/Superonline.
27
 
All in all, it is expected that with the Guidelines on Art.6, the “as efficient competitor” test 
will be consistently applied to price-based exclusionary conduct if is likely to exclude from 
the market an equally efficient competitor of a dominant undertaking. 
5.1.6. Art.6 and Efficiency Defence 
Neither Art.102, nor Art.6 envisages an exemption clause for the prohibition of abuse of a 
dominant position. In other words, there is no legal ground under any of these Articles for 
the undertaking to justify its conduct once it has been found contrary to Art.102 or Art.6. 
Notwithstanding, para.28 of the Guidance states that the Commission will take into account 
claims put forward by a dominant firm that its conduct is objectively justified and lists two 
ways as to how a dominant firm can avail itself of this objective justification: By either 
demonstrating that the conduct in question is “objectively necessary” or proving that the 
conduct produces substantial “efficiencies” outweighing its anti-competitive effects on 
consumers, commonly known as the “efficiency defence”. Likewise, a dominant firm may 
avail itself of these two types of justification, namely “objective necessity” under para.31 of 
the Guidelines on Art.6 or “efficiencies” under para.32 of the Guidelines on Art.6.28 
In sharp contrast to the enforcement of Art.102, the concept of efficiency has been 
the foremost criterion in the assessment of abusive conduct in Turkish competition law. 
Even the preamble of Art.6 refers to ‘internal dynamics’ of dominant undertakings in 
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 See also infra “5.1.7.2. Predatory Pricing”. 
27
 TTNET/Superonline, p.7 (‘Margin squeeze is a vertically integrated dominant firm setting a margin between 
upstream input price and downstream product price in a way that makes it difficult for an equally efficient 
competitor in the downstream market to operate profitably.’) 
28
 The four cumulative conditions for a successful efficiency defence under para.30 of the Guidance are 
identical to those set forth in para.32 of the Guidelines on Art.6 in that (i) the efficiencies have been, or are 
likely to be, realised as a result of the conduct, (ii) the conduct must be indispensable to the realisation of 
those efficiencies, (iii) the likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct outweigh any likely negative 
effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets, and (iv) the conduct does not eliminate 
effective competition. 
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justifying their conduct.
29
 The TCA has consistently made reference to this concept in its 
decisional practice and often used it interchangeably with efficiency as ‘internal efficiency’. 
As early as 2002, the TCA stated in Karbogaz that a dominant firm ‘successfully increasing 
its market shares through its own internal efficiency’ does not commit an abuse and 
maintained that ‘undertakings should be given the opportunity to make use of the benefits 
they derived from their own internal efficiency and dynamics in order to outdo their 
competitors’30 In Frito Lay, the TCA explained that the desire of all undertakings is to be 
the best in the market, but it is prohibited for undertakings to achieve this end ‘by excluding 
their competitors in ways that are different from efficiency’.31 
Indeed, efficiency has played a key role in many decisions of the TCA. In Hilal 
Ekmek Fabrikası, the TCA accepted that it is ‘natural for inefficient firms to exit the market 
as a result of fierce competition’ and reiterated that ‘the objective of competition law is to 
protect competition, not undertakings’.32 Likewise, in Tarsus Belediyesi, the TCA 
confirmed that ‘inefficient undertakings have to withdraw from the market in free market 
economies’.33 In Neveksan Ekmek Fabrikası, the TCA stressed that ‘it is the essence of 
competition that undertakings which fail to bring to the market high quality and more 
economic solutions in due course will be driven out of the market by competitive 
undertakings’.34 What is important, as the TCA maintained, is ‘not the protection of small 
or large undertakings, but competition.’35 In Cevahir AVM, the TCA decided that the 
exclusion of small undertakings in this case was not anti-competitive and was merely the 
result of them ‘not competing effectively due to their lack of a competitive power’.36 
Therefore, the TCA has not been “sentimental” to inefficient undertakings vis-à-vis 
efficient undertakings. 
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 Pursuant to the preamble of Art.6: ‘For an undertaking to grow through its own internal dynamics and to 
obtain a dominant position in various sectors is not against competition law... On the other hand, dominant 
undertakings are prohibited to abuse their dominant positions in a way that has as its object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within our country...’ 
30
 Karbogaz, Decision no: 02-49/634-257, dated: 23/08/2002, p.53 (emphasis added). 
31
 Frito Lay, p.53-54 (emphasis added).  
32
 Hilal Ekmek Fabrikası, Decision no: 09-48/1193-301, dated 21/10/2009, p.7. 
33
 Tarsus Belediyesi, Decision no: 10-52/992-356, dated: 05/08/2010, p.7. 
34
 Neveksan Ekmek Fabrikası, Decision no: 05-49/702-190, dated: 28/07/2005, p.2. 
35
 ibid. 
36
 Cevahir AVM, Decision no: 06-44/540-142, dated: 15/06/2006, p.4. See also Aurubis Bulgaria/Dostel 
Alüminyum, Decision no: 13-15/224-109, dated: 19/03/2013, p.9. 
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The TCA accepts the notion that the allegedly abusive conduct may generate 
efficiencies, which is one of the main premises of the modernisation of Art.102.
37
 In Sanofi 
Aventis, the TCA noted that practices of a dominant firm may generate anti-competitive 
effects even in the absence of an intention to distort competition, but such practices may 
nevertheless yield some ‘benefits’.38 In such cases, whether ‘efficiencies or ‘benefits’ 
outweigh adverse anti-competitive effects of the conduct on the market should be 
analysed.
39
 As early as 2006, the TCA recognised the possibility of efficiency defence and 
held that ‘provided that the undertaking can offer an objective justification for its practices 
and/or justify its practices on the ground of its own internal dynamics, such situation should 
be deemed as normal and should not be held as an abuse’.40 The decisions that were issued 
in the aftermath of the Guidance also confirm dominant undertakings’ efficiency defence 
under Art.6.
41
 Consequently, efficiency defence has been well established in Turkish 
competition law even before the issue of the Guidance, and the Guidelines on Art.6 have 
only laid down more concrete (and also tougher) conditions for such defence. 
5.1.7. Specific Forms of Abusive Exclusionary Conduct in the Guidelines on Art.6 
As discussed above, Section 5 of the Guidelines on Art.6 contains some detailed 
assessments on specific forms of abusive exclusionary conduct. Similar to the Guidance, 
almost two thirds of the Guidelines on Art.6 (61 out of 94 paragraphs) is devoted to the 
analysis of specific forms of conduct, which include “refusal to deal” (paras.35-49), 
“predatory pricing” (paras.50-60), “price/margin squeeze” (paras.61-63), 
“exclusivity/single branding” (paras.64-68), “rebate systems” (paras.69-81) and “tying” 
(paras.82-94). Other types of exclusionary conduct, such as “selective pricing”42 and “abuse 
of regulatory procedures”,43 are thus left outside the scope of this Section. Para.34 of the 
Guidelines on Art.6 make it clear that the TCA will develop the analysis of the general 
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 Furthermore, in some cases, the TCA took into account “lack of efficiency” as one of the necessary 
conditions for the conduct in question to amount to an abuse under Art.6. In TTNET/Avea, the TCA decided 
inter alia that for tying to amount to an abuse under Art.6, there must not be any ‘objective justification 
and/or efficiency-enhancing practice’. TTNET/Avea, Decision no: 08-57/912-363, dated: 09/10/2008, p.5. 
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 Sanofi Aventis, Decision no: 09-16/374-88, dated: 20/04/2009, p.46. 
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 ibid at p.73. 
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 Frito Lay, p.54. 
41
 Turkcell GSM Kampanyaları, p.19 and UN RO-RO, p.35. 
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 Anadolu Cam/Marmara Cam, Decision no: 09-35/877-206, dated: 06/08/2009 and İZOCAM, Decision no: 
10-14/175-66, dated: 08/02/2010. 
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 Turkish Airlines/Pegasus. 
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factors mentioned in para.26, together with the more specific factors described in the 
context of these specific forms of conduct. 
As will be seen, those specific forms of conduct largely correspond to those 
mentioned in the Guidance with a few differences in categorisation: 
- “Rebate systems” and “exclusivity/single branding” are examined in two different 
subsections in the Guidelines on Art.6, whereas they are located together under the 
same subsection, “exclusive dealing”, in the Guidance. 
- Contrary to the Guidance, “bundling” is separated from “tying” in the Guidelines on 
Art.6 and is placed under “rebate systems”. 
- “Multi product rebates”, which is placed under “tying and bundling” in the 
Guidance, is treated in the same section with “rebate systems” in the Guidelines on 
Art.6. 
- “Margin squeeze” is given an independent subsection in the Guidelines on Art.6 
contrary to the Guidance which treats it alongside “refusal to deal”. 
5.1.7.1. Refusal to Deal 
Refusal to deal stands out as the most analysed type of abusive exclusionary conduct in the 
enforcement of Art.6 and it could be due to this reason that Section 5 starts with refusal to 
deal.
44
 Para.35 of the Guidelines on Art.6 accepts the notion that ‘any undertaking, whether 
dominant or not, should have the right to choose its trading partners and to dispose freely of 
its property’, but also adds that in some exceptional circumstances, ‘an obligation to supply 
may be imposed on the dominant undertaking’. According to para.38, refusal to supply 
includes goods, services, raw materials, access to a distribution system or a network, IPRs 
and any other assets that can be commercialised. Para.39 explains that refusing to supply a 
new customer or an existing customer makes no difference. Para.40 makes it clear that the 
subsection on refusal to deal only includes “unconditional” refusal to deal, while para.41 
also includes “constructive refusal to deal” into the scope. 
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 Notwithstanding, it is surprising to see that the subsection on refusal to deal cites only one decision of the 
TCA: Cine 5/Digiturk, Decision no: 12-24/710-198, dated: 03/05/2012. 
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In line with para.81 of the Guidance, para.43 of the Guidelines on Art.6 lists the 
same three cumulative conditions for refusal to deal to amount to an abuse under Art.6: (i) 
the refusal relates to a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete 
effectively on a downstream market (paras.44-45), (ii) the refusal is likely to lead to 
elimination of effective competition on the downstream market (para.46), and (iii) the 
refusal is likely to lead to consumer harm (para.47). It can be observed that additional 
conditions were required in some past decisions of the TCA, while one or more than one of 
these three conditions was not deemed as necessary in other decisions as well. In Roaming, 
one of the conditions was expressed as ‘lack of a sufficient capacity to satisfy demand’,45 
while in Bausch & Lomb, the TCA listed ‘the dominant undertaking refusing to supply 
some undertakings vis-à-vis others’ as one of the necessary conditions in this respect.46 On 
the other hand, Anadolu Cam/Solmaz Mercan did not require the “objective necessity” 
condition,
47
 and CNR/NTSR required neither the “objective necessity” condition, nor the 
“elimination of effective competition” condition.48 In none of its decisions did the TCA 
require consumer harm as a separate condition. 
Despite being the most analysed type of exclusionary conduct, there are no general 
rules on refusal to deal in the decisions of the TCA as the analysis remained often case-by-
case. It can be argued that with the adoption of the Guidelines on Art.6, the future decisions 
will be more consistent as the conditions in these Guidelines are expected to replace the 
abovementioned different conditions laid down in previous decisions. However, the 
conditions in the Guidelines on Art.6 for refusal to deal to amount to an abuse do not 
entirely reflect the existing case law on this area in Turkey. In this respect, the Guidelines 
on Art.6 make no reference to “essential facilities doctrine”, although the TCA issued many 
prohibition decisions based on this doctrine.
49
 In addition to the abovementioned three 
conditions, the case law in this area often required the condition of “objective justification”, 
but the Guidelines on Art.6 already recognise such justification in para.48. As for the 
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 Roaming, Decision no: 03-40/432-186, dated: 09/06/2003. 
46
 Bausch & Lomb, Decision no: 07-30/302-115, dated: 05/04/2007 and Nuh Çimento, Decision no: 10-
63/1317-494, dated: 07/10/2010. 
47
 Anadolu Cam/Solmaz Mercan, Decision no: 09-39/949-236, dated: 26/08/2009. 
48
 CNR/NTSR, Decision no: 07-74/896-333, dated: 19/09/2007. 
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 Roaming; Türk Telekom/TİSSAD, Decision no: 06-02/47-8, dated: 05/01/2006; and ÇEAŞ, Decision no: 07-
13/101-30, dated: 08/02/2007. 
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condition of consumer harm, this is in fact consistent with the effects-based and consumer-
welfare spirit of the Guidelines on Art.6, and therefore is hardly objectionable. In terms of 
harmonising the assessments of the Guidance with the existing decisions of the TCA on 
Art.6, the subsection on refusal to deal is generally good. 
5.1.7.2. Predatory Pricing 
The second specific type of conduct in the Guidelines on Art.6 is predatory pricing. 
Historically, one of the most discussed problems in competition law is perhaps the dividing 
line between predatory pricing and low pricing. In one of the decisions of the TCA on 
predatory pricing, the TCA highlighted that ‘one of the difficulties in this area is to 
distinguish anti-competitive predatory pricing from competitive low pricing’.50 In its 
decisional practice, the TCA has generally been cautious not to chill pro-competitive low 
pricing which does not amount to predatory pricing.
51
 The Guidelines on Art.6 define 
predatory pricing as ‘an anti-competitive pricing strategy whereby a dominant undertaking, 
with a view to maintaining or strengthening its market power, prices below its costs and 
sacrifices profits to exclude, discipline or otherwise hamper one or more of its actual or 
potential competitors’ (para.50). Para.51 states that the TCA will apply the “as efficient 
competitor” test as the legal test governing predatory pricing. 
The Guidelines on Art.6 adopt new cost benchmarks in the assessment of predatory 
pricing and in this respect use average avoidable cost (AAC) and long-run average 
incremental cost (LRAIC). Similar to the Guidance, the Guidelines on Art.6 take the view 
pricing below AAC is an indication of sacrifice of profits on the part of a dominant 
undertaking and of foreclosure of market on the part of as efficient competitors (para.53). 
Pricing above LRAIC is an indication of the dominant undertaking’s pricing being not 
capable of foreclosing as efficient competitors from the market, and therefore does not give 
rise to an abuse (para.54). Unlike the clear “safe harbour” for pricing above LRAIC, the 
Guidelines on Art.6 state that in the event of pricing above AAC and below LRAIC, the 
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 Domino’s Pizza, Decision no: 10-69/1458-557, dated: 04/11/2010, p.2. 
51
 In Selena Gıda, the TCA did not directly equate low pricing with predatory pricing and explained that low 
prices might be the fruit of ‘economies of scale’ or might be simply ‘introductory’. Selena Gıda, Decision no: 
05-63/902-244, dated: 29/09/2005, p.4. In Akkaya Buz, low pricing was found to be the ‘competitive reflex’ of 
the dominant firm in question. Akkaya Buz, Decision no: 10-52/993-357, dated: 05/08/2010, p.5. 
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TCA will investigate whether there is direct evidence showing a clear predatory strategy 
(para.55) or other factors pointing to the conclusion that the conduct is capable foreclosing 
“as efficient competitors” from the market (para.56). 
A careful analysis of the past decisions of the TCA shows that average variable cost 
(AVC) and average total cost (ATC) benchmarks were generally used in predation cases, 
while AAC and LRAIC benchmarks have begun to be used in some recent decisions, 
especially in the aftermath of the issue of the Guidance.
52
 However, this transition seems 
imprecise that some other recent decisions also considered AVC and ATC.
53
 Furthermore, 
the “intention” of dominant undertakings was often listed as one of the necessary 
conditions for predatory pricing in the case law. In addition, the recoupment element, which 
has been often considered in the past decisions of the TCA,
54
 is no longer a necessary 
condition under the Guidelines on Art.6 (para.58). All in all, although the subsection on 
predatory pricing in the Guidelines on Art.6 is not fully in line with the previous decisions 
of the TCA, it can be argued that it follows the trend towards the use of AAC, LRAIC and 
the “as efficient competitor” test with the modernisation of Art.102. In this author’s view, 
the removal of the recoupment element from the necessary conditions is positive, due to 
problems with regard to its proof. 
5.1.7.3. Margin Squeeze 
The Guidelines on Art.6 define margin squeeze as ‘a vertically integrated dominant firm 
setting a margin between upstream input price and downstream product price in a way that 
makes it difficult for an equally efficient competitor in the downstream market to operate 
profitably’ (para.61). The biggest difference of the Guidelines on Art.6 from the Guidance 
is that the former treat margin squeeze as a stand-alone abuse, distinct from that of refusal 
to deal. The Guidance is based on the idea that if a dominant firm is entitled to refuse to 
deal with a competitor in the first place, it is also entitled to deal on conditions that make it 
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 UN RO-RO and Kale Kilit. 
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 Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları, Decision no: 13-46/589-259, dated: 18/07/2013. 
54
 In some decisions, the dominant firm in questiıon argued that recoupment must be a necessary condition for 
predatory pricing but the TCA rejected this argument (see Coca Cola). While in other decisions, the TCA 
decided to close the case due to a lack of possibility of recoupment (see Toprak Mahsülleri Ofisi, Decision no: 
08-50/720-280, dated: 14/08/2008; Türkiye Şeker Fabrikaları). This is true for the intention element in that 
the dominant undertaking in question defended that intention was needed to establish an abuse in predatory 
pricing cases, but the TCA rejected this argument (see UN RO-RO). 
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impossible for competitors to compete.
55
 However, this treatment of margin squeeze in the 
Guidance is explicitly rejected by the EU Courts in their judgments in the post-Guidance 
period.
56
 The CJEU held that it was not necessary to establish that either the wholesale 
prices or retail prices were ‘in themselves abusive on account of their excessive or 
predatory nature’ and therefore margin squeeze was ‘capable, in itself, of constituting an 
abuse’.57 
For margin squeeze to amount to an abuse under Art.6, four cumulative conditions 
have to be satisfied (para.62): (i) there must be a vertically integrated firm active in both an 
upstream market and a downstream market, (ii) this firm must supply an upstream input 
which is indispensable for its competitors to compete in the downstream market, (iii) this 
firm must hold a dominant position at least in the upstream market, and (iv) the margin 
between the wholesale prices charged in the upstream market and the retail prices charged 
in the downstream market must be so low that an equally efficient competitor cannot 
operate profitably in the downstream market. The TCA will take into account LRAIC of the 
vertically integrated dominant firm to determine the profitability of “as efficient 
competitors” in the downstream market (para.62) and consider the claims of objective 
justification (para.63). 
Because the Guidelines on Art.6 adopt a different approach to margin squeeze, the 
conditions in the Guidelines on Art.6 for margin squeeze to amount to an abuse do not exist 
in the Guidance. It can be seen that in fact these four conditions do not significantly differ 
from those set out in the leading judgments on margin squeeze in EU competition law.
58
 
Perhaps, more could have been discussed in the Guidelines on Art.6. For instance, the 
Guidelines on Art.6 could have stated that the “reasonably efficient competitor” test, which 
analyses whether the margin is insufficient to allow a reasonably efficient competitor to 
obtain a normal profit based on the costs of such a competitor, might be used in some 
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 See Guidance, para.80. 
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 See supra “3.3.2. The Judgments of the EU Courts in the Post-Guidance Period”. 
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 Case C-280/08 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555, para.183. 
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 See Case C-280/08 Deutsche Telekom AG v Commission [2010] ECR I-9555; Case C-52/09 
Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-0527; and Case C-295/12 P Telefónica SA and 
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cases.
59
 More importantly, the Guidelines on Art.6 could have included some paragraphs on 
the intersection of competition law with sector specific regulation in analysing the 
allegations of margin squeeze under Art.6, considering the fact that the TCA has 
extensively dealt with the allegations of infringement of Art.6 in the telecom sector.
60
 All in 
all, the subsection on margin squeeze stands out as one of the excellent parts of the 
Guidelines on Art.6. 
5.1.7.4. Exclusivity 
The Guidelines on Art.6 define “exclusivity agreements” as ‘agreements whereby a 
customer is required to purchase all of or a significant portion of its demand for a specific 
product or a bundle of products from a single supplier’ (para.64). Contrary to EU 
competition law, the TCA has taken a negative stance towards a per se illegality rule for 
exclusivity in Turkish competition law.
61
 The subsection on exclusivity in the Guidelines 
on Art.6 mirrors the effects-based approach adopted by the TCA towards exclusivity. The 
Guidelines on Art.6 take the view that exclusivity agreements may generate many pro-
competitive effects, such as the prevention of the free rider problem, increase in the 
incentives of the supplier to engage in specific commercial investments and advertisements, 
ensuring a reliable supply/distribution channel to the benefit of both the supplier and the 
buyer, and providing more effective intra-brand competition (para.65). Even the subsection 
on exclusive dealing in the Guidance does not mention such benefits of exclusivity. 
One of the few differences between the Guidelines on Art.6 and the Guidance 
relates to exclusivity in that the Guidelines on Art.6 examine exclusivity and rebates under 
two different subsections. As a result of this difference in categorisation, exclusivity and 
rebates are therefore subject to different analyses. As a general observation, rebates are 
subject to more economic analyses based on price and cost, while the assessment of 
exclusivity mostly involves behavioural and structural factors. Para.67 of the Guidelines on 
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 The use of this test in some circumstances is endorsed by the CJEU in Case C-52/09 Konkurrensverket v 
TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECR I-0527, para.45. 
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 Türk Telekom/Grid Telekom, Decision no: 09-47/1160-294, dated: 14/10/2009, p.7 (‘To claim that the 
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with final points of sale, and to regard those exclusive dealing arrangements as per se abusive because of the 
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Art.6 states that in assessing exclusivity agreements under Art.6, the TCA will consider (i) 
the scope of the exclusivity agreement (the share of the sales made under the exclusivity 
agreement versus the total sales in the relevant market), (ii) the level of the production 
chain (exclusivity at the retail level is considered more detrimental to competition 
compared to exclusivity at the wholesale level), (iii) barriers to entry, and (iv) the 
importance of the dominant undertaking for the customers (whether it is an unavoidable 
trading partner or not) and the duration of exclusivity. 
In the assessment of exclusivity agreements, the existing case law has mostly 
focused on the duration of such agreements. The duration of exclusivity agreements seems 
to have had a direct bearing on the outcome of the decisions of the TCA.
62
 The Guidelines 
on Art.6 contribute to the case law by adding additional factors to the assessment of 
exclusivity, some of which have been considered by the TCA, albeit not systematically. In 
addition, the Guidelines on Art.6 state that de facto exclusivity falls into the scope of the 
subsection on exclusivity as well. This internalises one of the features of the case law in 
Turkey, since in many cases the TCA encountered allegations of use of force, threat of 
force and assault on the part of the employees of dominant undertakings in order to ensure a 
de facto exclusivity.
63
 To sum up, apart from a lack of clarification on cases where Art.6 
and Art.4 of the Act jointly apply to exclusivity agreements,
64
 the subsection of exclusivity 
is very good in terms of harmonising the assessments of the Guidance with the existing 
decisions of the TCA on Art.6. 
5.1.7.5. Rebates 
The Guidelines on Art.6 define “rebate systems” as ‘price cuts offered to customers in 
exchange for their particular purchasing behaviour’ (para.69). The TCA takes the view that 
rebates are common practice and the structure, functioning and effects of rebates vary from 
rebate to rebate (para.69). Similar to exclusivity, the Guidelines on Art.6 accept that rebates 
may generate many pro-competitive effects, such decrease in price, increase in output, 
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 Karbogaz and Fida Film Reklam, Decision no: 09-29/632-148, dated: 18/06/2009. 
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 Frito Lay; Microsoft/Gelecek Bilişim, Decision no: 08-35/465-165, dated: 27/05/2008; 
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reduction in transaction costs, prevention of the free ride problem and so on (para.72). A 
fundamental distinction is made between “single product rebates” (para.74-78) and “multi 
product rebates” (para.79-80) and although multi product rebates are examined under the 
subsection on “tying and bundling” in the Guidance as a form “mixed bundling”, the 
Guidelines on Art.6 analyse them under the subsection on rebates. In addition, rebates are 
further categorised into “retroactive rebates” versus “top slice rebates”, and “individualised 
threshold” versus “standardised threshold” (paras.70-71). Unlike the Guidance, the 
Guidelines on Art.6 do not adopt the terminology of “conditional rebates”. 
 The substantive analysis of single product rebates in the Guidelines on Art.6 does 
not depart from that of it in the Guidance: In determining whether a rebate system amounts 
to an abuse under Art.6, the TCA will take into account AAC and LRAIC of the dominant 
undertaking based on the “effective price” which will vary according to “contestable” and 
“non-contestable” portions of the demand of the customer. The TCA will examine whether 
“as efficient competitors” can compete effectively on equal footing for the contestable 
portion of the customer’s demand (para.76). The Guidelines on Art.6 establish a safe 
harbour for rebates if the effective price remains consistently above LRAIC of the 
dominant undertaking, as this would allow equally efficient competitors to compete 
profitably (paras.77). On the other hand, if the effective price is below AAC, then the 
rebate will be deemed as capable of foreclosing as efficient competitors (para.77). Finally, 
if the effective price is between AAC and LRAIC, the TCA will investigate whether entry 
or expansion of equally efficient competitors is likely to be affected (para.77). 
In its past decisions on rebates, the TCA has mostly dealt with rebates in return for 
exclusivity and loyalty rebates, neither of which is specifically addressed in the Guidelines 
on Art.6. As a general observation, the TCA has adopted an effects-based approach to 
rebates, but it is hard to see detailed analyses on prices and costs in those decisions.
65
 With 
the introduction of new concepts and new assessment techniques, the Guidelines on Art.6 
significantly depart from the established case law on (single product) rebates. Although 
these detailed and fairly complicated price-cost analyses on rebates are in line with 
economics, they are very hard to implement in practice. A miscalculation of contestable 
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and non-contestable shares may result in significant errors in the assessment. Also the safe 
harbour for the effective price above LRAIC offers very little legal certainty, given the 
difficulties in the calculation of such price. Consequently, in the area of rebates, the 
Guidelines on Art.6 fail to attain its objective of providing legal certainty. The TCA may be 
required to enhance its capacity of economic analysis to implement the resource-intensive 
subsection on rebates. 
5.1.7.6. Tying 
The Guidelines on Art.6 define “tying” as ‘situations whereby a customer who buys a 
certain product (the tying product) from a dominant undertaking is also required to buy 
another product (the tied product) from that undertaking’ (para.82). Tying includes both 
“contractual tying” whereby two distinct products are tied through contractual 
arrangements and “technological tying” whereby two distinct are integrated to one another 
(para.82). The subsection on tying in the Guidelines on Art.6 mirrors the old theories based 
on market power and the leverage of market power from the tying market to the tied 
market, as well as the modern theories based on consumer harm and involving two distinct 
products in the absence of any coercion. Stressing that tying arrangements are common 
practice and do not restrict competition in most cases, the subsection on tying in the 
Guidelines on Art.6 points out that they may bring about better products and less costly 
options for consumers (para.83). The TCA has taken the view that tying arrangements are 
generally pro-competitive.
66
 
For tying to amount to an abuse under Art.6, the Guidelines on Art.6 require two 
conditions to be satisfied (para.86): (i) the tying and tied products must be distinct products 
(para.86) and (ii) tying is likely to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure (paras.87-91 and 
93). In some of its past decisions, the TCA required some additional conditions: In 
TFF/Digiturk, the TCA listed the necessary conditions for tying amount to an abuse as (i) 
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two distinct products, (ii) tying of those products, and (iii) the presence of a dominant 
position.
67
 In TÜVTÜRK, the TCA found that (i) there must be two distinct products, (ii) 
the undertaking must hold a dominant position in the relevant market, and (iii) there must 
be a link between these two products.
68
 In TTNET/Avea, the following conditions were 
required: (i) a dominant position, (ii) distinct/separate products, (iii) anti-competitive 
effects, and (iv) a lack of objective justification and/or efficiency-enhancing practice.
69
 As 
can be seen, there is a lack of consistency in the case law with regard to the necessary 
conditions for tying to amount to an abuse under Art.6. 
In the decisional practice of the TCA, the condition of two distinct products and 
tying of those products were required in every decision, while the condition of anti-
competitive effects and objective justification were not discussed in some cases. In the view 
of this author, although the past decisions of the TCA point to different conditions, the two 
conditions envisaged in the Guidelines on Art.6 are generally sufficient. This is because the 
condition on the presence of dominant position is actually a pre-requisite for unilateral 
conduct to fall into the scope of Art.6 rather than a specific condition for tying, and the 
possibility of objective justification is already envisaged both as a general factor in the 
assessment of abusive exclusionary conduct (paras.30-33) and as a specific factor in the 
context of tying (para.94). That being said, the Guidelines on Art.6 could have discussed 
that tying may also amount to an exploitative abuse as the TCA accepted in some of its past 
decisions that tying may lead to “exploitation of consumers”.70 All in all, the subsection on 
tying is very good in terms of harmonising the assessments of the Guidance with the 
existing decisions of the TCA on Art.6. 
5.2. Historical and Current Issues in the Enforcement of Art.6 
5.2.1. The Scope and Limitations of the Guidelines on Art.6 
As shown above, the Guidance has been used as a benchmark in the preparation of the 
Guidelines on Art.6 which are drafted in a way that closely mirrors the paragraphs of the 
Guidance. Therefore, the content and contributions of the Guidance are injected into 
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Turkish competition law. Another consequence of the adoption of the Guidance is that the 
subjects that are left outside the scope of the Guidance, such as different types of abuses, 
different forms of exclusionary conduct, different legal tests and so on, do not also fall into 
the scope of the Guidelines on Art.6 either. First and the foremost, the Guidance is only 
concerned with exclusionary abuses, and thus excludes exploitative and discriminatory 
abuses from its scope. Likewise, although the Guidelines on Art.6 recognise that abuse of a 
dominant position can occur in three different ways, namely exclusionary, exploitative and 
discriminatory abuses (para.5), it stresses that its scope ‘is limited to exclusionary conduct 
at this stage’ (para.6). 
Allegations of exploitative abuses, in particular excessive pricing, are very common 
in the decisional practice of the TCA. One study observed that nearly one-fifth of the 
decisions of the TCA dealt with exploitative abuses.
71
 In one of the seminal decisions on 
excessive pricing, BELKO, the TCA took the view that ‘the main objective of competition 
law is to protect the society from excessive prices’ and maintained that it would be against 
this objective to ‘tolerate’ excessive pricing.72 Although this decision dates back to early 
years of competition law in Turkey, it is hard to argue that the TCA has been reluctant to 
use its enforcement powers against excessive pricing since then. Even a couple of months 
before the publication of the Guidelines on Art.6, the TCA issued a very controversial 
prohibition decision on excessive pricing, TÜPRAŞ.73 Criticisms have been levelled against 
the very short duration of the infringement for being neither significant, nor persistent (2 
months 20 days) and against the level of the price differential, as the basis for the excessive 
price, for being so low (15 percent).
74
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The Guidelines on Art.6 left unanswered many questions on excessive pricing such 
as what price will constitute an excessive price and what price will not, which test(s) will 
be used by the TCA, how the price-cost comparison will be made, how much profit margin 
is allowed in determining the difference between the costs actually incurred and the price 
charged, whether the alleged excessive price will be compared with the dominant firm’s 
own prices in different geographic regions, at different points in time or with prices of 
competitors and so on. The draft Guidelines on Art.6 envisaged a limited intervention into 
excessive pricing, but the relevant section was removed from the final version.
75
 In the area 
of exploitative abuses, the Guidelines on Art.6 thus fail to provide predictability and legal 
certainty for undertaking, just as they fail to meet the expectations of their legal counsel.
76
 
Consequently, especially after TÜPRAŞ, they are a missed opportunity to offer much-
needed guidance on excessive pricing as one of the most common types of abusive conduct 
in the enforcement of Art.6.
77
 
Discriminatory abuses are also left outside the scope of the Guidelines on Art.6. It 
can be argued that there is a need for guidance on discriminatory abuses in Turkish 
competition law as well. Discriminatory abuses generally cause “secondary line injury” at 
the level of customers with which the dominant undertaking does not compete, whereas 
exclusionary abuses cause “primary line injury” at the level of competitors. However, it is 
not clear from the case law on Art.6 as to whether discriminatory conduct can amount to an 
abuse in the absence of secondary line injury or exclusionary conduct with a discrimination 
element can cause secondary line injury. The TCA seems to be inconsistent in situations 
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where the dominant undertaking is not present in the downstream market.
78
 In addition, 
there is a risk that the subparagraph (b) of Art.6 may wrongly apply to essentially pro-
competitive conduct since it does not include the condition of “placing trading parties at a 
competitive disadvantage” unlike the subparagraph (c) of Art.102.79 Also, whether the lack 
of such condition can be taken to mean that this subparagraph applies to discrimination 
among consumers is in need of clarification. Therefore, the Guidelines on Art.6 are also a 
missed opportunity to offer guidance on discriminatory abuses. 
In this respect, another subject is collective dominance. Para.4 of the Guidelines on 
Art.6 states that although Art.6 prohibits any abuse by one or more undertakings of a 
dominant position acting individually or by means of agreements with others or collective 
practices, only single dominance is dealt with. Collective dominance, which emerged in the 
context of merger control, has dramatically lost its importance after the advent of the SIEC 
test. In this author’s view, exclusion of this concept from the scope of the Guidelines on 
Art.6 raises no problem. However, in Turkish competition law, collective dominance may 
give rise to a specific problem in that the statutory text of Art.6 refers to ‘by means of 
agreements with others’. Restrictive agreements are already prohibited under Art.4, and 
Art.6 apparently makes them illegal when they are engaged in by dominant undertakings. 
Notwithstanding, this uncertainty stems from the poor drafting of the Act and given the 
hierarchy of norms in the Turkish legal system, the Guidelines on Art.6 cannot legally 
provide a solution. 
5.2.2. Exclusion of the Needs of Turkey from the Scope of Guidelines on Art.6 
The previous section discussed the subjects which were left outside the scope of the 
Guidelines on Art.6 as a result of the transposition of the Guidance into Turkish 
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competition law, but which should have been nevertheless discussed in those Guidelines 
due to them being in need of guidance. In addition to those subjects, there are also other 
subjects which are not addressed in the Guidelines on Art.6 due to them being left to the 
national laws of MSs by the Guidance. For example, the Guidelines on Art.6 are silent on 
the sanctions to be imposed on dominant undertakings and/or on their executives.
80
 Also 
the Guidelines on Art.6 do not mention the victim’s right to compensation for breach of 
Art.6 who is entitled to seek treble damages under Arts.57-58 of the Act. The fact that the 
Guidelines on Art.6 do not show the consequences of infringement of Art.6 to dominant 
undertakings, as well as the legal rights and other entitlements to victims, significantly 
undermines their aim of ‘providing guidance not only to undertakings in a dominant 
position on certain a market, but also to their competitors, customers or suppliers’ (para.3). 
Within this context, another issue is the intersection of competition law with sector-
specific regulation, and the relations between the TCA and sectoral regulators in Art.6 
cases.
81
 In EU law, competition rules are laid down in the Treaty, but sector-specific 
regulation is mostly left to secondary legislation. However, competition law and sector-
specific regulation are both legislation having the same legal force in Turkey, so 
competition law has no supremacy over sector-specific regulation and vice versa. Although 
the TCA has signed non-binding cooperation protocols with many sectoral regulators,
82
 the 
“grey area” between competition law and sector-specific regulation in Art.6 cases still 
creates uncertainties; especially many controversial infringement decisions of the TCA 
concerns the telecom sector and significant fines were imposed on telecom companies.
83
 
The Guidelines on Art.6 are not sector-specific, but a brief discussion on how the TCA 
would assess the allegations of infringement of Art.6 in regulated markets vis-à-vis the 
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jurisdiction of sectoral regulators on the relevant issue could have contributed to the 
predictability and legal certainty for dominant undertakings in regulated markets. 
In addition to the areas normally left to the MSs, the Guidelines on Art.6 do not 
fully address the needs of Turkey and exclude many problematic areas experienced in the 
enforcement of Art.6. In this respect, the reference to “aim” in the subparagraphs (a) and 
(d) of Art.6
84
 have caused a great deal of controversy in the enforcement of this Article.
85
 
Based on the exact wording of these subparagraphs, the Council of State has favoured a 
literal interpretation technique and ignored the analysis of effects once an “aim” is proved. 
Some decisions of the TCA, which were closed due to a lack of effect, were actually 
annulled by the Council of State on the ground that the conduct in question literally fell into 
those subparagraphs despite them being merely illustrative.
86
 The hierarchy of norms would 
probably tie the hands of the TCA and an amendment to the Act would eventually be 
needed, but the TCA could have at least explained in the Guidelines on Art.6 that the 
references to “aim” should not be taken to mean a per se illegality in the absence of an anti-
competitive effect and that the evidence of “aim” can only be considered as generally 
relevant to the assessment of anti-competitive foreclosure under para.26 of the Guidelines 
on Art.6. 
The subparagraph (a) of Art.6 also creates another problem in the enforcement of 
this Article: If interpreted literally, ‘practices which aim to impede the activities of 
competitors in the market’ comprise a very broad set of practices. Most practices 
unavoidably impede the activities of competitors, since it is inherent in the competitive 
process that competitors will be harmed from a dominant undertaking’s pro-competitive 
practices such as price cuts, introduction of new or improved products and so on. In some 
of its past decisions, the TCA rightly argued that this subparagraph should be interpreted 
narrowly and applied in rare cases where ‘the ability of a competitor to compete is 
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significantly impeded or completely eliminated’.87 In its decisional practice, the TCA 
seems to have distinuguished ‘impediments as can be normally expected from a competitive 
market’ from ‘impediments as a result of an anti-competitive practice of the dominant 
undertaking’.88 Although it may be hard to successfully draw a line between these two 
types of impediments, the need for a narrow interpretation as stressed by the TCA should 
have been mentioned in the Guidelines on Art.6 for the sake of clarity.
89
 
5.2.3. Problematic Areas in Practice: Observations of the Interviewees 
Based on the answers of the interviewees to the fourth interview question, Section 5.2.3 
deals with the most problematic areas in the enforcement of Art.6 that should have been 
addressed in the Guidelines on Art.6. It should be noted that only the problematic areas 
which were not identified in previous sections are examined herein. In cases where the 
interviewees deemed as problematic one of the abovementioned issues, such as the 
exclusion of excessive pricing from the scope of Guidelines on Art.6 or the inconsistency in 
the case law on a specific type of abusive conduct, their observations are analysed in the 
relevant section. 
To start with, the interviewees seemed to have acknowledged that problematic areas 
do exist in the enforcement of Art.6 implying that there is room for improvement. 
One member of the commission that prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 expressed 
that: 
‘Almost all areas [in the enforcement of Art.6] need clarification. We experience problems in 
every area.’90 
Speaking in the context of Art.6, one high-ranked official within the TCA stated 
that: 
‘This is a difficult area.’91 
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Perceiving the Article itself as the basis for the problems in its enforcement, another 
member of the commission that prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 claimed that: 
‘In fact, Art.6 is in itself a problem’92 
As a general observation, not all of the answers to the fourth interview question are 
helpful. This is because some interviewees preferred to answer this question very broadly, 
instead of pointing to specific problematic areas. For example, some interviewees took the 
view that definition of the relevant market, determination of a dominant position or the 
overall analysis of abuse were problematic in general and did not specify why this was so. 
Suggesting an improvement in market definition, one lawyer said that: 
‘The Guidelines on Art.6 could have reinforced the market definition... This is particularly 
important in abuse cases.’93 
Expressing their dissatisfaction with the determination of dominant position in the 
decisions of the TCA, one high-ranked official observed that: 
‘Dominant position is mostly about market power rather than market shares. I do not believe that 
the TCA makes adequate economic analysis on market power.’94 
Likewise, one judge took the view that: 
‘I find the enforcement [of Art.6 by the TCA] problematic in terms of the determination of 
dominant position and definition of the market. Guidelines involving specific and concrete criteria could 
have been adopted. Abuse is more clear I think.’95 
As for the analysis of abuse, one high-ranked official noted that: 
‘The determination of abuse is problematic. The standards, starting points, the necessary factors 
in the analysis are important etc. are important... There must be Guideline on exclusionary conduct.’96 
Stressing the insufficiency of the case law, one academic claimed that: 
‘I do not think that we have an established case law on many forms of abuses yet.’ 97 
Apart from such general observations, specific points that were raised by the 
interviewees are outlined below: 
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One lawyer criticised the TCA for the use of intention as a substitute for effects in 
the enforcement of Art.6 as follows: 
‘Although the effect principle [the effects-based approach] has been stressed in the Guidelines in 
both the EU and Turkey, the TCA places more emphasis on intention than on effects partly due to its 
laziness in terms of making economic analysis... Intention can only be an additional factor... If rivals are 
not excluded, the intention to foreclose should not make a difference. Unfortunately, this is not clear in the 
decisions of the TCA.’98 
 Addressing the same issue, one member of the commission that prepared the 
Guidelines on Art.6 expressed that: 
‘Intention is considered in some cases. But we begin to support our cases with more objective 
arguments. In our draft Guidelines, intention can only be an additional factor once the infringement is 
established. The introduction of more objective factors by the draft Guidelines is welcomed.’99 
One academic shed light on the relationship between Art.6 and Art.4 and drew 
attention to the potentially “opportunistic” use of Art.4 vis-à-vis Art.6: 
‘Sometimes the TCA relies on Art.4 [of the Act] to fine dominant undertakings... In order not to 
determine a dominant position, it prefers to go for Art.4... The per se rule under Art.4 is easier. In order to 
strengthen its hand, it relies on Art.4. This will lead to fewer Art.6 cases in the long-run.’100 
Pointing to the same problem, one lawyer similarly observed that: 
‘Our Communiqué on vertical agreements block exempt exclusivity agreements, if the market 
shares of the parties do not exceed 40 percent... But it is not clear whether conduct [exclusivity 
agreements] which forecloses competitors should be examined under Art.4 or Art.6... Here the 
fundamental problem is that while the object restriction is sufficient in the absence of effect under Art.4, 
the effect principle applies under Art.6. Different consequences may arise as a result of subjecting the 
same conduct to different rules.
101
 
Identifying a problematic area in the determination of pricing abuses, one high-
ranked official within the TCA expressed that: 
‘Statistics is very weak in Turkey. We face difficulties in calculating the costs of undertakings, 
for instance how much sale is made, how much imports and exports are made etc. Most of the time we 
have to rely on the information provided by the undertakings.’102 
 Likewise, one competition expert also complained that: 
‘The calculation of cost is difficult... In many sectors, the issue of cost is problematic... Cost 
benchmarks are too hypothetical. They originate from the application of economic theory to practice... The 
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issue of cost is a problem which cannot be overcome with the help of Guidelines. It will always be a 
problem that we face.
103
 
 Expressing their dissatisfaction with the treatment of the efficiency defence by the 
TCA, one judge said that: 
‘There may be issues related to the efficiency defence. I do not think that the TCA has any 
standard in this respect.’104 
Commenting on the burden of proof in objective justification, one competition 
expert argued that: 
‘The burden of proof in terms of objective justification is on the dominant undertaking, but 
undertakings may not have the necessary expertise to prove this... When we look at the example of 
Turkey, we have to deal with small- and medium-sized undertakings most of the time. Placing such 
burden on these undertakings may not serve the purpose [of objective justification].’105 
Lastly, one competition expert stated that: 
‘I think the number of safe harbours must be increased. For example in US antitrust law, above 
cost pricing is not regarded as an abuse from the outset... This should be the case with Turkey as well.’106 
To sum up, it appears from the observations of the interviewees that problematic 
areas do exist in the enforcement of Art.6. In other words, the enforcement of Art.6 does 
not please all of the interviewees. Not all interviewees pointed to specific areas that they 
deemed as problematic, but those who did so listed some problematic areas which were 
very different from each other. While the Guidelines on Art.6 addressed some of those 
problematic areas such as the role of intention in Art.6 cases (para.26), they are silent on 
many other problematic areas such as the relationship between Art.6 and Art.4, cost 
calculation and selective above cost pricing. Therefore, the Guidelines on Art.6 do not meet 
all expectations of the internal staff of the TCA, lawyers, judges and academics in Turkey. 
5.3. The Future of the Guidelines on Art.6 
5.3.1. Will the TCA Abide by Its Own Guidelines? 
One of the most questioned issues in EU competition law was how the enforcement of 
Art.102 would be shaped in the aftermath of the Guidance. There were doubts as to whether 
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the Commission would abide by its own Guidance, given the practical difficulties in 
applying the new effects-based approach and the “opportunity” to win the case on basis of 
the formalistic case law.
107
 Arguably, the same situation will not be the case with Turkey in 
that the new reading of Art.102 with the Guidance is generally not alien to Turkish 
competition law. As discussed above, the TCA was already inclined to make economic 
analysis and effects-based assessments even before the issue of the Guidelines on Art.6.
108
 
With the exception of some new conditions for specific forms of exclusionary conduct, the 
Guidelines on Art.6 do not radically differ from the case law on Art.6. Nevertheless, if the 
principles set out in the Guidelines on Art.6 are not enforced, there is a risk of legal 
uncertainty for dominant undertakings. Besides, since the Guidelines on Art.6 aim to 
provide consistency in the case law, they will be a missed opportunity unless they are 
complied with in practice.
109
 
As one member of the commission that prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 observed: 
‘Providing consistency in case law will be the biggest contribution to us.’110 
There are many signs that show the willingness of the TCA to apply and abide by 
the Guidelines on Art.6. First, in many of its decisions prior to the publication of the 
Guidelines on Art.6, the TCA directly referred to the Guidance and decided the case in 
question accordingly.
111
 Furthermore, the Guidelines on Art.6 reflect the EU experience 
with Art.102, and again in many of its decisions, the TCA quoted and discussed the 
literature on EU competition law.
112
 Most importantly, in a decision that was issued only 
weeks before the publication of the Guidelines on Art.6, the TCA referred to the draft 
Guidelines on Art.6 when listing the necessary conditions for tying to amount to an 
abuse.
113
 The fact that the TCA was inclined to make reference to the draft Guidelines even 
before the final version was published implies that it will a fortiori rely on the Guidelines 
on Art.6 in its future decisions. It is reasonable to argue that the TCA will be willing to 
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apply and abide by the Guidelines on Art.6 in its future decisions. As there is no formal 
commitment procedure in the Act, future decisions of the TCA will not mainly be 
commitment decisions in contrast to the post-Guidance period in the EU. 
5.3.2. What Will be the Reaction of the Appellate Courts? 
After the amendment made to the Act in July 2012, the court of first instances for the 
decisions of the TCA is changed from the Council of State to the Ankara Administrative 
Court, whose judgments are further appealable to the Council of State. Since the 
amendment is very recent, there is not an adequate body of judgments on Art.6 to 
determine the potential reaction of the Ankara Administrative Court to the Guidelines on 
Art.6. Nevertheless, one judgment of the Court deserves mention in this respect: Pursuant 
to para.7 of the Guidelines on Art.6, the TCA is entitled to close the case if there is no 
dominant position and/or abuse, and therefore may start its analysis with either of them. In 
Turkish Airlines/Pegasus, which was handed down in July 2013 when the draft Guidelines 
were released for public consultation, one of the grounds for annulment was the fact that 
the TCA held that there was no abuse without a priori determining that the undertaking in 
question held a dominant position.
114
 Thus, the Court clealry took a negative stance against 
the discretion of the TCA to start with the analysis of either dominant position or abuse, 
which was actually exercised in numerous decisions of the TCA.
115
 The Court’s objection 
to this relatively straightforward method of analysis suggests that the Court may a fortiori 
issue judgments contrary to other asssesments of the Guidelines on Art.6. 
One member of the commission that prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 argued 
logically that: 
‘We find no infringement where there is a lack of dominant position or abuse. This forms our 
usual practice and is vastly endorsed in the judgments of Danıştay. But the [Ankara Administrative] Court 
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reversed this... If we are facing problems even in such a fundamental area, we may experience difficulties 
in more fundamental areas on appeal. I hope this will not happen...’116 
Compared to the Ankara Administrative Court, the Council of State has handed 
down many judgments on Art.6 which may have some implications for the future of the 
Guidelines on Art.6. Still, the judgments of the Council of State have remained largely 
unsatisfactory in many respects. Demiröz and Tunçel observe that with some exceptions, 
the judgments of the Council of State on Art.6 tend to be very short, often repeat the text of 
Art.6 and the operative part of the decisions of the TCA and add a paragraph or two 
thereon, do not cite the previous judgments on similar matters and finally do not refer to 
cases from EU competition law or discussions in the EU literature.
117
 The authors find that 
they lack an analytical framework, are often confined to specific facts of the case at hand 
and almost refrain from challenging the substantive tests applied by the TCA on its own 
initiative.
118
 Furthermore, key concepts such as consumer welfare, foreclosure and so on 
were not, as the authors observe, adequately discussed in the judgments. For all these 
reasons, the authors reach the conclusion that the judgments of the Council of State on 
Art.6 were far from providing adequate guidance. 
Evident from its judgments, the Council of State neither objects to the consumer 
welfare objective, nor places the Ordoliberal philosophy at the forefront or justifies the 
protection of competitors in Turkish competition law. Instead the real problem is that the 
Council of State has favoured a literal interpretation of the Act in its judicial review and in 
this respect, placed greater emphasis on the statutory text of Art.6. Although both the text 
and the preamble of Art.6 make it clear that the subparagraphs of Art.6 are illustrative and 
non-exhaustive, the Council of State has treated them as almost per se infringements of 
Art.6: When the conduct in question literally falls into one of the subparagraphs of Art.6 
and the TCA decides that there is no abuse, in particular when the conduct does not 
generate anti-competitive effects; the Council of State tends to annul the decision of the 
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TCA.
119
 The practical consequence of such a method of interpretation is that it disregards 
the effects of the conduct on competition or on consumers and ultimately makes the 
Council of State less supportive of an effects-based approach to Art.6. Should the Council 
of State continue strictly adhering to the subparagraphs of Art.6, the future of the effects-
based assessments may be at risk in Turkey. The statutory text of Art.6 may therefore limit 
the scope for the enforcement of the Guidelines on Art.6. 
Practical views from practice also deserve mention in this respect. The interviewees 
were asked the fifth interview question as to whether they expected any opposition from the 
appellate courts to the implementation of the Guidelines on Art.6 in Turkey. Based on their 
replies, it can be observed that majority of the interviewees did not expect any opposition 
from the appellate courts to the Guidelines on Art.6 based on their experience with previous 
Guidelines issued by the TCA. The high-ranked officials within the TCA, the competition 
experts, the lawyers and the academics did not expect an opposition, whereas the members 
of the commission that prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 were more sceptical in this respect, 
mostly due to the literal interpretation of the subparagraphs of Art.6 by the Council of 
State. The judges chose not to answer this question due to their concern about bias of judge. 
One high-ranked official within the TCA observed that: 
 ‘So far we have issued many similar Guidelines... We have not experienced any problem like 
that yet... I do not think that we will face a problem unless of course it [the Guidelines on Art.6] is not 
contrary to the Act... Danıştay mostly relies on the Act and by-laws if there are any.’120 
One competition expert explained that: 
‘Based on the cases I worked on as a rapporteur, Danıştay attaches importance to what we have 
written in Guidelines, treats them like a piece of legislation and does not see any problem in applying a 
rule in Guidelines to the case at hand... The TCA has used its discretion by issuing Guidelines. There is no 
problem with that.’121 
Another competition expert expressed that: 
‘Unless the Guidelines include an area to which the appellate courts have objected before, I do 
not think that there will be any problem.’122 
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One other competition expert stated that: 
‘Since it [the Guidelines on Art.6] does not envisage a radical change, I do not expect any 
objection from the appellate courts...’123 
One lawyer took the view that: 
‘I do not expect [any opposition]... because the TCA has not experienced a real problem in terms 
of judicial review even in areas which do not provide a fertile ground for Guidelines... The biggest 
challenge was the Fining Guidelines [2009], but it [the TCA] has passed that test.’124 
One academic noted that: 
‘In my experience, I have not seen any particular objection to Guidelines from the judiciary 
because the courts are not bound by them. Guidelines only deal with likely actions which are subject to 
change based on the specific facts of the case at hand. I do not expect any objection.’125 
On the other hand, one member of the commission that prepared the Guidelines on 
Art.6 expressed that: 
‘The subparagraphs (a) and (d) of Art.6 speak of “aim”... To what extent these two subparagraphs 
and the preamble [of Art.6] allow an effects-based approach is disputable. There is a possibility that the 
courts may annul the effects-based decisions... We will see.’126 
Another member of that commission claimed that: 
‘The Guidelines [on Art.6] adopt an effects-based approach. It can be argued that this may 
conflict with the wording of our Art.6, since two of its subparagraphs explicitly refer to “aim”. Maybe at 
this point there can be a problem... However, problems can only arise in the short-run. In the long-run 
everything will be fine and undertakings will be provided a much more predictable state.’127 
Consequently, apart from the problem caused as a result of the literal interpretation 
of the statutory text, in particular the subparagraphs, of Art.6; the Council of State is not 
expected to raise objections to the Guidelines on Art.6. In contrast to the heated debates in 
the EU, whether the Turkish Appellate Courts would endorse the Guidelines on Art.6 will 
hardly be a topic for discussion in Turkey. In this respect, the contrast between the two 
jurisdictions could not be starker. 
5.3.3. Will the Guidelines on Art.6 Be in General Beneficial for Turkey? 
With the publication of the Guidelines on Art.6, it is expected that decisions of the TCA 
will be more consistent with each other, the decision making will be more transparent and 
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swift since rapporteurs within the TCA will be able to rely on one single document instead 
of having had to examine the entire case law, the use of effects-based assessments and 
economic analysis will be institutionalised in Turkey and a high level of convergence 
between EU and Turkish competition laws will be achieved. The decisions of the TCA will 
increasingly reflect the contributions of the Guidelines on Art.6. In this respect, the 
consumer welfare objective will be reiterated, the number of effects-based decisions will 
increase, more emphasis will be placed on the use of economic analysis, the “as efficient 
competitor” test will be more widely used in the context of price-based exclusionary 
conduct, the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure will be the governing standard for 
intervention into exclusionary conduct, the efficiency defence will be widely cited by 
dominant undertakings and finally decisions on specific types of abusive exclusionary 
conduct will be more in line with the assessments and tests envisaged for each specific type 
of conduct in the Guidelines on Art.6. Ultimately, effects of the Guidelines on Art.6 are 
expected to be more widely felt in the decisional practice of the TCA. 
The interviewees were asked the sixth interview question as to whether it would be 
beneficial in general for Turkey to adopt Guidelines in relation to Art.6. Based on their 
replies, not even a single member of the internal staff of the TCA, lawyer or academic 
answered in the negative. Most members of the internal staff of the TCA even replied with 
the words “absolutely”128 or “of course”.129 However, the judges took the view that such 
Guidelines could only be indirectly beneficial at best, implying that they would rather play 
a marginal role in the judicial review. 
One member of the commission that prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 expressed 
that: 
‘Absolutely beneficial. Beneficial and much-needed. Even belated.’130 
One academic stated that: 
‘It is hard to say that the Guidelines will not be beneficial.’131 
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One lawyer drew attention to the risk that: 
‘In general beneficial... Over time these Guidelines may no longer serve the purpose they 
intended. If necessary amendments are not made, they may lead to Type-1 and Type-2 errors... They must 
be kept up-to-date... But this would generate a risk for predictability: The more you update, the less 
predictable they will become.’132 
All in all, being the first piece of secondary legislation on Art.6 and having a vast 
support from the internal staff of the TCA, the lawyers and the academics in Turkey who 
were interviewed for the purposes of this thesis, the Guidelines on Art.6 will contribute to 
the establishment of a coherent policy on abuse of a dominant position in Turkey, despite 
the fact that they could have resolved many problematic areas in the enforcement of Art.6. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 5 examined how Guidelines in relation to Art.6 can be best tailored to reflect 
Turkey’s experience with Art.6. This Chapter critically analysed the Guidelines on Art.6 in 
order to determine to what extent they reflect the enforcement of Art.6 and pointed to 
Turkey’s own needs which were left outside the scope of these Guidelines. It provided a 
comparative analysis of the contributions of the Guidelines on Art.6 with the Guidance and 
the established case law on Art.6 in Section 5.1, addressed the historical and/or current 
issues in the enforcement of Art.6 in Turkey that were left outside the scope of the 
Guidelines on Art.6 in Section 5.2, and finally speculated on the future of the Guidelines on 
Art.6 in Section 5.3 by exploring whether the TCA will abide by its own Guidelines in its 
future decisional practice and what the reaction of the appellate courts to the Guidelines on 
Art.6 will be. Section 5.1 observed that majority of the contributions of the Guidelines on 
Art.6 in fact already existed in the decisional practice of the TCA especially in the 
aftermath of the Guidance, and while the general assessments of the Guidelines on Art.6 are 
to a great extent in line with the case law on Art.6, the specific assessments on for specific 
forms of conduct largely differ from those in the case law. Section 5.2 observed that the 
absence of any guidance on the problematic areas that are peculiar to Turkish competition 
law undermines predictability and legal certainty as aimed by the Guidelines on Art.6 in the 
first place. Finally, Section 5.3 observed that based on some of its previous decisions that 
referred to the Guidance and even the draft Guidelines on Art.6, the TCA is expected to 
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abide by its Guidelines on Art.6 in its future decisions, just as the appellate courts are 
expected to raise no objections so long as the TCA interprets these Guidelines in 
accordance with the statutory text of the Act. 
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THESIS CONCLUSION 
This thesis discussed the need for adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkish 
competition law and gave reflections on the legal regime and substantive content of 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6 that can be best tailored to the enforcement of Art.6 by the 
TCA and the Turkish Appellate Courts. This thesis is timely in that “Guidelines on the 
Assessment of Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings” were published 
in Turkey in April 2014. Being the first original research on the Guidelines on Art.6, it 
critically analysed the significant aspects of these Guidelines in the light of the national 
experience of Turkey with Art.6 while fully taking into account the EU competition law 
context. The thesis is enhanced by qualitative empirical data obtained as a result of a series 
of research interviews made with some selected members of the internal staff of the TCA, 
lawyers, judges and academics in Turkey. 
Even a cursory analysis of the Guidelines on Art.6 revealed that they mirror the 
Commission’s Guidance in terms of both structure and content. Because the Guidelines on 
Art.6 are closely modelled on the Guidance, the research would not be complete without a 
discussion of the Guidance. Since the Guidance does not exist in vacuum and is yet the 
final formal stage in the modernisation of Art.102, the inquiry started with the 
modernisation of Art.102. For this reason, Part I of the thesis was devoted to the analysis of 
the modernisation and the Guidance. Chapter 1 provided answers to the first and foremost 
question as to why Art.102 was subject to a modernisation process. This Chapter discussed 
the reasons that paved the way for the modernisation by shedding light on the text of 
Art.102, its objectives, and the case law and key literature on Art.102. Chapter 1 observed 
that some guidance on Art.102 was much-needed because of the fact that the text of the 
Article was silent on the meaning of abuse and on the objective(s) of the Article, the 
definition of abuse by the EU Courts was rather unsatisfactory and provided no 
methodology for identifying its scope, distinguishing legal conduct from abusive conduct 
was challenging and finally there was a lack of coherent analytical approach in the case 
law. 
Against this backdrop, Chapter 1 found that mainly because of the old case law on 
Art.102 which had been subject to heavy criticism for being formalistic and lacking 
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economic arguments or efficiency considerations, the Commission engaged in the 
modernisation of the way it enforced Art.102 with a view to bringing the Article into line 
with the modern economic thinking on unilateral conduct. Because the old case law on 
Art.102 was being heavily criticised in the literature and became no longer consistent with 
the other pillars of EU competition law after the modernisation of Art.101 TFEU and 
merger control, the Commission had no choice but to adopt a modernised approach to 
Art.102, one that would reflect the advances in the modern economic thinking on unilateral 
conduct. Taking the inquiry further, Chapter 2 analysed the changes that occurred in the 
Commission’s approach towards the interpretation of abuse of a dominant position with the 
modernisation of Art.102. This Chapter observed that the modernisation involved a 
reorientation in the Commission’s reading of Art.102 with respect to a greater recognition 
of efficiency, effects-based assessments and proof of consumer harm in Art.102 cases. 
Chapter 2 concluded that with the modernisation, the Commission aimed to steer the 
enforcement of Art.102 from a heavy reliance on the special responsibility towards a 
greater recognition of efficiency, from a form-based approach towards an effects-based 
approach into unilateral conduct, and lastly from the analysis of harm to competitors to 
consumer harm. 
The very reason why the Commission had engaged in the modernisation created at 
the same time the problem that tied its hands. Adoption of this new approach would 
inevitably require a certain degree of departure from the case law of the EU Courts and if 
these Courts did not alter their interpretation, the Commission could not legally do this on 
its own as an administrative body. However, the Commission was clever: Although the EU 
Courts have the power to interpret Art.102, the Commission resorted to its powers of 
enforcement within its legal remit. The main outcome of the modernisation of Art.102, the 
Guidance, only set out the Commission’s enforcement priorities. Devoted to the analysis of 
the Guidance, Chapter 3 began by examining the purpose and legal regime of the Guidance, 
and drew attention to the fact that the Guidance was not “Guidelines” from a legal point of 
view. Partly for this reason and partly because of other aspects, the Guidance had caused a 
great deal of controversy arising from its title to its substantive content among 
commentators. This debate on the Guidance was extensively addressed in Chapter 3. The 
Chapter proceeded with the contributions of the Guidance to the enforcement of Art.102 
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and observed that the concept of anti-competitive foreclosure, the “as efficient competitor” 
test, efficiency defence and detailed assessments on specific forms of abusive exclusionary 
conduct stood out as the most novel parts and contributions, all of which would promote a 
modernised approach to Art.102. 
The first contribution of the thesis to the research literature on Art.102 and its 
implications in Turkey was made in Chapter 3 with the analysis of the enforcement of 
Art.102 in the post-Guidance period. This thesis is timely in that it enjoyed the advantage 
of articulating what has actually happened after the issue of the Guidance, rather than to 
merely speculate on the future of the Guidance as had been done in most scholarly works. 
In dealing with the question as to how the enforcement of Art.102 has been shaped in the 
post-Guidance period; the Chapter explored whether the Commission stuck to the 
principles in the Guidance, whether the assessments of the Commission in its post-
Guidance decisions were in line with its “enforcement priorities”, what types of abuses 
were taken up by the Commission, how the allegations of abuse of a dominant position 
appeared and finally how the EU Courts reacted to the Commission’s new reading of 
Art.102. As an original contribution, Chapter 3 found that Art.9 Regulation 1/2003 
commitments mark another, albeit informal, stage in the modernisation of Art.102, as the 
Commission’s increasing use of such commitments outstripped many practical discussions 
that were expected to take place after the issue of the Guidance and instead created new 
problems on the appropriateness, legal review and excessive use of commitments in 
Art.102 cases. The Chapter noted that this informal stage would be unlikely to be a positive 
stage in contrast to the previous successful stages and may result in a change backwards in 
the modernisation of Art.102, if the Commission reneges on the Guidance in Art.9 
commitments and continues to satisfy with “preliminary assessments” instead of making 
rigorous effects-based assessments. 
Having completed Part I, the thesis shifted the focus of the inquiry to Turkey. The 
first chapter of Part II, Chapter 4, provided answers to the first main research question as to 
whether there is a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkey. This Chapter began by 
discussing the functions of Guidelines as soft law instruments and draws some theoretical 
conclusions for Turkey on the likely benefits and costs of adopting Guidelines in relation to 
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Art.6. It found that the TCA and other State authorities in Turkey explicitly stressed the 
need for adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6 which would theoretically provide 
transparency and predictability, increase legal certainty and minimise inconsistencies in the 
decisions of the TCA, while resulting in a voluntary restraint on the discretion of the TCA. 
Chapter 4 proceeded with a relevant issue in this respect, namely the impact of Turkey’s 
accession to the EU on the adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6. It found that mostly 
because of the sui generis nature of the Guidance as a soft law instrument, Turkey’s duty to 
harmonise its national competition law with the EU acquis under the Decision No 1/95 of 
the EC-Turkey Association Council does not de jure require the country to transpose the 
Guidance into Turkish competition law. The past experience of the country, however, 
showed that Turkey had a fair track record of transposing the applicable EU block 
exemption Regulations and Guidelines, and Guidelines in relation to Art.6 would, as the 
Chapter observed, highly unlikely to be an exception to this pattern. 
Chapter 4 was enriched by qualitative empirical data obtained as a result of a series 
of research interviews made with (1) the internal staff of the TCA; (2) the lawyers who 
specialise in competition law cases in Turkey; (3) the judges within the 13
th
 Chamber of the 
Council of State; and (4) the academics who have their research interests in Art.6 or have 
published widely on competition law in Turkey. Although the results were not 
representative, they showed that the overwhelming majority of the interviewees found that 
the decisions of the TCA were inconsistent and the judgments of the Council of State were 
far from providing any guidance on Art.6. Majority of the interviewees expressed that there 
was a need for reform. While all of the members of the internal staff of the TCA and the 
lawyers felt a need for Guidelines in their personal experience, the judges seemed rather 
reluctant to the adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6 and took the view that such 
Guidelines would have a limited impact on the judicial review of the decisions of the TCA 
on Art.6. In addition; “consistency”, “predictability” and “fulfilling the gap on Art.6 which 
was the only area left without any guidance” were the most cited reasons among the 
interviewees for the adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6. Put different way, the 
reasons that paved the way for the issue of the Guidance, namely switching to an effects-
based and a consumer welfare-oriented approach, were not considered. 
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The overwhelming majority of the interviewees expressed that Turkey should 
publish its own Guidelines in relation to Art.6, but should nevertheless benefit from the 
Guidance. The interviewees noted that Turkey’s own needs should not be disregarded if 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6 were to be issued; however, not all interviewees precisely 
mentioned what those needs were. On the first additional interview question as to whether 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6 should be in the form of “Guidelines” or “enforcement 
priorities” just like the Guidance, most of the interviewees who answered this question 
expressed that Guidelines in relation to Art.6 should be in the form of Guidelines 
suggesting that the reasons in the EU for the preference of enforcement priorities did not 
exist in Turkey. Consequently, the interviews showed that the enforcers of Art.6 and the 
legal counsel of the addresses of Art.6 seemed to be “speaking the same language”; they 
shared similar opinions and beliefs with regard to the inconsistency of the case law and the 
need for adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6 which should take into Turkey’s own 
needs. The judges provided the most radical answers and seemed rather reluctant to the 
adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6. The academics, while agreeing on the 
inconsistency of the case law, sent mixed signals on the need for Guidelines in that they did 
not object to the adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6, but did not advocate such need 
as strongly as the internal staff of the TCA and the lawyers. 
Taking further the findings of Chapter 4 on the need for Guidelines in relation to 
Art.6, Chapter 5 provided answers to the second main research question as to how these 
Guidelines can be best tailored to reflect Turkey’s experience with Art.6. The second 
original contribution of the thesis to the existing research literature was made in this 
Chapter.  Within this context, this Chapter provided a critical and comparative analysis of 
the Guidelines on Art.6 with the contributions of the Guidance and the established case law 
on Art.6 with a view to showing to what extent the Guidelines on Art.6 reflected the 
national experience with Art.6. Chapter 5 observed that even before the publication of the 
Guidelines on Art.6, the state of the case law on Art.6 was in line with the Commission’s 
new reading of Art.102 and even more advanced than the case law on Art.102 in many 
areas. It found that a strong emphasis was placed on the consumer welfare objective in 
Turkish competition law from the outset, the TCA became more disposed to make 
economic analysis especially after the issue of the Guidance and its recent decisions 
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indicated a high level of effects-based analyses, the traces of anti-competitive foreclosure 
and the “as efficient competitor” test were seen in some recent decisions, efficiency had 
been the foremost criterion in the assessment of abusive conduct and the TCA was not 
“sentimental” to inefficient undertakings, efficiency defence had been well established in 
Turkish competition law and finally the TCA already accepted the notion that the allegedly 
abusive conduct may in fact generate efficiencies. 
Therefore, the general assessments of the Guidelines on Art.6 were not found to 
have radically differed from the established case law on Art.6. However, the same was not 
the case with the specific forms of abusive conduct. Chapter 5 observed that the specific 
assessments in the Guidelines on Art.6 bore many similarities to those set out in the 
Guidance, but showed divergence from the established case law on Art.6. On refusal to 
deal, exclusivity, rebates and tying; the necessary conditions for these forms of conduct to 
amount to an abuse largely differed from those in the case law. Only the conditions for 
margin squeeze, and partly predatory pricing with the exception of new cost benchmarks, 
were found to be in line with the case law. Notwithstanding, the Chapter noted that in terms 
of harmonising the assessments of the Guidance with the existing decisions of the TCA on 
Art.6, the subsection on margin squeeze was excellent, the subsections on exclusivity and 
tying were very good, the subsection on refusal to deal was good, whereas the subsection 
on predatory pricing contradicted with the case law which put greater emphasis on the 
intention and recoupment elements and finally the subsection on rebates failed to provide 
legal certainty to undertakings and involved assessment techniques which were hard to 
properly implement in practice. One notable feature of the case law on Art.6 was, as the 
Chapter argued, that contrary to EU competition law; exclusive dealing, rebates and tying 
had never been subject to a per se illegality in Turkish competition law and in this respect, 
the TCA recognised that they may generate many pro-competitive effects. 
Chapter 5 proceeded with the discussion of the most problematic historical and/or 
current issues on Art.6 in Turkey which should have been addressed in the Guidelines on 
Art.6, but were left outside their scope as a result of the adoption of the Guidance. This 
Chapter determined that with the transposition of the Guidance, the content and 
contributions of the Guidance were injected into Turkish competition law; therefore, the 
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subjects that were left outside the scope of the Guidance did not also fall into the scope of 
the Guidelines on Art.6 either. It observed that the scope of the Guidelines on Art.6 was 
limited to exclusionary abuses, and thus exploitative and discriminatory abuses were left 
outside the scope. The Chapter argued that the Guidelines on Art.6 left unanswered many 
questions on exploitative abuses, in particular excessive pricing, allegations of which were 
very common in the decisional practice of the TCA. In the area of exploitative abuses, the 
Guidelines on Art.6 thus failed to provide legal certainty for undertaking and to meet the 
expectations of their legal counsel. As for discriminatory abuses, the Chapter observed that 
there was a need for guidance both because of the case law was inconsistent in similar 
situations and the statutory text of Art.6 was liable to wrongly apply to essentially pro-
competitive conduct. The Guidelines on Art.6 also excluded collective dominance from its 
scope just like the Guidance, but the Chapter argued that this raised no problem. 
Exclusion of the needs of Turkey from the scope of the Guidelines on Art.6 was 
also discussed in Chapter 5. The Chapter argued that the intersection of competition law 
with sector-specific regulation, and the relations between the TCA and sectoral regulators 
in Art.6 cases were not discussed in the Guidelines on Art.6. This issue was found to have 
created uncertainties in the enforcement of Art.6 and many controversial infringement 
decisions of the TCA concerned the telecom sector where significant fines were imposed 
on telecom companies. Also the Guidelines on Art.6 did not offer any guidance on the 
reference to “aim” in the subparagraphs (a) and (d) of Art.6, which had caused a great deal 
of controversy in the enforcement of this Article due to the literal interpretation of the 
Council of State. Similarly, the subparagraph (a) created another problem in the 
enforcement of Art.6 as it was capable of wrongly condemning a very broad set of practices 
which may be pro-competitive and the Guidelines on Art.6 failed to include the narrow 
interpretation the TCA adopted in some of its past decisions. Finally, the Chapter examined 
the observations of different interviewee groups on the areas they deemed as problematic in 
the enforcement of Art.6 and concluded that while the Guidelines on Art.6 addressed some 
of those problematic areas such as the role of intention, they were silent on many other 
problematic areas such as the relationship between Art.6 and Art.4, cost calculation and 
selective above cost pricing. 
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Just as the thesis analysed the post-Guidance period after 2009, the future of the 
Guidelines of Art.6 was not left outside the scope of the inquiry either. Chapter 5 
speculated on the future of the Guidelines on Art.6 by exploring whether the TCA would 
abide by its own Guidelines in its future decisional practice and what the reaction of the 
appellate courts to the Guidelines on Art.6 would be. It drew attention to the risk of legal 
uncertainty for dominant undertakings in the case of non-compliance of the TCA with its 
own Guidelines, but argued that since the TCA often made reference to EU competition 
law, to the Guidance and even to the draft Guidelines on Art.6 in its decisional practice, it 
would be willing to apply and abide by the Guidelines on Art.6 in its future decisions. It 
further argued that apart from the problem caused as a result of the literal interpretation of 
the statutory text of Art.6, the Council of State was not expected to raise objections to the 
Guidelines on Art.6 in general. The reaction of the Ankara Administrative Court, the 
Chapter maintained, was difficult to predict as its judgments were limited in number since 
it began to perform judicial review only after July 2012. Chapter 5 concluded that being the 
first piece of secondary legislation on Art.6 and having a vast support from the interviewed 
members of internal staff of the TCA, lawyers and academics in Turkey, the Guidelines on 
Art.6 would contribute to the establishment of a coherent policy on abuse of a dominant 
position in Turkey, though they could have resolved many problematic areas in the 
enforcement of Art.6. 
Based on this summary of findings, the following five conclusions can be derived. 
First, there is a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkish competition law for three 
reasons: To start with, the TCA and other State authorities, such as the State Supervisory 
Council, explicitly stressed the need for adopting Guidelines in relation to Art.6. Second, 
the analysis of the existing case law on Art.6 shows that there are considerable 
inconsistencies, especially with regard to specific forms of abusive conduct, which make it 
difficult to achieve general rules from case-by-case analyses. This issue is likely to create 
uncertainty for dominant undertakings in Turkey and paves the way for adopting 
Guidelines in order to ensure a certain level of predictability. Third, the research interviews 
articulate that all of the members of internal staff of the TCA and the lawyers, as well as 
some academics in Turkey, who were interviewed for the purpose of this thesis, felt the 
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need for Guidelines in their personal experience with Art.6. Being the first secondary 
legislation on Art.6, the Guidelines on Art.6 have thus met this need. 
Second, the Guidance can be used as a model when adopting Guidelines in relation 
to Art.6 also for three reasons: First, although Turkey’s duty of harmonisation does not de 
jure require the country to transpose the Guidance into Turkish competition law, the past 
experience of the country showed that Turkey has a fair track record of transposing the 
applicable EU block exemption Regulations and Guidelines, which implies that the 
transposition of the Guidance would follow this trend as well.  Second, the TCA began to 
align its decisions on Art.6 with the orientations of the Guidance years before the 
Guidelines on Art.6 came out and therefore it was highly unlikely that the Guidelines on 
Art.6 would show pivotal differences from its EU counterpart. Third, the research 
interviews articulated that the overwhelming majority of the interviewees expressed that 
Turkey should publish its own Guidelines, but should nevertheless benefit from the 
Guidance in this respect. In other words, issuing fully independent Turkish Guidelines did 
not attract so much sympathy.  
Third, because the Guidelines on Art.6 are closelly modelled on the Guidance, it is 
hard to argue that the Guidelines on Art.6 have fully suited to the needs of Turkey. The 
transposition of the Guidance has resulted in the exclusion of the problematic areas in the 
enforcement of Art.6. The Guidelines on Art.6 are a missed opportunity to offer much-
needed guidance on excessive pricing as one of the most common types of abusive conduct 
in the enforcement of Art.6. They could have clarified many points on discriminatory 
abuses as well. In addition, the intersection of competition law with sector-specific 
regulation and the relations between the TCA and sectoral regulators in Art.6 cases, 
clarification of the reference to aim in the subparagraphs (a) and (d) of Art.6 and the TCA’s 
narrow interpretation of the subparagraph (a) should have been explained to undertakings in 
these Guidelines. All in all, the lack of guidance on the problematic areas that are peculiar 
to Turkey undermines predictability and legal certainty as aimed by para.3 of the 
Guidelines on Art.6 in the first place. 
Fourth, despite having been modelled on the Guidance, the general assessments on 
unilateral exclusionary conduct in the Guidelines on Art.6 are in line with the established 
214 
 
 
case law on Art.6. In other words, even before the publication of the Guidelines on Art.6, 
decisions of the TCA reflect the Commission’s new reading of Art.102. For this reason, a 
radical shift in the enforcement policy is highly unlikely. On the other hand, the specific 
assessments on specific types of abusive exclusionary conduct in the Guidelines on Art.6, 
especially the subsections on refusal to deal, exclusivity, rebates and tying, largely differ 
from those in the established case law. However, this does not mean that the TCA should 
insist on its past assessments; by building the enforcement of Art.6 on these new 
assessments, future decisions of the TCA will be more consistent with the effects-based and 
consumer welfare-oriented spirit of the Guidelines on Art.6, as well as with each other in 
similar cases with similar facts. 
Finally, the future of the Guidelines on Art.6 seems straightforward. Because the 
general assessments of the Guidelines on Art.6 do not considerably depart from those in the 
established case law, the discussion on whether the Turkish Appellate Courts would 
endorse or reject these Guidelines is irrelevant in Turkish competition law, in contrast to 
EU competition law where a similar discussion has led to one of the most questioned issues 
after the publication of the Guidance. Instead, the real problem in the context of Turkish 
competition law is the literal interpretation technique adopted by the Council of State which 
reviews the decisions of the TCA on the ground of strict compliance with the statutory text 
of Art.6. The future will show which assessments in the Guidelines on Art.6 will be held 
contrary to the text of Art.6 by the Council of State. On the other hand, it will take some 
time for the Ankara Administrative Court to become “familiar” with competition law in 
order to properly examine contentious substantive issues in the decisions of the TCA. 
Against this backdrop, a new or revised edition of the Guidelines on Art.6 seems likely 
later rather than sooner in the foreseeable future. 
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ANNEX I – REFLECTIONS ON RESEARCH INTERVIEWS 
§. Introduction 
As discussed in “IV. Methodology”, a complementary methodology employed in this thesis 
is empirical research in the form of qualitative research interviews. The author of this thesis 
had applied to “Social Sciences/Arts Cross-School Research Ethics Committee” for the 
necessary ethics approval on December 13, 2013 and received the “Certificate of 
Approval” with the Reference No “ER/AO237/1” on January 15, 2014. The expected start 
date of the project was February 2, 2014 and the first research interview was successfully 
carried out on February 20, 2014. All research interviews took place in Turkey, in 
particular in Ankara and Istanbul, in a convenient atmosphere which was sufficiently 
private to provide answers. In order to ensure that no language barrier would create an 
obstacle to interviewees, all interviews were made in their native language, Turkish. 
The conditions for all interviews were similar: All of the participants received a 
Participant Information Sheet and signed a Consent Form. The participants agreed that they 
would be interviewed by the author, allowed the interview to be audio taped and finally 
allowed the author to anonymously use in this thesis the information they provided. They 
understood that no information that they disclosed would lead to the identification of any 
individual. They were reminded that their participation was voluntary, and they could 
choose not to participate in the interview and withdraw at any stage of the project without 
being penalised or disadvantaged in any way. Finally, they gave their consent to the 
processing of their personal information which would be treated as strictly confidential. 
None of the interviews involved any risk or disadvantage to the author or to the 
interviewees. 
A total number of 23 interviews were made within a period of 4.5 months. Majority 
of the interviews were made face-to-face and recorded using a tape recorder in order to 
both preserve the original data and give more confidence to the interviewees. Two 
interviewees refused to be audio taped and in such cases, the transcripts of the relevant 
interview were sent to those interviewees for verification of their answers. Another two 
interviewees preferred to send their replies via e-mail; therefore, they were not audio taped 
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either. One potential interviewee answered the questions, but later decided not to sign the 
Consent Form as they thought their answers did not reflect what they intended to say. Five 
potential interviewees agreed on principle to take part in an interview, but mostly 
indefinitely delayed the date or did not show up on the agreed date. 
§. Interviewee Groups 
The interviews involved a rational logical discourse between the author of this thesis as the 
interviewer and different groups of interviewees. With a view to achieving a wider level of 
representation in qualitative research interviews, the author tried to identify as many focus 
groups as possible. Each with different backgrounds, four different interviewee groups 
were identified as follows: 
1. The internal staff of the TCA 
a. Senior competition experts and other high-ranked officials, 
b. Competition experts who worked on Art.6 cases, 
c. The members of the commission who prepared the Guidelines on Art.6, 
2. The lawyers who specialise in competition law cases in Turkey, 
3. The judges within the 13th Chamber of the Council of State, and 
4. The academics who have their research interests in Art.6 or who have published 
widely in competition law in Turkey. 
Group 1 is further divided into three groups. Group 1(a), namely senior competition 
experts and other high-ranked officials, were chosen because of the fact that they had over 
10 years of experience in enforcing competition law, regardless of whether they were 
specialised in Art.6 cases. Group 1(b), namely competition experts who worked on Art.6 
cases, were chosen due to their specific experience in Art.6 cases. Lastly, Group 1(c), 
namely the members of the commission who prepared the Guidelines on Art.6, were 
targeted due to their long efforts in reviewing the existing case law on Art.6 during the 
preparation of the Guidelines on Art.6 and them being knowledgeable about the Guidance 
and the developments in EU competition law in general. In order to avoid a potential bias 
on the part of the members of the commission who prepared the Guidelines on Art.6 
towards the adoption of Guidelines in relation to Art.6 after their long endeavours, the 
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author also carried out interviews with competition experts, senior competition experts and 
other high-ranked officials within the TCA. 
Group 2, namely the lawyers who specialise in competition law cases in Turkey, 
were chosen in order to discuss the opinions of the legal counsel of dominant undertakings 
as the addresses of Art.6 vis-à-vis the opinions of the internal staff of the TCA as the 
enforcers of Art.6. On the other hand, dominant firms were left outside the scope of 
interviews mainly due to inherent difficulties in defining their dominant position by the 
author of this thesis. Furthermore, a lack of objective criteria in the selection process, for 
example why a certain dominant firm was selected at the expense of the others, was found 
liable to prevent the collection of sound empirical data. In addition, consumer groups were 
also left outside the scope of the interviews due to the marginal role they play in the context 
of competition law in Turkey. 
Group 3, namely the judges within the 13
th
 Chamber of the Council of State, were 
chosen to enrich the discussions by shedding light on the views from the judiciary. Mostly 
because of the problem of bias judge, the judges within the 13
th
 Chamber of the Council of 
State were reluctant to take part in an interview which would possibly result in the 
disclosure of their opinions. The president of the 13
th
 Chamber referred the author to two 
advocate generals (investigating judges), who were the only advocate generals specialised 
in competition cases within all the chambers of the Council of State. At the end, a joint 
interview was made with those two advocate generals. Interviews were made only with the 
judges within the Council of State, because of the fact that no case allocation is made 
within the Ankara Administrative Court. Since a competition case can be reviewed by any 
chamber of the Ankara Administrative Court depending on the workload and backlog of 
cases, judges within this Court are yet to be specialised in competition law. 
Lastly; Group 4, namely the academics who have their research interests in Art.6 or 
who have published widely in competition law in Turkey, were targeted in order to include 
into the thesis some views from the academia. The academics who were interviewed for the 
purposes of this thesis were based inside Turkey and published in Turkish or European 
academic outlets either in Turkish or in English. 
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§. Interview Questions 
The interview questions were designed in a semi-structured way that aimed to collect 
qualitative data: The interview questions had a structure and a pre-determined sequence and 
were thus not totally unstructured. Likewise, they were not tightly structured either, as there 
was no long list of survey-style yes/no questions. The number of questions was intended to 
be optimal in that the interviewees were asked 4-6 main interview questions depending on 
both the interview groups and their answers. The main interview questions were the same 
for all interviewees. 
 The following main interview questions were asked to all interviewee groups: 
1. What is your opinion on the current state of case law on Art.6 in Turkey? Is it clear 
and consistent or is it in need of reform? 
2. Based on your personal experience, have you felt an absence of Guidelines in 
relation to Art.6? Is a there a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6? 
3. (If the answer to the above question is in the affirmative) Do you think the 
Commission’s Guidance should be adopted or should Turkey publish its own? 
Within this context, what is your view of the draft Guidelines on the Assessment of 
Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings? (If the answer to the 
above question is in the negative) Why not? 
4. (Only if the answer to the second question is in the affirmative) What are the most 
problematic areas in the enforcement of Art.6 that should be addressed in 
Guidelines?  
5. (Only if the answer to the second question is in the affirmative) Do you see any 
problems that may constitute an obstacle to the application of Guidelines in relation 
to Art.6 in Turkey? Are you expecting any opposition in this respect, in particular 
from the appellate courts? 
6. Taking into account all associated costs and benefits, would it be beneficial in 
general for Turkey to issue Guidelines in relation to Art.6? 
Figure A shows the sequence of the main interview questions: 
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1. What is your opinion on the current state of case law on Art.6 in Turkey?  
Is it clear and consistent or is it in need of reform? 
2. Based on your personal experience, have you felt an absence of Guidelines in relation to 
Art.6? Is a there a need for Guidelines in relation to Art.6? 
 
(Negative) (Affirmative) 
3.   Do you think the Commission’s 
Guidance should be adopted or should 
Turkey publish its own? Within this 
context, what is your view of the draft 
Guidelines on the Assessment of Abusive 
Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant 
Undertakings?  
 
3.   Why not? 
4.   What are the most problematic areas in 
the enforcement of Art.6 that should be 
addressed in Guidelines? 
5.   Do you see any problems that may 
constitute an obstacle to the application of 
Guidelines in relation to Art.6 in Turkey? 
Are you expecting any opposition in this 
respect, in particular from the appellate 
courts? 
6. Taking into account all associated costs and benefits, would it be beneficial in general 
for Turkey to issue Guidelines in relation to Art.6? 
 
Figure A – The Sequence of Main Interview Questions 
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In addition to the abovementioned main interview questions, the following 
additional interview questions were asked to two specific interviewee groups: 
i. As a member of staff within the TCA, do you think Guidelines in relation to Art.6 
should be in the form of “enforcement priorities” as well, just as the Guidance? (to 
Group 1(b)) 
ii. How many replies have there been to the draft Guidelines on Art.6? What weight 
was attached to those replies? (to Group 1(c)) 
§. Explanation of the Interview Questions 
The first question was intended to be an opening question whereby the interviewees were 
asked to comment on the state of the existing case law on Art.6 and the enforcement of 
Art.6 in general. To limit the time the interviewees may need to think for their answers, this 
question was followed by a leading question. The leading question aimed to narrow the 
scope of the question to more concrete and focused answers. 
The second question aimed to discover the personal experience of the interviewees 
with regard to the subject matter of the thesis and to seek the professional opinion of the 
interviewees. Based on the answer to the second question, the interviewees were asked a 
different question as the third question. If their answer to the second question was in the 
negative, the interviewees were simply asked to provide reasons.  
If their answer to the second question was in the positive, the interviewees were 
asked to compare the Guidance with Turkey’s own Guidelines on Art.6 as to which would 
better suit to the needs of Turkish competition law. As a follow-up question, the 
interviewees were asked for their opinion on the draft Guidelines on Art.6, which later went 
into force, with a view to evaluating whether they mirrored the Guidance. However, as 
none of the respondents directly answered in the negative, all respondents were asked all of 
the main questions. 
The fourth question was a more open question whereby the interviewees were asked 
to list the areas they deemed as problematic in the enforcement of Art.6. The rationale 
behind this question was to point out the potential problems in the enforcement of this 
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Article so that they could be addressed when the TCA issued Guidelines in relation to 
Art.6. Therefore, this question aimed to seek practical knowledge which was often not 
available in published scholarly works. 
The fifth question was concerned with the future of Guidelines in relation to Art.6 
and the interviewees were asked to speculate in this respect. To help the interviewees to 
limit the scope of the question, as well as the time they needed to think, this question was 
followed by a leading question. The leading question aimed to narrow the scope of the 
question to more concrete and focused answers. 
The six and the last main interview question was intended to summarise the answers 
of the interviewees to the preceding questions whereby the interviewees were asked as to 
whether the issue of Guidelines in relation to Art.6 would be in general beneficial for 
Turkey. The question was simply answerable with a yes or no, but the interviewees were 
free to add whatever they thought was relevant. 
As for the additional interview questions, the first question was directed to Group 
1(b), namely competition experts who worked on Art.6 cases. The interviewees were asked 
for their opinion on the legal status of Guidelines in relation to Art.6 as to whether they 
should set enforcement priorities or simply be issued in the form of Guidelines. The 
interviewees within Group 1(b) were deemed as the most appropriate target that would 
provide accurate answers to this technical question as they were highly involved in the day 
to day enforcement of Art.6. 
The second additional interview question was directed to Group 1(c), namely the 
members of the commission who prepared the then draft Guidelines on Art.6. The 
interviewees were asked to provide information about the replies to the draft Guidelines on 
Art.6 during the public consultation and how they were evaluated by the TCA. As those 
members were given the task to work on the publication of the Guidelines on Art.6, 
naturally they were the most appropriate interviewees for this additional question. 
However, the second interview question was not used in the thesis. This is because 
replies to the public consultation of the draft Guidelines on Art.6 were not shared with 
public. Furthermore, the author’s request for information under the Right to Information 
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Act 2003 in relation to grant of access to such replies was rejected by the TCA with the 
letter no: 21267916-622-8899, dated 12/08/2014 due to issues of confidentiality. Without 
personally seeing and analysing the replies to the draft Guidelines and the issues raised by 
the respondents therein, the author then decided not to deal with this question in the thesis. 
§. Reporting of the Interview Data 
Based on the relevancy of the interview questions to the subject matter of the thesis 
chapters in question, the responses to the first three main interview questions and the first 
additional interview question were reported in Chapter 4 in Section “4.3 Guidelines on 
Art.6 in Practice”, while the responses to the last three interview questions were reported in 
Chapter 5, predominantly in Sections “5.2 Historical and Current Issues in the Enforcement 
of Art.6” and “5.3 The Future of the Guidelines on Art.6”. The vast amount of data was 
naturally reduced to what was of significance to the topic. 
To make the author’s personal involvement and bias less visible, significant 
substantive elements from the statements of the interviewees were picked out and inserted 
to the thesis in the form of direct quotations in the interviewees’ own words. Attention must 
be paid to the fact that due to the particular nature of qualitative data obtained from 
qualitative research interviews, the views of the respondents may not be necessarily 
representative. Table A summarises the responses of all interviewees to the main interview 
questions on a spreadsheet. 
All responses were anonymised throughout the thesis in line with the Consent Form 
which was duly signed by all interviewees. In incorporating the responses of the 
interviewees, the author preferred to use the date and place of interview rather than to 
assign each interviewee a letter or a number. In this author’s view, the latter approach 
would be liable to create an unnecessary complexity and could be problematic in terms of 
classification and anonymity, especially when there were few respondents in an interviewee 
group. Below is an example of the template that was used in footnotes to report the 
responses of the interviewees: 
“Anonymous interviewee, 20/02/2014, Ankara” 
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Attention must be paid to the fact that numbers were added to distinguish between 
different interviewees when more than one respondent was interviewed. The following 
references show that two different interviewees were interviewed on the same date: 
“Anonymous interviewee(1), 19/03/2014, Ankara” 
“Anonymous interviewee(2), 19/03/2014, Ankara” 
In cases where the interviewee decided to send their answers via e-mail, the date of 
interview was replaced with the word “email”. Below is an example of the template 
indicating such situation: 
 “Anonymous interviewee, 20/06/2014, (email)” 
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Table A - Record of Research Interviews 
 
 
Interviewee Date Place 1.Consistent? Clear? Reform? 
2.Need for 
Guidelines? 
3.Own 
version? 
5.Opposition? 6.Beneficial? 
1. Group 1(a) 20/02/2014 Ankara No - Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
2. Group 1(c) 21/02/2014 Ankara No - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3. Group 1(c) 21/02/2014 Ankara No - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
4. Group 1(a) 24/02/2014 Ankara - - - Yes Yes No Yes 
5. Group 1(a) 27/02/2014 Ankara No No No Yes Yes No Yes 
6. Group 2 28/02/2014 Ankara - - Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7. Group 1(c) 04/03/2014 Ankara No - Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
8. Group 1(b) 14/03/2014 Ankara No - Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
9. Group 1(b) 19/03/2014 Ankara No No - Yes Yes No Yes 
10. Group 1(b) 19/03/2014 Ankara No No - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
11. Group 1(b) 22/03/2014 Ankara - - - Yes Yes Yes Yes 
12. Group 1(c) 26/03/2014 Ankara - - - Yes Yes No Yes 
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13. Group 1(b) 03/04/2014 Ankara - No No Yes Yes No Yes 
14. Group 3 09/04/2014 Ankara Yes - - No Yes - No 
15. Group 3 09/04/2014 Ankara - - - No Yes - No 
16. Group 2 16/04/2014 Ankara No - Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
17. Group 1(b) 25/04/2014 Ankara No Yes - Yes Yes No Yes 
18. Group 4 25/04/2014 Ankara No - - Yes Yes No Yes 
19. Group 4 25/04/2014 Ankara No No No Yes No No Yes 
20. Group 2 05/06/2014 Istanbul No No - Yes Yes No Yes 
21. Group 2 19/06/2014 (email) No No Yes Yes Yes - Yes 
22. Group 1(a) 20/06/2014 (email) - - - Yes Yes No Yes 
23. Group 1(a) 10/07/2014 Ankara - - - Yes - No Yes 
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§. Analysis of the Interview Data 
As discussed above, the interview questions were designed in a semi-structured way that 
aimed to collect qualitative data. The interview questions purported to contribute 
thematically to knowledge production. The emphasis of the interviews was on exploration 
rather than on hypothesis testing: By approaching the interview data with an open attitude, 
the author did not address the data with a set of hypotheses to test or validate a theory. 
Because the participants were already grouped into different groups in the first place, no 
sub-categorisation or profile crafting was made when analysing the interview data. 
With the exception of the fourth interview question, the interview questions were mostly 
closed questions. Most of the time a simple yes/no provided the context, unless the 
interviewee decided to give reasons. The first and the fifth questions were followed by a 
leading question to maintain the relevancy of responses. Although the actual responses 
were unpredictable, the range of answers was in fact limited and there was not much room 
for diversity of answers. This facilitated the categorisation of answers.  
On the other hand, a thematic analysis was used for the fourth interview question which 
was a more open question compared to other questions. The key themes (the problematic 
areas in the enforcement of Art.6) that arose out of the responses of the interviewees were 
picked out and reported under different categories.  
Lastly, no computer-assisted qualitative data analysis software was used in reporting or 
analysing the interview data. With fewer than 30 responses, it was not efficient or effective 
to use such software. 
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ANNEX II – GUIDELINES ON THE ASSESSMENT OF ABUSIVE 
EXCLUSIONARY CONDUCT BY DOMINANT UNDERTAKINGS 
1. INTRODUCTION 
(1) Article 6 of the Act no 4054 on the Protection of Competition (Act) prohibits the abuse, by 
one or more undertakings, of their dominant position in a market for goods or services 
within the whole or a part of the country on their own or through agreements with others or 
through concerted practices, while the second paragraph of the same article lists certain 
instances of abuse as examples. 
(2) In the application of article 6 of the Act, it is not in itself an infringement for an 
undertaking to hold dominant position, and undertakings are allowed to become more 
prominent competitively as a result of their internal efficiencies. However, the Act prohibits 
any practice of dominant undertakings that may reduce consumer welfare by exploiting the 
advantages of the market power they enjoy. In this respect, dominant undertakings are 
considered to have a "special responsibility" not to allow their conduct to restrict 
competition.
1
 
(3) Preventing an undertaking holding dominant position in a market from abusing that 
dominance assists in the better functioning of the markets and the competition process to 
the benefit of businesses and consumers. However, in many cases, identifying the line 
between abusive and competitive conduct calls for detailed examination and assessment. 
These Guidelines were published in order to describe the factors the Competition Board 
(Board) shall take into consideration when assessing exclusionary abusive conduct by 
dominant undertakings under article 6 of the Act, to increase transparency, and thus to 
minimize the uncertainties that may arise in the interpretation of the article by the 
undertakings. To that end, the Guidelines are intended to be instructive not only for 
dominant undertakings in a market, but also for other undertakings such as their 
competitors, customers and suppliers.  
(4) Even though article 6 of the Act prohibits the abuse of dominant position by one or more 
undertakings on their own or through agreements with others or through concerted 
practices, these Guidelines only include explanations concerning abusive conduct 
committed by undertakings holding single dominant positions.  
                                                          
1
 See the Cine 5 decision of the 10th Chamber of the Council of State, numbered 2001/355 E., 2003/4245 K., 
as well as the Karbogaz decision of the Board numbered 05-80/1106-317. 
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(5) Abuses of dominant position are generally categorized in three groups: exclusionary, 
exploitative and discriminatory abuses. Article 6 of the Act no 4054 does not include such a 
categorization concerning types of abuse. As well, in practice it is not possible to 
completely separate such conduct from each other for every case under examination. In 
other words, a conduct examined by the Board may serve as an example for more than one 
item listed in paragraph 2 article 6 of the Act, or it may carry the characteristics of more 
than one category of abuse. The main focus of Board examinations is to determine, in an 
economic perspective, whether article 6 of the Act was violated; the conduct does not 
necessarily need to comply in full with one of the examples given in the article.  
(6) The scope of the Guidelines is limited to only exclusionary abuses at this stage. Examples 
of abuse given in the Guidelines include those principles which will provide guidance for 
undertakings based on the most frequent cases of abuse; they are not intended to be 
comprehensive. It should be noted that the principles set out in the Guidelines shall be 
implemented on a case by case basis, in light of the specific circumstances of each file. 
2. DOMINANT POSITION 
(7) In order for a particular conduct examined under article 6 of the Act to constitute an 
infringement, the undertaking engaged in the conduct must hold dominant position in the 
market and the conduct itself must be of an abusive nature. Where the absence of one of 
these fundamental factors may be demonstrated, the Board may choose not to perform 
analysis concerning the remaining factor.
2
 
(8) The concept of dominant position has been defined in article 3 of the Act no 4054 as "The 
power of one or more undertakings in a particular market to determine economic 
parameters such as price, supply, the amount of production and distribution, by acting 
independently of their competitors and customers". Within the framework of this definition, 
an undertaking with the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently from 
competitive pressure is considered to hold dominant position. Thus, an undertaking which 
can behave independently from competitive pressure is capable of profitably increasing its 
prices above the competitive level and maintain them at that level for a certain period of 
time.
3
 In addition, such an undertaking would also be able to keep other factors including 
the level of production and distribution, the variety and/or quality of goods and services and 
                                                          
2
 See the Board's Doğan Group TV Channels decision numbered 10-76/1569-604, Domino's Pizza decision 
numbered 10-69/1458-557, and GE Jenbacher decision numbered 11-57/1471-528.  
3
 While for the purposes of determination of dominant position the relevant period of time can vary depending 
on the characteristics of the product and market under examination, it is generally accepted that a two-year 
period would be sufficient.  
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the level of innovation below the competitive level to its own advantage and to the 
detriment of consumers.  
2.1. Market Definition 
(9) In order to determine whether an undertaking holds dominant position, first it is necessary 
to define the relevant market (or markets). The definition of relevant market constitutes the 
basis for the assessment concerning whether the examined undertaking has the power to 
behave, to an appreciable extent, independently from competitive pressures in the market. 
The identification of relevant market has two dimensions: product and geographical region. 
“Guidelines on the Definition of Relevant Market”4, offer guidance concerning the 
definition of relevant market within the framework of the application of the Act. Therefore, 
the Guidelines herein shall include the criteria to be used in determining dominant position 
concerning an undertaking in a relevant market defined in accordance with the 
aforementioned Guidelines, and shall not address details concerning relevant market 
definition.  
2.2. Determination of Dominant Position 
(10) When assessing dominant position, what is examined in principle is to what extent the 
undertaking examined can act independently of competitive pressure. In this assessment, 
the specific facts of each case are taken into account. The main factors taken into 
consideration in dominant position assessment are the positions of the undertaking 
examined and its competitors in the relevant market, barriers to entry and expansion in the 
market, and bargaining power of buyers. 
Market positions of the undertaking examined and its competitors: 
(11) For many relevant markets, the position of the undertaking examined in the relevant market 
is primarily indicated by the market share held by the undertaking. Depending on the nature 
of the activities under examination, market share is generally calculated based on the 
monetary value of sales or on sale volume. In its assessment, the Board can determine 
market share by taking the above criteria into account, together with one or more indicators 
such as capacity and reserve amounts depending on the characteristics of the market 
examined. 
(12) There is no specific market share threshold that proves an undertaking is dominant. 
However, the established practice of the Board, in the absence of any indication to the 
                                                          
4
 Guidelines on the Definition of Relevant Market, 10.01.2008, 
http://www.rekabet.gov.tr/dosyalar/kilavuz/kilavuz5.pdf  
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contrary, is to accept that undertakings holding less than 40% of the market share are less 
likely to be dominant,
5
 and more detailed examinations are conducted for undertakings with 
a higher market share.  
(13) In the first stage of this examination concerning actual competition, in addition to the 
market share of the undertaking concerned, the stability of this market share in time and the 
number and market shares of competitors operating in the relevant market are also taken 
into consideration. The larger and more stable the market share of the undertaking 
concerned, and the larger and more stable the differences between the market share of the 
undertaking concerned and those of its competitors, the less likely it will be for its current 
competitors to put competitive pressure on the undertaking concerned.  
(14) However, since market shares of undertakings are in constant fluctuation in tender markets, 
fast-growing markets and newly-established markets, it is not always possible to talk about 
market share stability and therefore market shares may cease to be a reliable indication for 
the market position of the undertaking. On the other hand, market shares are stronger 
indicators for saturated markets, which have an opposing structure.  
Barriers to entry and expansion: 
(15) The above-listed indicators concerning the existing state of competition in the market are 
not, by themselves, sufficient to determine dominance. Within that framework, the second 
step in dominant position assessment is to examine whether there are barriers to entry into 
the market for new undertakings or whether there are barriers to expansion for undertakings 
already operating in the market. This is because the likelihood of expansion of undertakings 
operating in the market or of entry into market by new undertakings can also exert 
competitive pressure on the behavior of the undertaking examined. However, in order to be 
able to talk about such a pressure, expansion or entry must be likely, it must be timely and 
it must be sufficient.  
(16) For entry or expansion to be likely, it must be sufficiently profitable for the relevant 
undertaking, taking into account factors such as the reactions of the undertaking examined 
and other competitors operating in the market, as well as the risks and costs of failure. For 
expansion or entry to be timely, it must be sufficiently swift to make it useless for the 
undertaking examined to exercise its economic power and deter the undertaking from 
exercising said power. For expansion or entry to be considered sufficient, it must be of such 
                                                          
5
 See the Board's Mediamarkt decision numbered 10-36/575-205, Pepsi Cola decision numbered 10-52/956-
335 and Egetek decision numbered 10-62/1286-487. However, the Board acknowledges that an undertaking 
with less than 40% market share may also hold dominant position depending on the specifics of the market 
under examination. See Electricity Distribution Privatization decision numbered 10-78/1645-609. 
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a magnitude as to be able to prevent any attempt to increase prices by the undertaking under 
examination. These conditions can only be realized when there are no barriers to entry or 
expansion in the market.  
(17) Barriers to entry or expansion may stem from the characteristics of the relevant market or 
from the characteristics or behavior of the undertaking examined. Barriers stemming from 
the characteristics of the relevant market can take the form of legal and administrative 
barriers such as state monopolies,
6
 authorization and licensing requirements
7
 and 
intellectual property rights, or they can be in the form of economic barriers such as sunk 
costs, economies of scale and scope, network effects, and switching costs faced by 
customers. 
(18) Barriers stemming from the characteristics of the undertaking in question include those 
cases where the undertaking possesses key inputs and access to special information, spare 
capacity, a vertically integrated structure, a strong distribution network and a large product 
portfolio, high brand recognition, and financial and economic power. Such characteristics 
of the examined undertaking can make market entry or expansion by competitors harder by 
providing advantages to the undertaking over its actual or potential competitors. 
(19) In addition to the characteristics of the undertaking concerned, its conduct in the market can 
also present barriers to entry for potential competitors or to expansion for actual 
competitors. Examples to such conduct include the undertaking making large-scale 
investments which existing or potential competitors would have to match and concluding 
long-term contracts which may lead to appreciable foreclosure effects in the market.  
(20) The existence of any of the factors listed as examples for barriers to entry and expansion 
may not be considered, by itself, an indicator for dominance. In dominant position analysis 
all such factors must be evaluated together, with the relevant market examined to see how 
suitable it is for entries by new undertakings as well as for expansion of existing ones, and 
how much competitive pressure would potential entries and expansions place on the 
conduct of the undertaking examined. 
Buyer power: 
(21) Factors affecting the conduct of an undertaking within the relevant market are not restricted 
to actual and potential competitors. In case customers of the undertaking examined are 
relatively large, sufficiently informed about alternative sources of supply and capable of 
                                                          
6
 See the Board's Belko decision numbered 01-17/150-39. 
7
 See the Board's Turkcell decision numbered 11-34/742-230.  
248 
 
 
switching to another supplier or creating their own supply within a reasonable period of 
time, then these customers may be said to have bargaining power, i.e. buyer power. In this 
case, buyer power of the customers will present as a competitive factor restricting the 
conduct of the undertaking examined and may prevent determination of dominant position 
for the undertaking. However, buyer power may be considered not to form sufficient 
competitive pressure if it only ensures that a limited segment of customers is shielded from 
the market power of the dominant undertaking.  
3. ABUSE 
(22) For a particular conduct examined under article 6 of the Act to be considered an 
infringement, not only the undertaking concerned must hold dominant position, but the 
conduct in question must have an abusive nature. Abuse may be defined as when a 
dominant undertaking takes advantages of its market power to engage in activities which 
are likely, directly or indirectly, to reduce consumer welfare. Abuse of dominant position 
by a dominant undertaking can lead to result that may harm consumer welfare including 
increases in prices, decreases in product quality and innovation level, and reduction in the 
variety of goods and services. This reduction in consumer welfare may emerge at the resale 
level or at the final consumer level.  
(23) Exclusionary abuses negatively affect efficient competition in the market and therefore lead 
to a decrease in consumer welfare. Such abuses may lead to foreclosure for rival 
undertakings as a result of the actions of the dominant undertaking against its competitors, 
and it may also lead to the exclusion of a certain portion of downstream undertakings from 
the market as a result of the actions of the dominant undertaking towards those of its 
customers which are not its competitors.  
(24) In the assessment of exclusionary conduct, in addition to the specific conditions of the 
conduct under examination, its actual or potential effects on the market should be taken into 
consideration as well. Such effects may emerge in the market where the undertaking is 
dominant, or they may emerge in other related markets.
8
 
(25) The basis of the Board evaluation on exclusionary conduct is the examination of whether 
the behavior of the dominant undertaking leads to actual or potential anti-competitive 
foreclosure. Anti-competitive foreclosure is the obstruction or prevention of access to 
sources of supply or markets for actual or potential competitors as a result of the conduct of 
the dominant undertaking, to the detriment of the consumers. Harm to consumers may 
                                                          
8
 See the Board's Türk Telekom decision numbered 12-10/328-98. 
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occur in the form of increased prices, decreased product quality and level of innovation, 
and reduced variety of goods and services.  
(26) When examining the presence of anti-competitive foreclosure, the Board, in general, takes 
the following points into account. The importance to be attached to the factors in question 
may vary on a case by case basis, depending on the nature of the conduct under 
examination. 
 The position of the dominant undertaking: In general, the stronger the dominant position, 
the higher is the likelihood of the conduct resulting in anticompetitive foreclosure.  
 The conditions in the relevant market: High barriers to entry and expansion increase the 
likelihood of the conduct under examination to foreclose the market. In that context, 
presence of entry and expansion conditions, such as economies of scale and/or scope and 
network effects are important. In case economies of scale exist, foreclosure of a significant 
part of the market by the dominant undertaking could make it harder for competitors to 
enter the market or stay in it. Similarly, abusive conduct may also allow the dominant 
undertaking to direct a market with network effects to its own advantage or in a way that 
would reinforce its own position. As well, high barriers to entry in the downstream and/or 
upstream markets may make it harder for competitors to overcome a potential foreclosure 
through vertical integration.  
 The position of the dominant undertaking's competitors: In some cases even a competitor 
with a relatively low market share can place competitive pressure on the dominant 
undertaking. For instance, a competitor whose products are close substitutes for the 
products offered by the dominant undertaking, who has an innovative reputation or who can 
cut prices systematically may be in such a position. Another factor to consider when 
assessing the positions of the competitors of the dominant undertaking is whether it is 
likely for the competitors in question to develop counterstrategies that may render the 
conduct of the dominant undertaking ineffective.  
 The position of the customers or suppliers: Another factor to examine in anticompetitive 
foreclosure analysis is whether the practice of the dominant undertaking has a selective 
nature. In some cases the dominant undertaking may target the practice under examination 
only to those customers or suppliers which have particular importance for the entry or 
expansion of competitors. Customers which can respond to offers from alternative 
suppliers, which have distribution methods suitable for new entrants, which are situated in a 
geographical region well-suited for new entry, or which are likely to affect the behavior of 
other customers may be considered to have particular importance. In terms of suppliers, 
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those who can be considered within this group are the suppliers with whom the dominant 
undertaking concluded exclusive agreements, or those who are more likely to respond to 
requests by customers who are competitors of the dominant undertaking in a downstream 
market, or those who manufacture the product type or in the region that is most suitable for 
a new entrant.  
 The scope and duration of the conduct examined: In general, the higher the percentage of 
sales affected by the conduct within the total sales in the relevant market, the longer its 
duration, and the more regularly it has been applied, the greater is the likelihood of market 
foreclosure.  
 Possible evidence of actual foreclosure: If the conduct has been maintained for a certain 
period of time, the market performance of the dominant undertaking and its competitors 
may provide direct evidence of anti-competitive foreclosure. For reasons attributable to the 
allegedly abusive conduct, the market share of the dominant undertaking may have risen or 
a decline in market share may have been slowed. For similar reasons, actual competitors 
may have been marginalized or may have exited, or potential competitors may have tried to 
enter and failed.  
 Direct or indirect evidence of exclusionary strategy: The intent of the dominant 
undertaking when it engaged in the conduct under examination may also be taken into 
consideration. Basically, the intent may be identified through indirect evidence gathered as 
a result of deductions from the conduct in question, as well as through the use of direct 
evidence. Direct evidence includes internal documents of an exclusionary strategy, such as 
a detailed plan to engage in certain conduct in order to exclude a competitor, to prevent 
entry or to pre-empt the emergence of a market, or evidence of concrete threats of 
exclusionary action. Direct and indirect evidence may be used in a complementary manner 
when analyzing the intent. 
(27) In certain cases, abuse may emerge through the pricing practices of the dominant 
undertaking. Even though strong price competition is beneficial for consumers in the short 
term in general, there is a chance of anti-competitive foreclosure as a result of certain 
pricing practices of dominant undertakings. When evaluating any such foreclosure, the 
Board examines whether it is likely for a hypothetical competitor that is as efficient as the 
dominant position (equally efficient competitor) to be foreclosed as a result of the conduct 
under examination. This assessment examines economic data on costs and sale prices and, 
in particular, whether the dominant undertaking has engaged in below-cost pricing. While 
conducting the examination in question, primarily the costs of the dominant undertaking are 
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taken into consideration. In case no reliable data on these costs is available, then cost data 
of competitors or other comparable reliable data may be utilized.  
(28) If, using these data, the Board determines that an equally efficient competitor can 
effectively compete with the pricing practices of a dominant undertaking, in principle it will 
not intervene based on the consideration that the practice in question does not have a 
negative effect on effective competition, and thus on consumers. However, if the analysis 
of the aforementioned data shows that the pricing of the dominant undertaking has the 
potential to foreclose equally efficient competitors, then the Board will integrate this 
determination in its general assessment of anti-competitive foreclosure, taking into account 
other relevant quantitative and/or qualitative evidence. 
(29) On the other hand, recognizing that in certain exceptional circumstances a less efficient 
competitor may also gradually achieve a position to exert competitive pressure on the 
dominant undertaking by utilizing demand-related advantages, such as network and 
learning effects, the Board may also assess the (potential) effect of the pricing practice on 
these undertakings.  
4. JUSTIFICATION 
(30) In the application of article 6 of the Act, the Board will also take into consideration any 
claims put forward by a dominant undertaking that its conduct is justified. Claims of 
justification examined by the Board may be classified under the categories of objective 
necessity and efficiency. 
(31) When assessing an objective necessity justification, the Board will first see whether the 
conduct protects a legitimate benefit and whether the conduct is indispensable for achieving 
the relevant benefit. As well, in order to consider the examined conduct objectively 
necessary, this conduct of the dominant undertaking must be caused by external factors 
(such as health and safety requirements set out by relevant public authorities) and the 
undertaking must not restrict competition more than necessary when protecting the benefit 
in question. The burden of proof for demonstrating that the conduct under examination is 
indispensable for protecting a legitimate benefit lies with the dominant undertaking. 
(32) When assessing the efficiency justification put forward by the undertaking under 
examination, the Board will expect the undertaking to prove that all four conditions listed 
below are fulfilled: 
 the efficiencies should be realized or likely to be realized as a result of the conduct, 
 the conduct should be indispensable to the realization of those efficiencies, 
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 the likely efficiencies brought about by the conduct should outweigh any possible negative 
effects on competition and consumer welfare in the affected markets, 
 the conduct should not eliminate effective competition by removing all or most existing 
sources of actual or potential competition. 
(33) Examples of justification for each type of abuse listed below are given separately in the 
relevant section. 
5. FORMS OF ABUSE 
(34) When assessing claims of abuse of dominant position, in addition to the general approach 
explained above, the Board will take the following factors concerning the conduct under 
examination.  
5.1. Refusal to Supply 
(35) In competition law practice, it is acknowledged, in principal, that any undertaking, whether 
dominant or not, have the right to freely choose the undertakings with which they will do 
business and dispose of the assets under their ownership. Nonetheless, in certain 
exceptional circumstances, a refusal to supply by a dominant undertaking may be 
considered as behavior with restrictive effects on competition, and the dominant 
undertaking may be placed under an obligation to supply, within the framework of 
competition law. 
(36) Introducing an obligation to supply on dominant undertakings will generally lead to short-
term benefits for consumers by increasing the number of undertakings active in the market. 
However, by preventing undertakings from receiving compensation for their investments 
and innovations, such an obligation imposed on dominant undertakings may pose the risk 
of causing a reduction in incentives for investment and innovation for both dominant 
undertakings and other undertakings and of leading to results to the detriment of consumers 
in the long-run.  
(37) Consequently, in its analysis concerning a refusal to supply by a dominant undertaking, the 
Board will take into account the short and long term effects of an obligation to supply 
together. 
(38) An undertaking's refusal to supply the goods or services it produces as well as tangible or 
intangible business inputs in its possession to other undertakings, or its direct or indirect 
refusal to allow other undertakings to use thereof are considered instances of refusal to 
supply. Within this framework, physical products in the nature of raw materials, 
infrastructure necessary for the provision of certain services, product distribution systems 
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and intangible business inputs or information protected or unprotected by intellectual 
property rights as well as other assets which undertakings may demand can be counted 
among the goods, services or inputs mentioned above.  
(39) Refusal to supply can take the form of halting an ongoing supply relationship concerning 
the goods, services or inputs, or it can be in the form of refusing the demands of potential 
customers for supply.  
(40) Refusal to supply may occur as unconditional or conditional refusal to supply. If the 
dominant undertaking refuses to supply without attaching any conditions, this is considered 
unconditional refusal. On the other hand, if it imposes certain conditions on the undertaking 
requesting the supply, such as not competing with the dominant undertaking in the 
downstream market or not dealing with an undertaking competing with the dominant 
undertaking, this is considered conditional refusal. Conduct under the scope of conditional 
refusal is generally an instrument for other competition infringements such as tying and 
exclusivity, and are therefore examined within the framework of those infringements. This 
section of the Guidelines will only deal with unconditional refusals.  
(41) Refusal to supply can be in the form direct refusal through the dominant undertaking 
refusing the request for supply without citing a reason, or in the form of "constructive 
refusal" through behavior including undue delays, restriction of product supply and 
imposition of unreasonable conditions.  
(42) As well, the practice of refusal to supply may be aimed at those undertakings which are 
rivals to the dominant undertaking in the downstream market, or at those customers are not 
in competition with it. In this instance, the concept of "downstream market" refers to the 
market for which the input demanded is needed for manufacturing a product or providing a 
service. In case the dominant undertaking is in competition with the undertaking it refused 
to supply in the downstream market, then the refusal to supply practice is more likely to 
lead restrictive effect on competition.  
(43) When assessing claims of refusal to supply, Board looks for the presence of all of the 
following three conditions in order to find a violation.
9
 Within this framework, 
 the refusal should relate to a product or service that is indispensable to be able to compete 
in a downstream market, 
 the refusal should be likely to lead to the elimination of effective competition in the 
downstream market, 
                                                          
9
 See the Board's Digiturk decision numbered 12-24/710-198.  
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 the refusal should be likely to lead to consumer harm. 
(44) When evaluating the indispensability condition, the Board tries to determine if the refused 
input is objectively necessary in order to compete effectively in the downstream market. 
This is the case where there is no actual or potential substitute for the refused input on 
which competitors in the downstream market could rely so as to counter – at least in the 
long term – the negative effects of the refusal. When assessing whether there are actual or 
potential substitutes for the relevant input, the Board considers whether the competitors of 
the dominant undertaking could effectively duplicate the input in question in the 
foreseeable future. In general, if the relevant input is the result of a natural monopoly, if 
there are significant network effects, or in case of information that can be acquired from a 
single source, it is generally concluded that the input in question is impossible for the 
competitors to duplicate. Nonetheless, the Board takes the dynamic structure of the market 
and the sustainability of the market power provided by the relevant input into account 
separately for each file.  
(45) The criteria listed in paragraph 43 apply both to cases of disruption of previous supply 
relationship and to refusals by the dominant undertaking to supply a good, service or input 
which has not previously provided. However, an infringement is more likely in case of the 
disruption of a current supply arrangement. For instance, specific to the supply relationship 
established with the dominant undertaking, the customer may have made an investment to 
use the input it would procure under the arrangement concerned. This would be taken into 
account as an important factor in identifying the relevant input as indispensable. Also, the 
fact that the dominant undertaking previously supplied the input in question may be 
considered an indication that supplying the product does not constitute a risk that the 
undertaking would be unable to receive sufficient compensation for its initial investment.  
(46) Where it is established that the refused input fulfills the indispensability condition, the 
Board evaluates whether a refusal to supply by the dominant undertaking is likely to 
eliminate effective competition in the downstream market immediately or over time. The 
larger the share of the dominant undertaking in the downstream market, the greater the 
likelihood of elimination of effective competition in the downstream market will be. In 
addition, if the dominant undertaking has less capacity-constraints relative to competitors in 
the downstream market and if the goods or services it produces are close substitutes for 
those of its competitors in the downstream market, the likelihood for elimination of 
competition in the downstream market will increase. This is due to the fact that, in this 
case, the proportion of competitors affected by the refusal to supply will increase, as will 
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the level of demand that will shift from the foreclosed competitors to the dominant 
undertaking.  
(47) In examining the likelihood of a refusal to supply to lead to consumer harm, it is examined 
whether, for consumers, the negative consequences of the refusal to supply in the relevant 
market outweigh the negative consequences to be created over time by imposing an 
obligation to supply. For instance, consumer harm may be likely where, as a result of the 
dominant undertaking's refusal to supply, competitors are prevented from bringing 
innovative goods or services to market and/or where the refusal behavior stifles follow-on 
innovation. This may be particularly the case where the competitor which requests supply 
does not intend to limit itself to the goods or services already offered by the dominant 
undertaking, but aims to produce new or improved goods or services for which there is 
potential demand or where the competitor is likely to contribute to technical development. 
Similarly, in assessing consumer harm, it is also taken into consideration whether a refusal 
to supply would allow the dominant undertaking to gain more profits in the downstream 
market than it would normally do. 
(48) In addition to the co-existence of the three conditions listed above, the Board will also 
consider claims of justification put forward by the undertaking. Issues which may be 
considered objective necessity include those cases where the undertaking requesting supply 
lacks commercial credibility, where the supply is temporarily or permanently halted due to 
capacity constraints, or where certain safety requirements could not be met.  
(49) On the other hand, the claim that the dominant undertaking would not realize adequate 
returns sufficient to compensate its investment in case it agreed to supply, that the dominant 
undertaking would need to exploit the input refused for a certain period of time in order to 
continue its investments or otherwise the incentives to invest would be negatively affected 
can be evaluated within the context of the efficiency defense.  
5.2. Predatory Pricing 
(50) Predatory pricing is an anti-competitive pricing strategy whereby a dominant undertaking, 
with a view to maintain or strengthen its market power, accepts incurring losses (sacrifices 
profits) by setting a below-cost sales price in the short-term, in order to foreclose or 
discipline one or more of its actual or potential competitors, or otherwise prevent their 
competitive behavior. In predatory pricing, even though consumers enjoy low prices in the 
short-term, competition constraints can lead to undesired consequences in the mid- and 
long-term, such as high prices, low quality and a decrease in consumer choice.  
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(51) In predatory pricing analysis, which compares the price implemented by the dominant 
undertaking with the costs incurred with respect to the conduct under examination, the 
Board evaluates whether the conduct in question is likely to lead to market foreclosure for 
an equally efficient competitor.
10
 
(52) The first phase of the predatory pricing analysis of the Board is the assessment of whether 
the dominant undertaking sacrificed in the short-term with its pricing practice. If, by 
charging a lower price for all or a particular part of its output over the relevant time period, 
the dominant undertaking incurred or is incurring losses that could have been avoided, this 
will be considered a sacrifice. Accordingly, the criterion of average avoidable cost (AAC)
11
 
may be used in determining whether a dominant undertaking incurred avoidable losses as a 
result of its conduct under examination. 
(53) If the dominant undertaking sets a price below AAC for all or part of its output, it is 
incurring a loss that could be avoided by not producing that output. Therefore, failing to 
meet AAC indicates that the dominant undertaking sacrificing in the short-term and 
suggests that an equally efficient competitor would be unable to serve the targeted 
customers without incurring losses.  
(54) Another cost criterion that can be used by the Board in predatory pricing assessment under 
certain exceptional circumstances in light of the conditions of the relevant market is the 
long-run average incremental cost (LRAIC).
12
 LRAIC is generally higher than AAC 
because unlike AAC (which only includes fixed costs incurred within the examined 
period), LRAIC also includes fixed costs related to the product under examination, incurred 
in the period before the asserted abusive conduct. Where LRAIC is used as the relevant cost 
                                                          
10
 For exceptions see paragraph 29. 
11
 AAC may be defined as the costs an undertaking would avoid or save if had not produced a discrete amount 
of output. When calculating AAC, the sum of all variable and fixed costs directly related to production can be 
taken into account in order to calculate all costs incurred by the business for the production under 
examination. Since it is only possible to avoid variable costs in the short-term, in most cases AAC and 
average variable cost (AVC) will be the same. However, in cases where the dominant undertaking must make 
additional investment in capacity in order to implement the conduct under examination, the fixed costs in 
question are also taken into account in cost calculation. In such cases AAC is a more suitable criterion than 
AVC. 
12
 LRAIC, on the other hand, is the average of all (fixed and variable) costs a firm incurs to manufacture a 
product. Average total cost (ATC) and LRAIC are good proxies for each other. In fact, these two types of 
costs are the same for single product firms. On the other hand, for multi-product firms, LRAIC may be below 
ATC for each individual product, where economies of scope are a factor. In the case of multiple products, any 
costs that could have been avoided by not producing a particular product cannot be considered common costs. 
However, in situations where common costs are significant, such costs may also be taken into account in the 
assessment concerning the exclusion of an equally efficient company. It may be said that LRAIC is a more 
suitable criterion for those markets with very low variable costs and very high fixed costs, such as network 
industries, technology markets and markets that require high R&D investments.  
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criterion, failing to meet LRAIC shows that the dominant undertaking did not recoup all 
costs concerning the production of the good or service in question and an equally efficient 
competitor can be foreclosed. Where the price is above LRAIC, the conduct of the 
dominant undertaking will not be considered predatory pricing, since equally efficient 
competitors will be able to continue their operations without incurring losses.  
(55) In assessing the existence of sacrifice in the dominant undertaking's conduct, it may be 
possible to rely upon direct evidence such as a detailed plan belonging to the undertaking in 
question to sacrifice, which aims to exclude a competitor, to prevent entry or to pre-empt 
the emergence of a market. 
(56) In predatory pricing analysis, when evaluating whether the pricing practice of the dominant 
undertaking is likely to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure, factors other than those listed 
in paragraph 26 may be examined, in addition to the establishment of short-term sacrifice. 
For instance, if the dominant undertaking is better informed about cost or other market 
conditions, it may engage in predatory conduct so as to influence the expectations of 
potential entrants and thereby deter entry. If the targeted competitor is dependent on 
external financing, substantial price decreases or other predatory conduct by the dominant 
undertaking could adversely affect the competitor's performance so that its access to further 
financing may be undermined. In addition, if the conduct and likely effects are felt on 
multiple markets and/or when there are various attempts at entry, the dominant undertaking 
may be said to be seeking a reputation for predatory conduct within the market. 
(57) It is necessary for competitors to have actually exited the market for the Board to conclude 
that there has been anti-competitive foreclosure through predatory pricing. The possibility 
should not be excluded that the dominant undertaking may prefer to prevent the competitor 
from competing efficiently and instead have it follow the dominant undertaking's pricing, 
rather than eliminate it from the market altogether. Such disciplining conduct avoids the 
risk of driving competitors out of the market, in particular the risk that the assets of the 
competitor are sold at a low price, allowing a new entrant into the market with low costs. 
(58) Generally speaking, if the dominant undertaking is expected have greater market power 
after it concludes its predatory conduct than it did before the conduct in question, then the 
undertaking is considered to be in a position to benefit from the sacrifice and thus consumer 
harm is likely. However, this does not mean that the Board will only intervene if the 
dominant undertaking gains the ability to increase its prices above the level persisting 
before the conduct. For instance, it is sufficient for the identification of consumer harm that 
the conduct would be likely to prevent or delay a decline in prices that would otherwise 
have occurred.  
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(59) Since selectively targeting only certain customers for below-cost prices would limit the 
losses incurred by the dominant undertaking, it may be easier for it to engage in predatory 
conduct in this way. 
(60) In general it is considered unlikely that predatory conduct will create efficiencies. However, 
provided that the conditions set out in Section 4 are fulfilled, the Board will consider claims 
by a dominant undertaking that the low pricing enables it to achieve economies of scale and 
ensure efficiencies related to expanding the market.  
5.3. Price/Margin Squeeze 
(61) Price squeeze occurs when an undertaking active in vertically related markets that is 
dominant in the upstream market sets the margin between the prices of the upstream and 
downstream products at a level which does not allow even an equally efficient competitor 
in the downstream market to trade profitably on a lasting basis.
13
 The undertaking dominant 
in the upstream may cause margin squeeze by increasing the price for the upstream product, 
by decreasing the price for the downstream product, or by doing both simultaneously. Thus, 
the dominant undertaking is able to transfer its market power over the upstream product to 
the downstream market and lead to the restriction of competition.  
(62) In determining the likelihood of the conduct under examination leading to anti-competitive 
foreclosure by price squeeze, the Board takes the following factors into account, in addition 
to those listed in paragraph 26: 
- Structure of the undertaking: The undertaking must be active in upstream and downstream 
markets that are connected to each other in a production chain; i.e., it must have an 
integrated structure and form a single economic entity.  
- Nature of the product: The upstream product must be indispensable for operating in the 
downstream market.
14
  
- Position of the undertaking in the relevant market(s): The undertaking must hold dominant 
position in the upstream market. On the other hand, even though the Board does not look 
for dominance in the downstream market, this may be taken into consideration as a factor 
that compounds the restrictive effects of the price squeezing behavior on competition.  
- Margin between prices: The margin between the upstream and downstream products must 
be so low as to ensure that a competitor that is as efficient as the undertaking dominant in 
the upstream market would be unable to profit and operate in the downstream market on a 
                                                          
13
 See the Board's TTNET price squeeze decision numbered 08-65/1055-411. 
14
 For indispensability criterion see para. 46. 
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lasting basis. When establishing the costs of the equally efficient competitor, the Board will 
generally use LRAIC, calculated for the downstream product of an undertaking dominant in 
the upstream market.
15
  
(63) The Board considers justification claims put forward by the vertically integrated 
undertaking concerning the price squeeze. Within this context, in particular, claims that the 
asserted strategy is caused by market conditions, that the margins shrunk due to changes in 
the upstream supply and downstream demand, and/or that the lower-priced product is 
newly-launched may be taken into consideration as justifications. 
5.4. Exclusivity/Single Branding Agreements 
(64) Exclusivity agreements are agreements which place a buyer under an obligation to purchase 
the entirety or a significant portion of its demand for a product or group of products only 
from a single supplier.
16
 These agreements may be examined under article 6 of the Act if 
the supplier holds a dominant position.
17
 In this context, a written agreement between the 
dominant undertaking and the buyer including an exclusivity provision is not necessary; 
oral agreements and/or dominant undertaking practices which may lead to de facto
18
 
exclusivity (such as various obligations placed on the buyer or indirect provisions in 
agreements) are also evaluated within this framework. 
(65) Agreements with exclusive provisions may have positive effects on competition. The first 
of these pro-competitive effects is the elimination of the free-riding problem. For instance, 
any inclination of a supplier to provide training for the personnel of its distributor in order 
to increase its sales and/or make its distribution chain more efficient may be eliminated if it 
is likely that its competitor might take unfair advantage of that training (free-riding 
problem). However, if the distributor were to sell the products of the supplier exclusively, 
this problem would disappear. Another positive effect of exclusivity is that it ensures a 
regular product flow for the buying undertaking while providing a steady sales channel for 
the supplier. As well, exclusivity agreements increase the likelihood of the supplier making 
                                                          
15
 When calculating the aforementioned LRAIC, it is assumed that that undertaking dominant in the upstream 
market uses its upstream product at the same price it sells that product to its competitors downstream.  
16
 As the definition implies, exclusivity agreements are concluded between undertakings operating at different 
levels of the production chain (production, input supply, wholesales, distribution, retail sales, etc.). The 
commercial relationship with the end-user/consumer is not addressed within this framework. In addition, 
exclusivity agreements also include agreements a buyer holding dominant position signs with an input 
supplier, which places that input supplier under an obligation to make the entirety or a significant portion of 
its sales to the dominant undertaking.  
17
 Exclusivity agreements may be addressed under the scope of article 4 of the Act.  
18
 See the Board's Turkcell decision numbered 11-34/742-230. 
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investments specific to the trade relationship. This is because exclusivity contributes to the 
return of investment process for the supplier as well as to the elimination of the hold-up 
problem,
19
 especially as its duration extends.
20
 In addition, exclusivity agreements may 
contribute to the competitive process and consumer welfare by focusing the buyer on a 
single product/brand and allowing it to make more effective promotions, by establishing a 
more robust inter-brand competition environment, and thus by ensuring an increase in 
product and service quality.  
(66) On the other hand exclusivity agreements signed by a dominant undertaking also have 
restricting effect on competition. By preventing the access of (actual and potential) 
competitors to necessary channels, exclusivity agreements foreclose relevant market(s) and 
thus may restrict the likelihood that other firms might emerge as an efficient competitor for 
the dominant undertaking.  
(67) Even though factors listed in paragraph 26, such as the positions of the dominant 
undertaking and its competitors and the duration of the conduct examined,
21
 are important 
in identifying (potential) anti-competitive foreclosure effects stemming from exclusive 
agreements, other factors considered during the assessment are as follows: 
- The scope of the conduct under examination: Foreclosure effects of exclusive agreements 
increase as the exclusive portion of the dominant undertaking's sales within the total sales 
in the market, i.e. tied market share, increases. In particular, anti-competitive effects 
increase if tied market share is sufficiently high to prevent a competing firm from operating 
efficiently by taking advantage of economies of scale However, if the dominant 
undertaking implements exclusivity only for important (in that they are financially strong or 
their place of business is critical in terms of location) buyers (that is to say, in case it selects 
important buyers), anti-competitive foreclosure effects may still arise even in the absence 
of significant tied market share. 
- The level of trade: A dominant undertaking introducing exclusivity arrangements for a 
buyer at the retail level may lead to more anti-competitive foreclosure effects in 
comparison to the situation where the buyer is at the wholesale level. In other words, the 
closer the level of trade with exclusivity to the end-user, the more likely it will be for the 
relevant market to be foreclosed to actual or potential competitors.  
                                                          
19
 For detailed information on the hold-up problem, see the Guidelines on Vertical Agreements, p.32. 
20
 For an example to the Board decisions assessing investments specific to the trade relationship, see the 
Karbogaz decision numbered 05-80/1106-317. 
21
 See the Board's Karbogaz decision numbered 05-80/1106-317 and Frito Lay decision numbered 06-24/304-
71.  
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- Barriers to entry: The harder it is for rival suppliers to access alternative buyers and/or 
create new buyer channels, the more severe will be the foreclosure effect of the dominant 
undertaking's exclusive arrangements in the market. Barriers to entry also gain importance 
for the assessment since they make it more difficult for potential competitors to emerge as 
efficient competitors.  
- The importance of the dominant undertaking for customers and the duration of exclusivity: 
If the dominant undertaking and its rivals can compete for the entirety of each consumer's 
demand under equal conditions, it is not considered likely for exclusive purchase provisions 
to have negative effects on competition. However, in such cases, a long duration of 
exclusivity may negatively affect competition by making it harder for customers to switch 
suppliers. On the other hand, if the dominant undertaking is an unavoidable trading partner 
for a significant part of the customers' demand,
22
 even a short-term exclusivity provision 
may lead to anti-competitive foreclosure.  
(68) Claims of justification put forward by the dominant undertaking in regard to exclusivity 
agreements are considered by the Board in its assessments. Within the framework of 
exclusivity, the presence of relationship-specific investments, the reductive effect of 
exclusive arrangements on costs or their positive contribution to innovation, etc. may be 
taken into consideration as claims of justification.  
5.5. Rebate Systems 
(69) Rebate systems refer to the discounts in price offered to customers in return for them 
engaging in a certain purchasing behavior. Under the dynamic conditions of commercial 
life, rebate systems can be encountered in many different forms and they may vary 
depending on their structure, function and effect.  
(70) The most fundamental distinction in the classification of rebate systems is between single-
product rebates and package rebates. If, in a rebate system, discounts are tied to the 
purchase of a single product, such rebates are considered to be "single-product rebates". 
However, if the purchasing obligation of the rebate system covers more than one product or 
market, then the rebates in question are referred to as "package rebates".
23
 Rebate systems 
are also classified into retroactive rebates and top-slice rebates, depending on the scope of 
                                                          
22
 In case a customer is obligated to make a portion of its purchases from the dominant undertaking under any 
circumstances, then the dominant undertaking is considered an unavoidable trading partner for the customer 
in question.  
23
 In package rebates known as multi-product rebate or mixed packaging, the products may be offered for sale 
separately, however when they are bought separately the total price of the products adds up to more than the 
package price. Rebates which are offered depending on the customer purchasing at least two distinct products 
or purchasing a certain amount from the market in a certain time period are also considered package rebates.  
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the discount. Rebate systems in which the customer can get discounts for all of its 
purchases from the undertaking offering the rebate within the relevant period if it hits the 
rebate target are called "retroactive rebates," while rebate systems in which the customer 
can only get discounts for its purchases over the rebate target are called "top-slice rebates".  
(71) Rebate systems may include standard purchase target(s) applicable to all customers, or they 
may include purchase targets individualized depending on the demand of each customer.
24
 
If a purchase target applicable to all customers serves the same function as an 
individualized purchase target for a certain group of customers, the target in question is 
considered to be individualized for those customers.  
(72) Rebate systems, which see common use in commercial life, can have effects that can 
increase efficiency and consumer welfare, such as ensuring price drops, increasing level of 
output and product variety, reducing transaction costs stemming from the separate sale of 
products, and preventing free-riding by ensuring that resellers focus on the products of the 
supplier. On the other hand, when offered by dominant undertakings, the rebates in 
question may also lead to anti-competitive foreclosure.  
(73) When assessing whether a rebate system implemented by a dominant undertaking is likely 
to cause anti-competitive foreclosure, the Board will consider the following factors, in 
addition to those listed in paragraph 26.  
Single-Product Rebates 
(74) The typical characteristic of single-product rebates is that the purchase condition included 
in the rebate system must be fulfilled within a certain period (reference period). In such 
rebates, no discount is awarded if the purchase condition required for the rebate is not 
fulfilled within the relevant reference period. Whereas, in rebate systems which do not limit 
the purchase condition to a certain period, buyers do not face the risk of losing the discount 
due to the expiry of the reference period. Therefore, buyers can always switch to rival 
suppliers offering more attractive deals than the dominant undertaking, so long as the 
system does not turn into predatory pricing. Within this framework, the Board will examine 
those rebate systems which include a certain purchase condition but do not limit the 
fulfillment of that condition to a certain reference period in light of the above clarifications 
on predatory pricing. 
                                                          
24
 Individualized purchase targets may be formulized in various ways. For instance, such a purchase target 
may be a quantity target identified depending on the total demand of the customer in a certain period, or it 
may be identified as a portion of the purchases the customer will make in a certain period or as a portion of 
the purchases the customer made in a reference period in the past. 
263 
 
 
(75) It is more likely for retroactive rebates to cause anti-competitive foreclosure where rebate 
targets are individualized, where the rebate percentage and rebate target constitute a 
significant part of the total demand of the consumer within the relevant reference period, 
and particularly where the competitors of the dominant undertaking are unable to compete 
with it under equal conditions for the entirety of each customer's demand 
(76) If any customer must meet a part of its demand in the reference period from the dominant 
undertaking in any case, then the competitors will not be able to compete with the dominant 
undertaking under equal conditions for the entirety of the demand of the customer in 
question. By offering a retroactive rebate to such a customer, a dominant undertaking can 
prevent equally efficient competitors from selling to the said customer without dropping its 
prices below its costs.
25
 The basis of the Board's assessment concerning retroactive rebates 
is the examination of whether, in response to the rebate, equally efficient competitors 
would be able to effectively compete with the dominant undertaking for the contestable 
portion of the customer's demand.  
(77) Within this framework, if it is established that, in response to a retroactive rebate offered by 
the dominant undertaking, the price competitors would have to offer in order to attract the 
contestable portion of the customers (effective price) is above LRAIC, it will be concluded 
that, for the customers in question, equally efficient competitors will be able to effectively 
compete with the dominant undertaking. However, in case it is established that the effective 
price is below AAC, then the conclusion is that the rebate system implemented excludes 
equally efficient competitors from competing for the customers in question. In case the 
effective price is established to be between AAC and LRAIC, the Board examines whether 
the rebate system has negative effects on the entry or expansion of equally efficient 
competitors. In this context, the Board examines whether competitors have realistic and 
effective counter-strategies to counter the rebate system implemented. For instance, 
strategies which allow the competitors to counter the discounts of the dominant undertaking 
without resorting to below-cost pricing, by utilizing the non-contestable portion of their 
                                                          
25
 That is to say, even if, in response to the rebate implementation of the dominant undertaking, competing 
undertakings were to offer the customer, who must fulfill the non-contestable portion of its demand in the 
relevant period from the dominant undertaking in any case, rebates for the contestable portion of its demand 
equal to the discounted prices of the dominant undertaking, the customer would continue to purchase from the 
dominant undertaking in order not to lose the rebates for its purchases, at least until it hits its rebate target. In 
this case, in order to convince the customer to buy from them, competing undertakings would, within a 
relatively limited sales volume, need to offer a price that would meet the dominant undertaking's rebate for 
the relevant units and that would, at the same time, compensate the amount of rebates the customer would 
lose due to buying from them instead of the dominant undertaking. Consequently, to be able to sell to a 
customer in a retroactive rebate system, competing undertakings must offer a price that is sufficiently below 
the discounted price of the dominant undertaking.  
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own customers' demand may be considered within this framework. If the Board finds that 
competing undertakings are unable to put such a counter-strategy into effect, it concludes 
that the rebate system under examination excludes equally efficient competitors. 
(78) It is possible to address top-slice rebates as a pricing strategy where low prices are 
implemented only for a portion of the sales. In examining such discounts, the Board looks 
at whether equally efficient competitors are excluded from competition for the units above 
the rebate target. This examination is conducted based on the price-cost analysis given in 
paragraph 77.  
Package rebates  
(79) The Board's assessments concerning the restrictive effects of package rebates on 
competition may vary depending on the package offered by the dominant undertaking, and 
on whether competitors can (either alone or together with other competitors) compete by 
offering a reasonable alternative package. Restrictive effects on competition which are 
likely to emerge where competition between packages is possible would be similar to 
predatory pricing.  
(80) Where the rebate implemented for the whole package is attributed to any individual product 
within the package, if the effective price for the product in question
26
 is lower than LRAIC 
for the same product, it is concluded that equally efficient competitors are excluded from 
competition by the rebate implementation.  
(81) When assessing rebate systems, the Board considers justification claims put forward by 
undertakings, such as increasing output level and product variety, reducing transaction 
costs stemming from buying the products separately, and preventing free-riding by ensuring 
that reseller are focused on the products of the supplier.  
5.6. Tying 
(82) Tying usually refers to situations where customers that purchase one product (the tying 
product) from the dominant undertaking are required also to purchase another product (the 
tied product) from the same undertaking as well. Tying can be implemented by integrating 
what may be recognized as two separate products (technical tying) or through contracts 
(contractual tying).  
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 In package sales, effective price for the relevant product is calculated by subtracting the rebate offered for 
the whole package from the individual sale price of the product concerned. 
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(83) In most cases tying is a common commercial practice with no restrictive effects on 
competition. Both dominant undertakings and others may engage in tying in order to 
present better products to their customers or to offer less costly choices.  
(84) On other hand, a dominant undertaking can harm consumers by causing foreclosure in the 
tied market. This is because through tying, the dominant undertaking can drive existing 
competitors from the market by reducing the number of potential customers and create new 
barriers to entry for its competitors in the tied market. 
(85) Foreclosing the tied market would allow the dominant undertaking to make higher profits 
from that market, and it would also strengthen or maintain its dominant position in the 
tying market.  
(86) When assessing whether the practice of an undertaking with dominant position in the tying 
market is in violation of the Act, the Board looks for the presence of two factors: 
- the tying product and the tied product should be distinct, 
- it should be likely for the tying practice to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure.  
(87) If, in the absence of the tying practice, a significant portion of the customers would 
purchase or would have purchased the tying product without purchasing the tied product, 
the Board considers these products to be distinct. When determining whether the tied and 
tying products are distinct, the Board may use direct evidence showing that customers buy 
the products separately when given a choice, or it may use indirect evidence such as the 
presence of undertakings in the market which are specialized in the production or sales of 
the tied product without the tying product.  
(88) As stated above, tying may lead to anti-competitive foreclosure in the tying market, in the 
tied market, or both. When determining the likelihood of a tying practice implemented by 
the dominant undertaking to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure, the Board will take the 
following factors into consideration in addition to those listed in article 26. 
(89) The risk of anti-competitive foreclosure stemming from the conduct is greater where the 
dominant firm makes the strategy in question a lasting one. Technical tying, which is costly 
to reverse, may be given as an example to this.  
(90) In some tying cases the undertaking may have dominant position in more than one product. 
As the number of such products subject to tying increases the likelihood of anti-competitive 
foreclosure increases as well.  
(91) Where the production of the tied product benefits from economies of scale, it may become 
likely for competitors in the tied product market to lose customers which purchase the tying 
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product and fail to achieve sufficient sales to realize economies of scale. This, in turn, 
would indicate that anti-competitive foreclosure is more likely, for the purposes of the 
assessment of the Board. 
(92) If the prices the dominant undertaking can charge in the tying market are regulated, tying 
may allow the dominant undertaking to raise prices in the tied market in order to 
compensate for the loss of revenue caused by the regulation in the tying market. 
(93) If the tied product is an important complementary product for customers of the tying 
product, a reduction of alternative suppliers of the tied product and hence a reduced 
availability of that product can make entry to the tying market alone more difficult. 
(94) The Board may consider and include in its analysis arguments of the dominant undertaking 
engaging in the tying conduct, which claim that the practice ensures production and 
distribution savings to the benefit of customers, that it reduces transaction costs for 
customers who otherwise would have to buy the bundled products separately, and that it 
allows the supplier to pass on to the consumers any efficiencies stemming from the 
production or purchase of the tied products in large numbers. 
